University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
2020

Unruly Mountains: Competing Visions For China’s Inner Asian
Highland, 1368-1600
Xiaobai Hu
University of Pennsylvania

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Asian History Commons, and the Asian Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Hu, Xiaobai, "Unruly Mountains: Competing Visions For China’s Inner Asian Highland, 1368-1600" (2020).
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 4258.
https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/4258

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/4258
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Unruly Mountains: Competing Visions For China’s Inner Asian Highland,
1368-1600
Abstract
This dissertation uses the analytical tool of “competing visions” to examine the historical development of
China’s Inner Asian highland from 1368 to 1600. Straddling the Chinese heartland, Tibetan plateau, and
the Mongol steppe, the highland region was a convergence zone that facilitated a constant flow of people,
goods, and knowledge. Competing visions over the highland, as both historical phenomena and research
perspective, highlight the dynamic nature of the region and its function as a bridge for cross-cultural
encounters and transregional geopolitical interactions. By investigating how and why different social
groups understood the highland differently, this dissertation scrutinizes the operating mechanism of a
borderland society and its role in macroregional geopolitics. Focusing on material exchanges, knowledge
circulations, border-crossings, and contestations over territoriality through the lens of Ming emperors,
highland regime lords, Tibetan Buddhist monks, Ming military deserters, and Mongol nomads, this
dissertation highlights the formation of a borderland space as the outcome of constant compromise and
negotiation. This dissertation argues that the conflict of ideas and agendas in the highland provided the
driving force not only for the formation of its political-economic landscape, social structure, and humanenvironment relations, but also the transformation of the highland from a middle ground where multiple
territorial perceptions co-existed into a demarcating frontier between Ming China and the Inner Asian
world.

Degree Type
Dissertation

Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Graduate Group
History

First Advisor
Siyen Fei

Keywords
Inner Asian Highland, Ming China, Mountain society, Sino-Tibetan Borderland

Subject Categories
Asian History | Asian Studies | History

This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/4258

UNRULY MOUNTAINS:
COMPETING VISIONS FOR CHINA’S INNER ASIAN HIGHLAND, 1368-1600

Xiaobai Hu

A DISSERTATION
in
History
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania
in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
2020

Supervisor of Dissertation
___

______

Siyen Fei
Associate Professor of History

Graduate Group Chairperson

____

_________

Peter Holquist, Ronald S. Lauder Endowed Term Associate Professor of History

Dissertation Committee
Christopher P. Atwood, Professor of East Asian Languages and Civilizations
Frederick R. Dickinson, Professor of History
Siyen Fei, Associate Professor of History

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Many people would agree that the pursuit of a Ph.D. is similar to taking a journey:
there is tiredness, there are annoying surprises, there are doubts sometimes, but there
is also beautiful scenery. Journeys are always full of memories, good and bad, but it is
exactly such experiences that make the journey unforgettable. I still remember the
first day of my journey, August 19th, 2015, when I landed at Newark Airport on a
breezy afternoon. That was my first time traveling outside of Asia. But I was not a
relaxed tourist taking a short vacation; instead, I was a nervous prospective Ph.D.
student about to be challenged at one of the most prestigious universities in the world.
I felt I was not ready for anything—a feeling that I have now for my future. But I
have come to find that it is just this kind of uncertainty that makes a journey, be it
academic or not, intriguing and appealing.
This dissertation would not have been feasible without the generous support,
advice, honest critique, and friendship of many scholars, friends, and family
members. First, from the bottom of my heart I would like to express my thanks for the
members of my dissertation committee. I am deeply grateful for Prof. Siyen Fei’s
constant encourgement and tough love over the years. Prof. Fei’s honest approach to
learning and teaching—and life in general—will serve as an invaluable model to me
for the rest of my career. Prof. Christopher Atwood familiarized me with the
historiography of the Inner Asian world and has played the important but thankless
role of devil’s advocate by challenging me to refine my arguments and rethink my
assumptions. Prof. Frederick Dickinson has always been generous with his time. He
sets a high standard for what makes a good teacher and educator.

iii
I would also like to express my gratitude and appreciation for those who have
helped me throughout my journey. I am grateful to Prof. Peter Holquist and my HIST
700 friends for their warm welcome and help that allowed me to familiarize with the
US-style academic world; I am indebted to Prof. Gray Tuttle and the Khorlo group of
Columbia University who have taught me so much about Tibetology; I really
appreciate Prof. Paul Smith’s help, encouragement and mentorship when I was
teaching at Haverford and I truly enjoy the time with my dear “Chinese Revolution”
students; many thanks are due to my Chinese History Matters! friends with whom I
have had tremendous fun in VP 251; my sincere gratitude for Joan Plonski and Penn
staff whose generous help and support have made my life at Penn a lot easier than I
thought; not to mention my Tibetan, Mongolian, and Japanese language teachers and
partners who have opened up many other worlds for me. Last but not least, I want to
thank those who I met during my fieldwork: our friendship and love shared at the
hillfoot of Himalaya and on the vast Qinghai steppe will be with me forever.
Finally, I would like to thank wholeheartedly my wife, Dai Bingyi, for her patience
in putting up with my bad temper, for her relentless encouragment, for her help in my
discovering the expansive horizons beyond myself, and for her belief in me and our
future.

iv

ABSTRACT
UNRULY MOUNTAINS:
COMPETING VISIONS FOR CHINA’S INNER ASIAN HIGHLAND, 1368-1600

Xiaobai Hu
Siyen Fei
This dissertation uses the analytical tool of “competing visions” to examine the
historical development of China’s Inner Asian highland from 1368 to 1600.
Straddling the Chinese heartland, Tibetan plateau, and the Mongol steppe, the
highland region was a convergence zone that facilitated a constant flow of people,
goods, and knowledge. Competing visions over the highland, as both historical
phenomena and research perspective, highlight the dynamic nature of the region and
its function as a bridge for cross-cultural encounters and transregional geopolitical
interactions. By investigating how and why different social groups understood the
highland differently, this dissertation scrutinizes the operating mechanism of a
borderland society and its role in macroregional geopolitics. Focusing on material
exchanges, knowledge circulations, border-crossings, and contestations over
territoriality through the lens of Ming emperors, highland regime lords, Tibetan
Buddhist monks, Ming military deserters, and Mongol nomads, this dissertation
highlights the formation of a borderland space as the outcome of constant
compromise and negotiation. This dissertation argues that the conflict of ideas and
agendas in the highland provided the driving force not only for the formation of its
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political-economic landscape, social structure, and human-environment relations, but
also the transformation of the highland from a middle ground where multiple
territorial perceptions co-existed into a demarcating frontier between Ming China and
the Inner Asian world.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
As its title suggests, the Collected Essays on the Statecraft of the August Ming
(Ming jingshi wenbian 明經世文編) is an extensive corpus of political essays
centering on statesmanship during the Ming dynasty. Compiled in the dynasty’s final
decade, the work serves as an important lens through which later readers and
researchers developed a panoramic view of how various policies, economic
development plans, and cultural and ideological trends were perceived and discussed
by Ming authors. In short, the collection reveals how Ming state actors filtered and
coded their attitudes toward their own times.
The Ming empire, similar to many other dynasties in Chinese history, faced
territorial challenges from all directions. As one of the central issues of imperial
politics, frontier defense is a primary concern of many works in Collected Essays on
Statecraft of the August Ming. But in terms of which specific frontier region was most
pressing for imperial security, different authors had their own opinions. Nonetheless,
the summary of the collection’s compilers could be treated as a fair comment with
which many contemporaries as well as modern scholars would agree:
Of the dangers created by the exotic barbarians, those from the
northern barbarians (Beilu 北虜) are the most urgent; the next severe
are the threats from the barbarians of Guangdong and Guangxi
(Liangyue 兩粵), followed by the menace from the Yunnan and
Sichuan barbarians (Dianshu 滇蜀) and the challenges posed by the
barbaric Japanese dwarfs (Woyi 倭夷); what come at last are those
westerly barbarians of Qiang (Xiqiang西羌).1
Many scholars of Ming China would agree with the late Ming intellectuals. The
alleged northern barbarians were indeed the primary external threat for the regime;
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although defeated by the Ming founder Zhu Yuanzhang, the Mongols had always
been the greatest danger to Ming China.2 Their successful capture of a Ming emperor
was one of the most torturous humiliations, haunting the Ming intellectuals for
centuries. Next were the so-called barbarians of Liangyue and Dianshu. These
southern non-Han communities had largely maintained autonomy throughout the
dynasty and constituted constant military and cultural pressures for the Ming.3 During
the Imjin war, the Japanese almost occupied and colonized Korea and thus
considerably sabotaged the Ming-dominated East Asian world order.4 What comes at
last is the allegedly barbaric Xiqiang people, the protagonists of this dissertation.
Defining the Highland
The late Ming writings’ references to the Xiqiang barbarians correspond to the
indigenous non-Han communities living in modern-day eastern Qinghai, southern
Gansu, and northwest Sichuan, a region this dissertation designates as the highland.
Straddling the Chinese heartland, Mongol steppe, and Tibetan Plateau, the highland
area was a topographical upland with high altitude, cold and dry climate, and halfagricultural, half-pastoral environment. Geographically speaking, it was the eastern
end of the Hexi corridor, thus marking the gate to the Silk Road, and the northern part
of the Chinese-Tibetan borderland that separated two cultural and political realms.
From the geopolitical perspective, the highland region was the transitional zone that
bridged the East and Inner Asian worlds (Fig. 1.1).
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Fig. 1.1: Highland in East and Inner Asian worlds
My taking the highland as an analytical unit does not necessarily mean that this
dissertation treats the region as a homogenous entity. None of the environmental and
ecological criteria such as ruggedness, altitude, and remoteness are sufficient to define
the region as a holistic geographical component. Quite the opposite, the region was—
and still is—famous for its complicated topographical constitution and resultant
diversity in its inhabitants’ ethnicity, livelihood, and even biological species.
Therefore, the concept of the highland here is primarily an artificial one.
But the highland designation for the region does not appear out of nowhere; rather,
it emerges from the Ming people’s perspective. First, the designation for the place and
its inhabitants in Ming-produced texts are quite consistent. The area was called Fan
Di (番地) in Ming sources, and the locals Fan Ren (番人) or Xifan (西番).
Sometimes the Chinese character Qiang (羌) is also variously used to refer to either
the people or the region, such as in the above-mentioned paragraph from Collected
Essays on Statecraft of the August Ming. As later chapters will show, however, Qiang
is most likely a romanticized designation for the so-called western barbarians, and the
term of Fan is used with greater frequency throughout the Ming. Therefore, it was the
Ming people who tended to treat the region as a whole and its inhabitants as
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homogenous group. This understanding, from a contemporary academic and
ethnographical point of view, is most likely biased and cannot accurately reflect the
situation on the ground. But from the late 14th to the late 16th century, it was such an
idea that primarily drove the Ming court’s consistent economic, military, and religious
policies exclusively applied to the region. This Ming perspective of the area is the
historical root for this dissertation’s definition of the highland.
The concept of the highland, by its own definition, is a term from the Ming’s
perspective. After all, it is only a ‘high-land’ when compared to the relatively low
Chinese heartland. But this is not the only reason for me to adopt the term. Another
imperative, perhaps more important in terms of historiography, is that the term
“highland” implies a sense of distinctiveness. Mountainous regions in world history—
no matter in the Mediterranean world, South American Andes, or southeast Asian
Zomia area—have always been portrayed as realms of distinctive political economic
and cultural traits. It is exactly this peculiarity of the mountain world that I would
reveal. The highland world had its own social norms and political and cultural
landscapes that in many ways were quite different from those of the lowland (i.e.
Ming China). Therefore, employing the notion of the highland allows this dissertation
to highlight such distinction and examine the history of the highland in its own light.
During the Ming dynasty, the highland region constituted the empire’s northwest
frontier. Compared with other frontier regions, the area was less of a military concern
for the Ming. Although put under the close supervision of the Ming military, the
Ming-designated Fan-Qiang (番羌) indigenes of the highland maintained a relatively
peaceful relationship with the Ming. This was mainly due to two reasons. First, the
highland indigenes had no vendetta against the Ming regime. They were not like the
Mongols, whose relationship with the Ming was highly charged for historical and
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political reasons. Second, resource competition between the highland indigenes and
the Ming’s Han subjects was less fierce. Unlike the empire’s southern frontier region
where the Ming’s civilian migration mingled with the local non-Han groups and thus
frequently fought with each other for scarce resources, the highland region was not a
destination for the Ming’s proactive civil migration. In contrast, throughout the
duration of the dynasty, different highland regions were mostly the Ming’s military
administration units. Therefore, Ming people who dwelled in the highland were
relatively disciplined able-bodied soldiers checked by the empire’s passive military
policy in the region.

Fig. 1.2: Highland as the Ming empire’s northwestern frontier
If that is the case, one may wonder: Why would I focus on a seemingly less
important frontier? A short answer to this question, I argue, is tied to how I
understand the latest scholarly development of the fields of Ming history and Chinese
frontier history. This dissertation downplays the decisive role of the state in Ming
studies and conceptualizes the highland region not as an area under Ming China’s
iron-handed control, but as a contested zone in Chinese-Mongol-Tibetan geopolitics.
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In this regard, the highland was a place where multiple political and religious forces
constantly competed with each other, and their visions of the highland were at odds. It
is exactly such diversity and dynamism on the highland that this dissertation
addresses.
Positioning the Highland in Ming Studies
Like many other dynasties in Chinese history, by the end of its imperial evolution the
Ming empire’s sociopolitical engagement had extensively exceeded the dynastic
founder’s initial project. The tremendous changes that the Ming experienced over the
arc of two and a half centuries have drawn considerable scholarly attention. A review
of the extensive literature on Ming China suggests two major intellectual trends in the
field: shifts from autocracy to state-society relations and center to frontier. In this
dissertation, I argue that the decades-long debate on Ming dynasty state-society
relations has the potential to inspire a revisit to Ming dynasty center-frontier
interactions. The highlighted historical agency of Ming society allows me to
challenge the central position of the state in current Ming frontier history, which
overshadows to some extent the independence of frontier regions that oftentimes
developed on their own terms.
The scholarly tendency to portray the early Ming as an autocratic state stemmed
from the political concerns of the American academy in the 1970s, which sought to
better understand the current despotic Chinese party-state through Chinese history.
Political implications aside, I argue the research on early Ming autocracy served as
the starting point for the long state-society debate to come. John Dardess’s
Confucianism and Autocracy is one of the foundational works of the field that
provides an in-depth analysis of the early Ming empire’s autocratic nature. In addition
to Zhu Yuanzhang’s imperial blueprint for Chinese society and his administration of
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the bureaucratic system, Dardess pays specific attention to the early Ming Confucians,
arguing that these intellectuals had formed an independent profession dedicated to
ruling the state and thus contributed as much as Zhu himself to early Ming tyranny.5
In contrast, Edward Farmer unpacks the ways that Zhu implemented power
penetration into every capillaries of the imperial body. Focusing on Zhu’s legislation
specifically, Farmer reveals how the Ming founder programmed social regulation
through a sophisticated legal system.6 Because of these early studies, later scholars
were primed to understand the Ming as an autocratic state.
Many of Zhu’s choices built the framework in which the Ming regime matured.
Relying on the Ming founder’s policies for explanation thus became both a historical
and historiographical phenomenon.7 But in contrast with the path following early
Ming inertia that took whatever the Ming founder perceived as the set rules, what we
see in the late Ming is a completely different outlook featuring vibrant commerce,
upside-down social hierarchy, and liberated values. These new changes are welldocumented in Timothy Brook’s Confusion of Pleasure, which provides a close
examination of how commercial culture reshaped the social and political landscape of
late Ming.8 Along the same lines, Si-yen Fei’s monograph on late Ming Nanjing
provides an apt example to showcase the tension between early Ming utopia for a
rural society and the late Ming reality of rapid urbanization.9 Fei argues that cities, as
an almost unremarked category in early Ming, played an important role as the
dominant sphere of late Ming politics, economy, and culture. In a recent publication,
Michael Szonyi aims to conclude the state-society debate by stating that the ongoing
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interaction between the state and the society should be understood not as “a story in
which market displaces autocratic state,” but rather as a process of negotiation in
which the state-society relationship was constantly restructured.10 In other words, the
agency of society as a historiographical intervention is already evident and needs no
more stressing. A much more productive angle is to look at how such agencies
changed our understanding of the Ming state.
Similar to the state-society binary, I argue that the center-frontier paradigm should
be understood along the same lines. Previously, the notion of the “frontier” as a
conceptual tool oftentimes marginalizes peripheral regions in the process of state
formation. When a specific region is positioned as a “frontier,” state expansion, ethnic
unification, economic growth, and religious integration in that region are often cast as
metropole-driven progress, which leaves little space for local agency and disguises
the on-the-ground complexity. This stereotype may be recognized in a recent article
by Chinese historical anthropologist, Du Shuhai, that discusses how south China, as a
geographical frontier, was pulled into the imperial orbit. In total, the author
categorizes five mechanisms through which the peripheral societies were brought into
the imperial system, namely the imagination of common ancestries; construction of
cultural landscapes; imposition of ideological discourse; mobilization of resources
and population; and integration of worship rituals.11 In other words, the article
identifies how the state gradually transformed many peripheral regions into part of
China through different cultural and ideological means. Although the article admits
that frontier social groups demonstrated the agency to proactively choose to cooperate
with the center, usually for their own sake, the author suggests the inevitability of an
overarching penetration of the frontier by the imperial center.
10
11
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This paradigm, I argue, is teleological and gives the imperial center too much
credit. The Ming court was nothing like a modern state, able to penetrate deep into the
frontier region. Its impact on the distant periphery was intermittent at best. In other
words, although nominally belonging to the Ming empire, many frontier societies
were in fact autonomous and followed their own logics of historical development.
While the imperial intervention indeed provided part of the driving force, the
historical evolution of the frontiers was not necessarily directed by the center. This
dissertation argues that the agency of the frontier, just like the society in the statesociety binary, is self-evident. But unfortunately, it is still relatively understudied.
Although scholars such as John Herman have persuasively foregrounded the historical
trajectory of a frontier society on its own, scholarship that speaks to the agency of the
frontier is still under-appreciated.12 This dissertation does not only highlight the
imperative to understand frontier society in its own light; more importantly, it further
explores how exactly portraying the highland as a frontier with agency could change
our understanding of its history in relation to the so-called center. The answer to this
question, to some extent, lies in how I position this dissertation within the
historiography of Chinese frontier history.
Positioning the Highland in the Field of Chinese Frontier History
Roughly since the 1990s, Chinese frontier history has become a popular topic
among historians of China. Even though the field was not new in the 90s, it received
increased attention at this point due to the rise of the so-called New Qing History
School. Previously, scholars understood frontiers in Chinese history in relation to
imperial centers, as if the former were destined to be annexed by the latter. The
process of cultural integration (i.e. “civilizing missions”) accompanied the center’s
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military expansion, which, according to Stephen Harrell, grants imperial centers the
dominating role while categorizing peripheral people as subordinate.13 The most
representative variant of this “civilizing project” is the concept of “Sinicization”
which served as the basic paradigm for Chinese frontier history for quite a long time.
Yet the New Qing History scholars harshly challenged this framework. Although
quite diverse in their understanding of the Qing empire as a whole, the New Qing
History scholars share one key value. They agree that the Manchus did not merely
inherit the institutional legacy and political legitimacy from the Ming, as earlier
generations of scholars had claimed, but also blended in certain Inner Asian
characteristics in the process of empire-building and thus rendered the regime a multiethnic/cultural political entity. This re-conceptualization of the Qing empire
stimulated scholars’ interest in the history of these Inner-Asian frontier regions and
thus extensively enriched the field of Chinese frontier history.
From the 90s to the first decade of the twenty-first century, scholars, primarily
historians of Qing China, repositioned the frontiers in the imperial apparatus by
revisiting the presupposed dominate-subordinate relationship between the imperial
center and frontier. Recognizing the agency of frontier regions, historians further
identified how the frontier history perspective could shed new light on the dynamics
of China’s imperial centers, and they addressed this question from different analytical
angles such as ethnicity, environment, gender, and religion. Pamela Crossley
highlights the constructivist nature of ethnic identity in Qing China’s frontier regions.
She proposes that both the Manchus and the Mongols went through the process of
rephrasing origin legends and reclaiming genealogical lines and thus constructed a

13

Harrell, ed., Cultural Encounters on China’s Ethnic Frontiers, 3-17.

11
sense of collective mentality to serve specific political needs.14 Leo Shin, examining
the Ming dynasty southern frontier, argues that the idea of Chineseness was fostered
through Han people’s increased contacts with non-Han others and eventually factored
in the formation of a Han-centric ethnic discourse.15 Such attempts to reveal the
constructive essence of certain traits of the frontier are also seen in environmental
studies. Jonathan Schlesinger, by focusing on the cultural connotations of pearls,
mushrooms, and fur, argues that the image of the frontier’s pristine nature was in fact
invented by the Qing court in response to the 19th century large-scale Han
immigration to the empire’s northern frontiers.16 David Bello, along a similar line,
identifies ecology as a variable for ethnicity formation as the Manchu rulers
correspondently related certain ethnic traits to specific ecological settings.17 From
both ethnic and environmental perspectives, these scholars have considerably
challenged the Sinicization paradigm in Chinese frontier history.
Other scholars deployed the lens of gender and religion to examine center-frontier
relations. In Goddess on the Frontier, Megan Bryson points out how the binary
concepts of Chineseness-barbarity or center-periphery are gendered as the center
controlled the image of frontier female as one way to instill imperial ideology.18 Johan
Elverskog, in Our Great Qing, challenges the presupposition that Tibetan Buddhism
functioned as an ideological tool for the Manchus to culturally integrate the Mongols
into the empire. Instead, he argues that this was true only for a short period during the
Qianlong dynasty and that very different types of state-religion relations persisted in
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other periods.19 Research privileging the frontier allows historians to examine centerfrontier interaction from various perspectives and thus reveals more nuance to
understand how imperial apparatuses worked.
Rejecting the frontier’s subordinate role in relation to the center and acknowledging
the subfield to be productive for revisiting many aspects of Chinese history, frontier
history also allows for a trans-regional framework through which China may be
understood in a macro-regional and even global context. This, I argue, indicates the
newest trend in Chinese frontier history. Evelyn Rawski’s Early Modern China and
Northeast Asia is a welcome attempt in this regard. By erasing obstacles that the
modern nation-state framework has posed to historical studies, Rawski proposes that
Northeast Asia should be understood as an analytical category on its own. If scholars
could investigate the region’s historical development in its own right, then we might
develop a new and deeper understanding of certain political events and cultural
phenomenon in Korea, Japan, Manchurian China, and Russia.20 By so doing, Rawski
proposes to unveil the diversity embedded in northeast Asian social-cultural
landscape and revisit the region’s history as a product of constant trans-regional
interaction.
This dissertation is inspired by the aforementioned historiographical trajectory in
three ways. First, it perceives the highland, as the Ming’s northwest frontier, not as a
place homogenized by the political center but as a region featuring diversity. It allows
us to investigate the various approaches that the Ming adopted to its interaction with
the highland society, and hence questions the conventional narrative that portrays the
Ming as a purely Han-centered empire that only aimed at Sinicizing frontier regions.
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By examining the Ming’s flexible policies toward the highland, this dissertation
highlights the imperial characteristics of the Ming as a multi-ethnic/cultural political
entity. In this regard, we may even push further to question the image created by the
New Qing History school that highlights the peculiarity of the Qing empire. If the
Ming was also able to adopt different methods to interact and govern various frontier
regions, to what extent was the Qing special in this vein?
Secondly, this dissertation, in addition to traditional political and economic
perspectives, also widely consults environmental history, ethnic studies, religious
studies, and material culture studies to examine frontier history from a bottom-up
perspective. These disciplines not only help to excavate the agency of the highland
society in providing the driving force for geopolitical changes, but also serve as a
superb lens to examine previously unnoticed nuances in the highland’s interaction
with the Ming.
Thirdly, this dissertation adopts a trans-regional perspective and argues that the
highland was an area of contestation in which the Ming was only one among several
players in the game. The highland was a place through which various types of people,
goods, and information flowed constantly. With different communities flocking to the
highland—carrying with them their diverse languages, religions, commodities, and
epistemes, the region soon became a place where new ideas and norms overwrote old
principles. Power struggles on the ground thus became dynamic, and the perception of
various social groups for the highland were oftentimes at odds. This dissertation
argues that it is exactly in such encounters, clashes, negotiations, and compromises
that the highland provided driving forces for geopolitical changes.
Finally, let us go back to the earlier question: why choose to study this seemingly
unimportant frontier? I argue that just because this frontier was not particularly
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important or special from the Ming intellectuals’ perspective, it functions as a
reference point for us to understand other frontiers in a comparative framework. Quite
unlike the Ming’s other peripheral regions where military actions frequently took
place, the relatively peaceful highland region represents the normal status of a
frontier, whereas the highly charged Ming-Mongol borderland was peculiar in
comparison and thus not representative. Therefore, observations drawn from the
highland allow greater breadth for comparative studies in which scholars may detect
shared experiences, tactics, and policies in the Ming’s other frontier regions. The
highland, in this respect, was probably the least special Ming frontier, but it was also
the most standard frontier through which the Ming’s overall attitude toward frontiers
was revealed. Thus, the highland’s meaning to the Ming requires reevaluation, and its
history requires revision.
Materials and Methodologies
This dissertation chiefly examines four types of primary sources. The first type is
Ming court records, mainly the Ming Silu (The Veritable Records of the Ming
Dynasty 明實錄), imperial edicts, and imperial memorials, and they constitute a
considerable portion of the source base of this dissertation. Though created by the
Ming court and thus reflecting the Ming’s perspective, these records include details,
often from transcribed memorials, that other sources could not provide. However, it is
also important to note that many court policies were defined one way at court, but
executed in the highland in another.
The second type of primary source is local materials that include, but are not
limited to local gazetteers, atlases, military defense guidebooks, and local private
writings. These primary sources, compared with the first type, were usually locally
produced and hence entail more on-the-ground information. However, because of
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their diversified genres, it would be dangerous to lump them together and simplify
them as materials of elite perspective. The ideas of literati on the frontier might differ
from military men, and one gazetteer might provide opposing comments on certain
issue than the other one. Such a wide array of voices needs to be treated carefully so
as to avoid the appearance of an undifferentiated “Ming people” perspective.
The third type are primary sources in non-Han languages. These include religious
history accounts and hagiographies in Tibetan and biographies and chronicles in
Mongolian. Despite the fact that such non-Chinese language materials are not written
contemporaneously but are produced in later periods, they still allow for a non-Chinacentric point of view through which to understand highland history. However,
hegemonic voices in these materials also require careful close reading. For example,
many Tibetan materials about this region were produced after the 16th century, when
the Geluk school became the dominating sectarian of Tibetan Buddhism. Therefore,
when describing issues related to non-Geluk schools or even anti-Geluk forces, such
materials oftentimes manipulated the narrative. Modern readers should not take these
sources at face value and must compare them with other sources for the sake of
accuracy.
The fourth type of primary source are what I consider as unpublished, on-theground materials. These include stone tablet inscriptions, genealogies, or land
contracts that are still scattered in rural areas and preserved by peasants and herders.
Such private accounts are quite valuable because they let the voice of as yet silent
grassroots to be heard. Also, it enables scholars to examine the frontier ramifications
of center-imposed social and political norms. Still, many of these sources are in rough
condition, and thus they are oftentimes hard to read. Meanwhile, because they were
produced in the local settings and usually in a later historical period, the descriptions
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in these sources at best provide only certain aspects of the story but definitely not the
whole picture.
In this dissertation, all these types of primary sources are examined with particular
attention as to how and why they were produced. This is important because I use
materials written by outsiders to reconfigure the history of the highland. Without
question, these materials may be quite biased, either in the political or the cultural
sense, and they at best only reveal parts of the picture. In this regard, reading between
the lines is necessary to discern what happened on the ground and how they were
portrayed for specific reasons. Keeping in mind such possible corruptions in texts can
help to extract relatively objective information through close reading.
In order to manage these materials, this project particularly draws on cultural
anthropology and digital humanities methods to reveal the natural complexity of
borderland society. This dissertation first follows an ontological turn in the field and
consults anthropological approaches to recalibrate a borderland logic. It relies on
personal fieldwork to collect materials in the rural settings. The relative scarcity of
official textual records on the highland history makes it necessary to turn to everyday
manuscripts that are unknown to most scholars. It is equally important to collect oral
materials during fieldwork, such as fragments of the historical records preserved in
epics, folk songs, and local legends. These oral interviews expose a local cosmology
which reflects the indigenous conceptualization of history and their perception of
interactions with the outside world.
This dissertation also utilizes digital humanities approaches to reveal a detailed
process of borderland power negotiation. Due to the scarcity of textual records of
borderland history, digital humanities has become a new methodological trend in
frontier studies. Through scientific data collected during fieldwork, this dissertation
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intends to establish three-dimensional topographical models via GIS mapping to
visualize the spatial pattern of borderland military garrisons, Buddhist monasteries,
and indigenous villages. This dissertation also adopts regulatory expression
approaches, with the help of MARKUS, to conduct data mining and topic modeling of
a large digitalized corpus. With digital humanities techniques, this dissertation intends
to visualize the social dynamics of a mountainous borderland region that may be
unknown to previous scholars, such as the mapped power relation between military
and religious institutions and the correlation between the strength of indigenous
community leaders, the frequency and intensity of tribute interactions, and the
construction of routes.
Chapter Outlines
In addition to the Introduction and Conclusion (Chapters 1 and 7), the main body of
this dissertation has five chapters. Organized chronologically, each of these chapters
focuses on one specific type of vision for the highland. By investigating how different
groups of people or individuals understood the highland, this dissertation charts the
historical evolution of the highland from 1368 to 1600.
Chapter 2, “Emperors,” charts how the Ming emperor’s understanding of the
highland was the driving force for the region’s tremendous change between the 1370s
and 1390s. The highland during the Mongol era was the strategic gate through which
the Yuan dynasty administrated many Tibet-related affairs. Its geopolitical relevance
did not change much after the Yuan-Ming dynastic transition. To protect the Ming’s
communications with Tibet and to prevent the Mongol’s continuing interaction with
its Inner Asian allies, the Ming founder Zhu Yuanzhang mounted a series of military
campaigns against Mongol remnants in the area and eventually subordinated the
highland non-Han secular and religious leaders. At the same time, the Ming emperor
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also extensively changed the ethnic make-up of the highland population by promoting
large-scale military migration. Many Han soldiers flocked to the region, settled down
in Han-exclusive military towns, and hence marked the change of the highland’s
political and social landscape in the ensuring centuries.
Chapter 3, “Lords,” takes the lens of certain highland figureheads to examine how
they perceived the power structure of the highland society. In the early 15th century,
these power dynamics were based on an exclusive social structure in which highland
inhabitants grouped themselves in a dichotomous manner. Meanwhile, religion
functioned as another source of legitimacy for highland rulership. When the Ming’s
tributary system was recognized as one way to incorporate the highland into its
imperial orbit, the highland regime leaders also mimicked this system and created a
highland version of a tributary system in the mountains. With their strong military
powers and religious authority, it was these regional leaders, not the Ming, that
determined the social norms of the highland society.
Chapter 4, “Monks,” adopts the perspective of Tibetan Buddhist monks in the
highland and examines how they reshaped the region’s religious landscape from the
mid to late 15th century. Although Tibetan Buddhism was not intrinsic to many
highland communities, many Tibetan Buddhists made full use of the preferential
treatment they received from the Ming court to facilitate the spread of Tibetan
Buddhism in the region. Relying on lineage networks or taking advantage of
institutional loopholes, Tibetan Buddhists actively engaged with highland society in
the mid-15th century, and thus accomplished the rapid dissemination of Tibetan
Buddhism that reconfigured the local social structure.
Chapter 5, “Soldiers,” explores the significance of the highland through the eyes of
Ming soldiers in the late 15th and mid-16th century. In the late 15th century, the
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highland was a place where indigenes overpowered Ming soldiers. Many Ming
soldiers were bullied, killed, and captured by the highland inhabitants and thus forced
to enter the highland in a passive way. In the early 16th century, as a response to the
rising Mongol threat, the Ming implemented large-scale reforms in its highland
military. However, treating these new programs as opportunities to escape from heavy
military duties, many Ming soldiers simply deserted into the highland, thus
proactively de-Sinicizing themselves and altering the ethnic make-up of the highland
society.
The last chapter, Chapter 6, “Nomads,” traces how the Mongols changed their
perception of the highland from time to time in the late 16th century. Treating the
highland as a military shelter, a religious bridge for Tibetan Buddhism, and a new
settlement with abundant subjects and resources, the Mongols gradually transformed a
half-controlled, half-autonomous military buffer zone to a new piece of territory with
strategic importance. Such geopolitical changes stimulated the Ming to change its
policies and perceptions of the highland in turn, which eventually resulted in the
incorporation of the highland into the Ming’s imperial realm. By the late 16th century,
the highland transformed from a borderland into a border.
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Chapter 2: Emperors

Place names in China can be strange due to historical reasons. For example,
scholars interested in Ming history may get confused when they travel in Lintan (臨
潭), a small county in Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (甘南藏族自治州) of
Gansu Province. Famous for its impressive early Ming city wall, Lintan also attracts
historians of Ming China with the local people’s colorful historical memory.
Nowadays, many Lintan inhabitants can still vividly recount stories of their
adventurous early Ming ancestors, and many of these tales are supported by the
detailed records in the yellowing genealogies that several Lintan families have
preserved for centuries. But one would hardly believe that these ancient monuments
and unfading legends cannot be found in the Lintan Old Town (臨潭舊城), where
grandiose government buildings and fancy shopping malls are located; conversely,
they are scattered in a place called Lintan New Town (臨潭新城). After all, a place
bearing the designation of new, in northwest China, could easily be mistaken for a
modern-era migration hub without much history and traceable past. Yet Lintan
subverts outsiders’ common sense.
Lintan New Town is called as such for a reason. During the Ming dynasty, the
region enjoyed much weightier geopolitical importance than it does today. Known as
Taozhou in the early 14th century, the Lintan Old Town functioned as the regional
commercial center. Yet when the Ming dynasty founder Zhu Yuanzhang (朱元璋
1328-1398) ordered his army into the region, he was informed of hostile sentiment
among the Taozhou indigenes. Therefore, instead of stationing the troops in Taozhou
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city, Zhu had a completely new walled fortress constructed to house the soldiers and
also repress the animosity among the locals. This military base hence bore the name
of “New Town” in the local context.
What happened in Taozhou was not unique. In the late 14th century, the emperor
ordered large-scale military migration to many places in the Ming’s newly conquered
northwest highland. As hundreds of thousands of Ming soldiers flocked into the
region, the social and cultural landscape of the previously underpopulated highland
were reconfigured. The somewhat confusing designation of Lintan New Town, in this
regard, was only the tip of the iceberg. This chapter examines how the Ming emperor
perceived the newly annexed highland, positioned it in his imperial blueprint, and
reshaped the region’s landscape through his policy. Through an examination of the
geopolitical role of the highland between East and Inner Asian worlds, its position
and function in the emperor’s eyes, and the tension between highland locals and
newcomers, this chapter illustrates how the highland entered a new epoch through a
bumpy road.
Resurrecting Sino-Tibetan Interactions
As a crossroads that connects the Chinese heartland with the Inner Asian world, the
highland region has been considered as the gateway to the Tibetan plateau. This
section situates the region’s strategic importance in the context of Ming-Tibet
interaction during the early years of Zhu Yuanzhang’s reign. It argues that the half
decade between 1369 to 1374 was the decisive period for the Ming to establish
contact with Tibet and that the value of the highland was greatly cherished by the
Ming court because of its role in facilitating such interactions.
Due to its geographical location, the highland region has been long considered the
outpost for Sino-Tibetan interaction, with its eastern part identified in Tibetan
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historiography as the intersection of Chinese and Tibetan cultural and political
realms.21 This geopolitical role was clearly recognized from the Mongol era. In 1269,
the Yuan dynasty founder Qubilai (忽必烈 1215-1294) established the Tufan and
Vicinity Pacification Commission (吐蕃等處宣慰司) in the highland, and later chose
the city of Hezhou (河州) as its administrative center.22 Being the very first Yuan
dynasty local administrative office in the great Tibetan region and a subdivision of the
central Office of Buddhism and Tibet (宣政院), the Tufan and Vicinity Pacification
Commission was not only granted direct control over a vast territory in contemporary
east Qinghai, South Gansu, and Northwest Sichuan, but also played an important role
in many Tibet-related political, economic, and religious affairs.23
The highland region’s administrative function and geopolitical role in Yuan
dynasty Tibet world greatly affected its position in the early Ming imperial blueprint.
It was initially abandoned by the Ming’s frontline general for its dense non-Han
population. In 1369, the Ming army marched into the region and took over the
regional administrative center of Hezhou. But the commander Feng Sheng (馮勝)
soon ordered a retreat, including the confiscation of all portable properties and
captives, and burned the entire city down. Although criticized by his contemporaries
for being extremely shortsighted, Feng Sheng, holding a somewhat racist viewpoint,
considered Hezhou a non-Han place beyond civilization and thus not worth keeping.24
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The city was not left wasteland for too long. In May of 1370, only one year after
Feng Sheng’s raid, Hezhou was recaptured by the Ming army under the command of
general Deng Yu (鄧愈). Although the situation did not improve and actually
worsened, this time the Ming troops stayed, most likely at the court’s request. This is
probably because the Ming court had already noticed the strategic value of Hezhou.
Regardless of its non-Han character, the area’s potential to grant the Ming access to
the Inner Asian world, particularly Tibet, must have been promising for the newly
founded dynasty. Yet the initial stage of the occupation did not go smoothly. Living
in the dilapidated frontier town was not easy for military personnel, and Ming officers
began to defect. In July, more than seven hundred soldiers deserted in a single night
due to severe starvation.25 Aware of sinking morale and widespread dissatisfaction,
Deng Yu could do nothing other than give touching speeches and reiterate army
values. Fortunate for him, many soldiers were eventually convinced to stay.26 In the
coming months, it was these soldiers, fed on bitter ferns and surrounded by corpses,
who managed to build a new Hezhou.27
I propose that the reason for the sharp reversal of Hezhou’s fate in just one year lies
in the emperor’s gradual realization of the region’s importance in facilitating SinoTibetan interactions. The turning point was the surrender of certain iconic figures. In
1370, shortly after Deng Yu retook Hezhou, the half-ruined city witnessed the arrival
of several Yuan officials led by a certain He Sonam-po (何鎖南普).28 Not just
someone with a prestigious family background, He Sonam-po was the last Yuan
dynasty pacification commander-in-chief (吐蕃等處宣慰使司都元帥) of Tufan and
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Vicinity Pacification Commission. In other words, he was not only the highest official
overseeing Hezhou, but also Tibet-related affairs in the entire eastern fringe of the
Tibetan plateau. From then on, more and more Ming officials and commanders began
to recognize the region not as the terminus of the Chinese cultural realm, but rather as
the outpost to exert Ming empire’s influence, if not total control, over Tibet.
The high geopolitical value of the region is most clearly highlighted by the Ming’s
attempts at establishing diplomatic relations with and collecting intelligence from
central Tibet. In June 1370, less than two months after occupying Hezhou, Zhu
Yuanzhang named an esteemed monk, Ke Xin (克新 1321-1370), as his envoy and
dispatched him to deliver an imperial order to the Tibetans.29 Two months later in
August, a second envoy named Kunga Sonam (鞏哥鎖南) made his way to Tibet.30
The purpose of these missions, as one Ming imperial edict shows, was to build a
hierarchical system in which the Ming was the suzerain and Tibet the subordinate.
Such a vision for the regional world order, I argue, was a restoration of the Mongol
model. In this regard, sending two envoys in a row within a short time indicates Zhu
Yuanzhang’s great eagerness to establish contact with Tibet. Such impatience attests
to the emperor’s anxiety because foreign acknowledgements of his rulership did not
meet his expectation. Scholars have pointed out that the emperor considered visits by
foreign envoys as public confirmations of his legitimacy, especially to his domestic
subjects.31 By the time he dispatched envoys to Tibet, Zhu Yuanzhang’s court had
received several embassies from Champa, Dai Viet, and Koryo, but nothing from the
rest of Asia.32 The emperor was longing to see more people from afar.
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To Zhu’s disappointment, the envoys could not live up to his expectations. Though
Ke Xin passed away en route before he even made to the plateau,33 Kunga Sonam did
not achieve much either: eight months later after his departure, still nothing was heard
from him. Thus in May 1371, the impatient emperor sent another delegation to Tibet,
but this time with two Hezhou natives as group leaders.34 In retrospect, the Hezhou
envoys did eventually accomplish their missions to facilitate Sino-Tibetan interaction,
but the good news did not make it back to the metropole until four years later in 1374.
During the years while they were gone, Zhu did not leave his officials in Hezhou
unoccupied: they were busy with Tibet-related intelligence collection.
As the outpost for communication with Tibet, Hezhou played an important role in
collecting accurate information for the Ming while the court was quite unfamiliar with
this westerly neighbor. This is most typically revealed in the case of Jamyang Shakya
Gyaltsen (章陽沙加堅贊1340-1373). In 1372, Zhu Yuanzhang received a report from
a Hezhou official on an internecine feud in eastern Tibet. The official suggested
having Jamyang Shakya Gyaltsen settle it. He was confident that with this Tibetan’s
help, not only could the clash successfully be dealt with, but also would the
submission of the entire eastern Tibet region come along naturally.35 Upon hearing
this idea, Zhu decreed that a jade seal, as well as the title of Anointed State Preceptor
(灌頂國師), be conferred upon Jamyang Shakya Gyaltsen , but requested him to
relocate to a Hezhou monastery to educate his people.36
Zhu Yuanzhang’s response was improper in three ways. First and foremost, the
emperor obviously did not know how powerful a figure Jamyang Shakya Gyaltsen

33

Yu, Jishi Lu Jianzheng, 328.
Yu, Jishi Lu Jianzheng, 337.
35
Gu, Ming Shilu Zangzu Shiliao, 17.
36
Gu, Ming Shilu Zangzu Shiliao, 18.
34

26
was at the time. He was not an ordinary regional figurehead, but the nephew and
successor of Changchub Gyaltsen (絳曲堅贊1302-1364), the founder of the
Phagmodrupa government in Tibet. Historians have agreed that around the mid-14th
century, the Sakya government, exclusively patronized by the Yuan court to preside
over Tibet, had already largely been replaced by the powerful Phagmodrupa
government.37 Immediately after Changchub Gyaltsen passed away, Jamyang Shakya
Gyaltsen became the most powerful figure in central Tibet, and both his secular and
religious authorities were recognized by the Yuan court.38 Yet the Ming emperor
seemed to have no knowledge of him and simply noted him in the court records.
Moreover, Zhu Yuanzhang granted him only a religious title, and not even the most
prestigious one, but no secular title that reflected his real power and role in Tibet. In
addition, the Ming court requested that the Tibetan king move to into its territory and
ordered him to educate its Tibetan subjects, which was a ludicrously ill-informed
demand by any measure.
The emperor’s inappropriate responses stand in sharp contrast with the Hezhou
officials’ efficient and accurate intelligence-gathering work. The officials in Hezhou
were crystal clear about the changing political situation in the Tibetan heartland and
suggested the most competent candidate to the court, while the court acted slower in
an inattentive manner. Nevertheless, Hezhou still played a significant role in
facilitating this first formal contact between the Ming and the most powerful secular
ruler of Tibet. Two years later in 1374, it was Hezhou agents again that successfully
brought the most prestigious religious leaders of central Tibet to the Ming realm.
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In May 1374, the two long-gone envoys finally made their way back to Hezhou.
Together with them were the retainers of Sakya sect Buddhist master Kunga Gyaltsen
Palzangpo (公哥堅藏巴藏卜), the descendent of Pakpa (八思巴),39 the most famous
Tibetan Buddhist in the entire Mongol era. Although the Sakya school had lost certain
authority in Tibet’s secular affairs by the 1370s, it was still highly influential in the
religious realm. Recent scholarship has revealed that in the early Ming, Sakya
doctrines were continuously popular, not only in Tibet but also in the Chinese
heartland, and had greatly dominated the Ming court’s Buddhist realm.40 As a
religious leader of the Sakya school and Pakpa’s successor, Kunga Gyaltsen
Palzangpo’s willingness to build a relationship with the Ming, in Zhu Yuanzhang’s
eyes, was a significant symbol of continued authority over Tibet from the Yuan to
Ming, a religious legitimacy the Ming direly needed. Moreover, in addition to various
gifts, the delegation brought many Yuan-issued documents to submit to the Ming
officials and committed to send 2,000 horses to the Ming every three years as gifts.41
In this vein, the Ming had acquired certain recognition from Tibet in the secular
respect as well. The emperor was delighted by this breakthrough. Therefore, he
granted Kunga Gyaltsen Palzangpo the title of “Great State Preceptor of Perfect
Wisdom, Marvelous Enlightenment, and Magnificent Teaching”
(圓智妙覺弘教大國師).42 In the whole of the Hongwu reign, this was the only Great
State Preceptor title issued to Buddhists and certainly the highest.
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Thus, the Ming emperor clearly recognized the contribution made by the Hezhou
officials, as well as Hezhou’s strategic value in connecting Tibet. In July 1374,
following the arrival of Kunga Gyaltsen Palzangpo’s delegation, Hezhou was elevated
as the headquarter of Xi’an Auxiliary Regional Military Commission
(西安行都指揮使司), an office designed to preside over the entire Tibetan region.43
In early Ming imperial blueprints, this adjustment signified the restoration and even
expansion of the role of Hezhou as not only one among several, but the highest
administrative center of all Tibet. Although being largely Zhu Yuanzhang’s fantasy
from a retrospective standpoint, the erection of Hezhou as the political center for the
Tibetan world marked the consolidation of his authority in the empire’s westerly
subordinating state. However, Zhu Yuanzhang was not the only one who was aware
of the region’s importance and intended to control it—the Mongols set their sights
there as well.
The Haunting Mongol Shadow
The fact that the last Yuan emperor Toghon-Temür (妥懽帖睦尔) fled to Mongolia
in 1368 does not signify the evaporation of Mongol powers in China proper overnight.
The severe menace of the Mongol remnants came from far and near to challenge the
nascent Ming. The highland region was one such arena. The region’s geopolitical
function as a crossroads allowed the Mongols to outflank the Ming’s forces from all
directions, and the local figureheads’ opportunistic character created extensive
difficulties for the Ming to implement effective control. This section argues that the
Ming emperor’s policies aimed at these two problems constituted the main reason for
the highland’s fading Inner Asian character.
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The Yuan dynasty implemented a multi-layered system of governance in the
highland. With officials like He-Sonam-po in charge of civil affairs and Tibet-related
issues, military authority was vested in several Mongol princes to prevent potential
uproar.44 During the last days of the Yuan dynasty, there were chiefly three princes
residing in the region: Dorjibal (朵爾只巴), the prince of Qi (岐王) who descended
from imperial son-in-law Chikü (赤窟) of the Qonggirads (弘吉剌),45 Budnal
(卜納剌), the Pacifier of the West and Prince of Wujing (鎮西武靖王) who was
descended from Qubilai’s ninth son A’uruqči (奥魯赤),46 and Qošang (和賞), the
prince of Gaochang (高昌) who descended from the Uighur Iduq-qut.47 One thing
these non-Han aristocrats all shared was a personal connection, usually by blood or
marriage ties, with the Mongol khans. In other words, they were imperial relatives
whose legitimacy derived directly from the political center through non-bureaucratic
but aristocratic linkages.
As the Ming forces swept the region, these three Mongol princes all surrendered.48
Other than Dorjibal who soon regretted his decision, a case I will examine in detail
later, both Budnal and Qošang chose to pledge loyalty to the Ming throne. However,
their status was soon rendered titular. After their submission, both princes were
granted honorary titles as the commanders of a nominal military institute.49 But this
was no more than a political gesture. At that time, Zhu Yuanzhang was concerned
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more with depicting himself as a model ruler who showed benevolence toward the
“former Yuan imperial family members,”50 rather than with granting them substantial
power. As a result, although the court promised the princes that their positions would
be hereditary, we do not see any mention of the descendants of Budnal and Qošang in
Ming documents after 1376.
With the substantial power of Mongol imperial princes taken away, one should not
assume that the Ming intended to completely replace the local administrative system
with a Han-Chinese style bureaucracy. For this newly occupied territory, in unstable
political circumstances, the Ming still preferred to rely on intermediary agents to
interact with and govern the locals. Therefore, after enfeebling top-level imperial
nobles, the Ming emperor continued to assign local affairs to numerous indigenous
non-Han leaders. In Hezhou, for example, among the fifteen senior officials,51 eleven
were Tibetan or Mongol leaders.52 Thus, these surrendered officers constituted a large
portion of the bureaucratic landscape of the region.
Taking on many daily administrative tasks on the ground did not necessarily make
the non-Han officials the lords of the highland. They were given less power in the
military and politics than their predecessors enjoyed. The regional leaders’ daily
routine was occupied with drilling, provisioning the military, or lobbying for the
submission of other groups. From time to time, they were also responsible for
everyday administration such as collecting taxes and conducting censuses.
Meanwhile, these regional leaders had to take on the work of postal station officers.
As Lane Harris argues, early Ming empire heavily relied on roads to project its
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imperial power into frontier regions and maintain effective, long-distance control.53
And in the highland, such roads were maintained to guarantee transportation between
China and Tibet.54 Although the roads to Tibet were established as early as the mid13th century, their condition was not ideal and often halted travelers’ progress.55
Therefore, the Ming emperors initiated several rounds of road construction, and nonHan groups were commonly dispatched for these works.56 The workload at these
postal stations was so intensive that the early Ming court considered sending prisoners
there as a form of punishment.57 Treated as cheap labor, some indigenous leaders
rebelled, but many others chose to accept the status quo, until the rise of the Mongol
Qi Prince Dorjibal brought them hope.
The rough interactions between the Qi Prince Dorjibal and the Ming forces in the
highland exemplify the turbulent geopolitical situation in the late 14th century
highland. In 1371, after other local figureheads such as He-Sonam-po, Budnal, and
Qošang submitted to the Ming, Dorjibal also sent his underlings to the Ming’s
military office to pledge allegiance. Yet he was merely sounding out the Ming’s
reaction and did not plan to yield in the end.58 Later that year, after receiving another
call to surrender, Dorjibal dispatched his nephew to Hezhou,59 and he even offered to
marry his daughter to the Ming prince.60 The main reason that Dorjibal never fully
surrendered to the Ming lies in his top position in the Mongol northern Yuan court at
the time. One official document excavated from the northern Mongolian desert
reveals that in 1371, Dorjibal still exerted great influence on the northern Yuan
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bureaucracy and could intervene remotely in the court’s personnel appointments.61 He
could not simply relinquish these privileges: he would to wait and see how
geopolitical situations shifted.
In 1371, the Ming force in the highland was still trying to subjugate Dorjibal
through peaceful means. But in 1372 and 1373, tensions escalated, and military
clashes began to erupt. This shift resulted from the changing Ming-Mongol power
dynamic in the north. In 1372, the Ming launched a large-scale northern expedition to
eliminate the Mongol Yuan remnants on the steppe. However, due to strategic
mistakes, among other reasons, the Ming’s northern expedition was a total failure.
Among the campaigns in all directions of north China, the expeditionary army only
achieved certain victories in the northwest, but suffered from tremendous causality in
the north and northeast where the Ming’s main force was completely crushed.
The clash in 1372 changed the balance of power between the Ming and Mongol at
the time, and the Ming’s defeat may have prompted the surrendered non-Han officers
in the region to revisit their relationship with the Ming. What added fuel to the fire
was the resurrection of the Mongol’s confidence to retake the highland. In January
1373, a Buddhist official was dispatched from the Northern Yuan capital as the state
preceptor of Qara-Qorum (和林國師) to the highland to lobby the local figureheads to
rebel against the Ming.62 Although the monk was eventually captured by the Ming
army, he had already completed his mission. During the summer of that year, the
indigenous leaders in Taozhou secretly contacted Dorjibal. Likely suffering under the
Ming’s heavy military occupation, these non-Han leaders persuaded Dorjibal to attack
the Ming army and agree to be their inside man. This collaboration damaged the Ming
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considerably. At the cost of many able-bodied soldiers, the Ming barely managed to
repel the strike.63
However, winning one battle did not mean that Dorjibal could win the war. In the
face of constant military retaliation by Ming troops, Dorjibal was frequently defeated.
Therefore, at the end of 1373, he sent his son to the Ming capital to be a hostage in a
gesture of submission.64 Although the Ming officials considered this act as a stalling
tactic to escape the Ming’s intensive military campaigns, in retrospect it worked.65
The two parties did not clash again for another three years.
For the Mongols, the highland’s strategic function as the crossroads between East
and Inner Asia did not diminish after the dynastic transition. In Autumn 1375, a group
of twenty-five envoys was dispatched by the Mongol Liang prince (梁王) in Dali to
Qara-Qorum. The envoys’ mission was to forge a north-south alliance in order to
surround the Ming. The mission travelled more than two thousand miles along the
two panhandles of the Sino-Tibetan borderland and the Hexi corridor before they
were eventually captured.66 It is natural to assume that the envoys already had
conducted countless secret exchanges with the indigenous leaders over the course of
their long journey. Although there are not enough materials to confirm the on-theground ramifications of this diplomatic mission, we may speculate a thin connection
between this diplomatic mission and the two rebels in 1376 who caused the deaths of
several Ming diplomats.
Dorjibal kept a low profile in 1374 and 1375. He maintained a relatively peaceful
relationship with the Ming, maintaining his Ming appointed military title and
acknowledging the Ming’s authority in public. But in hindsight, these were all
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strategic moves. Shortly after Dorjibal’s 1373 “surrender,” the Ming emperor
assigned one diplomat, Xiong Ding (熊鼎 ?-1376), to Dorjibal’s office, most likely to
oversee Dorjibal’s daily activities given his provocative actions. Indeed, as soon as
Xiong arrived at the Mongol camp, he soon discovered that Dorjibal only pretended
his subjugation, waiting for the right moment to rebel once more. After the Ming
emperor received his reports, the official was requested to return to the court out of
concern for his safety. But it was already too late. In month VI of 1376, Dorjibal
finally turned his back on the Ming and murdered Xiong Ding, together with two
other diplomats.67 The emperor was infuriated. But before he dispatched his army to
punish Dorjibal’s betrayal, another seasoned diplomat, Kunga Sonam, whom the
Ming court highly relied upon to communicate with Tibet, was also murdered by proMongol indigenes.68 It was not until then that Zhu Yuanzhang noticed the prevalence
of pro-Mongol sentiment across the region.69 It is highly likely that the 1375 Mongol
envoys from Yunnan had a part in this shift in public opinion, but Dorjibal
unquestionably played an important role to fomenting the dissension.
Turmoil caused by the local non-Han leaders’ rebellion continued in 1378 and
1379. In mid-1378, scattered upheavals broke out in multiple places in the Qinghai
part of the highland. Later that year, further social unrest emerged in the regions to the
east and south of Hezhou.70 All these rebellions were kindled by Dorjibal, who by
then was remotely planning more attacks in the area.71 Zhu Yuanzhang knew that
allowing Dorjibal to continue disturbing the social stability of the highland would
threat the Ming’s entire northern frontier. Therefore, instead of suppressing turmoil on
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case-by-case, he planned to mount a large-scale decisive military campaign and solve
the problem once and for all.
Zhu Yuanzhang’s expedition to put down the highland threats in the late 1370s has
received little scholarly attention. However, I argue that it demonstrates the Ming
emperor’s determination to scour the Mongol shadow from the highland in order to
prevent the re-establishment of a Mongol-Tibet alliance, as well as to secure the
newly formed Ming-Tibet relationship. Zhu’s emphasis on the campaign, as Qin Bo
nicely points out in an unpublished article, is evidenced in three aspects. First, Zhu
Yuanzhang worshiped the deities of mountain and river twice over the course of the
battle, which was a political ritual that the emperor only conducted before campaigns
of life and death significance to the entire empire. Second, Zhu dispatched the
strongest Ming troops and virtually all his capable commanders to the highland,
indicating his strong will to eradicate the Mongol threat. Third, the emperor expanded
the campaign from a regional battle in the highland to one that involved the entire
Chinese-Tibetan borderland and thus greatly affected the geopolitical landscape of
western Sichuan.72
As the Ming emperor made up his mind, his frontline commanders and soldiers did
not fail the emperor’s high expectations. After a series of clashes, the Ming troops
finally wiped out the Mongol force in the region. Although Dorjibal was not caught,
his name disappeared in Ming texts from that point on, indicating his fading influence
in regional geopolitics. As the Mongols became less a military back-up, the highland
non-Han leaders had no more choice but to accept the Ming’s control. This process,
as described by Elliot Sperling when he examines the submission of many Tibetan
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figureheads, indicates “the decline of the area’s Tibetan character.”73 In fact, in
addition to Tibetan character, I argue the region’s Inner Asian character faded since
the Ming’s occupation. This was even more evident when many Han soldiers arrived
and settled in the highland as the result of a large-scale military migration.
Chinatown in the Mountains
Before the late 14th century, the highland had been, as the previous sections
indicate, a place with dense Inner Asian influence. Although these is no way to
assume the exact ratio between Han and non-Han people in the region, Han people
were unlikely to be the ethnic majority. But this situation permanently changed. This
section examines how and why many Han soldiers settled down in the highland
through a case study of Taozhou (洮州).
Despite having cleared up more or less the pro-Mongol forces in the highland by
1379, the Ming’s military force in the region was still insufficient. After all, most
troops in the 1378 and 1379 battles were transferred from other parts of northern
China, such as Henan, Shanxi, and Shaanxi, and even the personal guard army of the
Ming emperor was sent to join the northwestern fight.74 Therefore, immediately after
taming the social turmoil, the emperor mounted a large-scale military migration in
order to strengthen the Ming’s frontier presence. In this way, the highland was
gradually transformed into a military society.
By 1380, there was no Ming army in Taozhou, or Lintan Old Town by its modern
designation. In the late 1370s, the largest army in the area stationed at the
geopolitically important Hezhou. However, from 1376 to 1379, three rebellions
erupted in Taozhou one after the other as a result of indigenous leaders’ conspiracy
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with Dorjibal.75 The destruction incensed the Ming emperor. He decided to increase
the military power in Taozhou to prevent further unrests. Therefore, in 1379, shortly
after putting down the third rebellion, Zhu Yuanzhang transferred half of the Hezhou
troops to Taozhou.76
To use the terminology of the Ming’s military administrative system of guards and
battalions (weisuo 衛所), the Hezhou army was constituted of two guards, each
nominally comprised of 5,600 regular soldiers (正軍).77 But, as Zhang Yun points out,
the actual number would have been higher since many frontier guards were larger in
size compared to those in the Chinese heartland.78 Therefore, around 6,000 to 8,000
regular soldiers in total were transferred to Taozhou.79 Some of these soldiers were
what the Ming’s military system categorized as submitters (歸附), those individuals
who used to fight for Zhu Yuanzhang’s foes but were accepted, registered, and
incorporated into the Ming army after their surrender. Others were newcomers as
fellow campaigners (從征) and banished soldiers (謫戍) who arrived in the highland
from elsewhere. By William Guanglin Liu’s estimation, these newcomers took up half
of the region’s military population.80 It is these military immigrants’ life stories that
this section is about.
The military migration changed the social landscape of the highland in many ways.
One of the most notable phenomena is the erection of many walled garrisons. In early
1379, still in the middle of the battle, Li Wenzhong (李文忠), a Ming senior court
official and also Zhu Yuanzhang’s nephew, was dispatched to the highland.81 Li’s
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primary mission was to supervise military infrastructural construction, especially
those pertinent to building, repairing, and walling garrison cities. Among several
military bases, Li spent much time and effort on Taozhou, as it was treated as a
geopolitical spot that needed urgent strengthening.82 It is in this context that the
Taozhou guard city (洮州衛城), the Lintan New Town illustrated in the opening
vignette, was built.
The soldiers transferred from Hezhou were the primary laborers in the building of
the Taozhou guard city, and the construction was completed within a mere ten days.83
Some scholars claim that this unbelievable speed is an exaggeration, but I argue that
such records in fact reflect how military settlements in the late 14th century highland
were built.84 One corroborating case is the construction of the Minzhou guard city.
When Minzhou was built in late 1378, the soldiers were required to concentrate on
garrison walls and moats as well as infrastructure works like weeding and paving,
over improving their own barracks. The soldiers thus had to wait for several more
months until something with a roof was erected in the city.85 The Taozhou guard city
was most likely constructed in a similar manner: what was completed within ten days
was only the most basic infrastructure of the garrison, while most buildings were not
there yet. The rushed construction reflected the Ming emperor’s intent to use heavy
military presence to intimidate the indigenes, dissuading them from engaging in
future collusion with the Mongols.
The intimidating character of these military bases is also demonstrated in the
location the Taozhou guard city, the Lintan New Town. The site of the garrison was
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not randomly chosen but decided after meticulous strategic consideration. An
inscription implies that it was only twenty steps away from the Zhudanghagai Temple
(竹當哈蓋寺), a Tibetan Buddhist monastery that had been influential in the area for
hundreds of years.86 This suggests that the garrison was likely built to intimidate the
local Tibetan Buddhist community, who were potential threats from the perspective of
the Ming empire.
Apart from strategic reasons, distinctive physical environmental factors also
influenced the location of the Ming’s military bases. Fig. 2.1 indicates the spatial
distribution of the military garrisons across Taozhou’s mountainous terrain. It is clear
that military infrastructure was either built along the Tao River or the mountain passes
leading to the intermountain basin where the Taozhou Guard sat. According to one
local source, the Ming troops only tried once to build a fortress on the south side of
the Tao River.87 But it was quickly abandoned, highlighting the Ming’s inability to
install effective control beyond the relatively flat region on the north side of the Tao
River.

Fig. 2.1: Military garrisons in Taozhou
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Establishing many more settlements with heavy military characters in the highland,
the Ming emperor also implemented some ethnic segregation policies. In 1379, Zhu
Yuanzhang issued several imperial edicts to the generals in Taozhou. With line after
line accusing the indigenes of corrupt morality and brutal barbarity, the emperor
ordered his officers to drive all the non-Han inhabitants out of the Taozhou guard
city.88 Similarly, all non-Han people were forced to move out of Maozhou in the
Sichuan part of the highland in 1382.89 For those non-Han groups scattered in the
region, the Ming strictly demanded that the indigenous leaders keep an eye on their
subjects in case they wandered outside of their proper territory.90 In the initial stage of
its occupation, the Ming wished to create a social landscape demarcated by ethnicity.
Such an ethnically segregated landscape, I argue, even paralleled the Manchu cities
during the Qing, which, according to Mark Elliot, were the “sites of the re-formation
of Manchu ethnicity.”91 When an ethnic minority group entered a region of ethnic
majority, forming a compact community seemed to be a commonly adopted way to
maintain its integrity.
For the numerous Ming soldiers who were quite unfamiliar with the area, living in
this newly incorporated frontier was not easy. Modern historians seldom have the
opportunity to learn the life details of voiceless people like the Ming dynasty foot
soldiers. But during my fieldwork in 2017, I was fortunate to find some unpublished
primary source containing such extensive details. The local materials I found in this
region include multiple genealogies and three Ming dynasty imperial edicts that were
issued in the thirteenth year of Hongwu (1380) and the fourth and fifth years of
Zhengtong (1439 and 1440) respectively (Fig. 2.2-2.4). These materials provide
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personal accounts which reveal the whole process of military migration and
settlement in the late 14th century.

Fig. 2.2: Ming dynasty imperial edict, 13th year, Hongwu Reign

Fig. 2.3: Ming dynasty imperial edict, 4th year, Zhengtong Reign

Fig. 2.4: Ming dynasty imperial edict, 5th year, Zhengtong Reign
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Despite having several thousands of soldiers relocated to Taozhou in the 1370s,
Zhu Yuanzhang was not satisfied with what happened on the ground. Therefore, in
1380, more soldiers were transferred to Taozhou from various regions of China,
including one named Liu Gui (劉貴). Liu Gui joined the Ming army as early as 1365
and fought for the emperor in various places from the lower Yangtze delta, to the
central plain, and the Sichuan basin. Then, in 1375, Liu Gui was dispatched to the
northern frontier, officially registered as a military household in the Front Guard of
Datong (大同前衛) in Shanxi under the title of company commander (百戶 also
translated as centurion), but summoned to go to Taozhou in 1380.92
From the imperial edicts, we can speculate that Liu Gui’s transfer initially was
meant to be temporary. His main job was to suppress scattered rebels, guard the
Ming-occupied territory, and construct more fortresses in the region. He was even
granted the privilege to recruit soldiers himself,93 which indicates the severe personnel
shortage that the Taozhou military was facing. By 1392, although large-scale
rebellions in the region were gradually put out, turmoil still took place to challenge
the Ming’s control over the region here and there. Even a seasoned veteran like Liu
Gui, who had fought for the Ming army for fifteen years by this point, was wounded
in one of these skirmishes and died thousands of miles away from his hometown in
the lower Yangtze delta.94
Liu Gui’s death made his son, Liu Shun (劉順), feel that their ‘temporary’ mission
in this northwest strange land had officially ended. After all, his father had died for it.
Therefore, in the autumn of 1392, Liu Shun sent a memorial to the court and pleaded
to move back to Datong, where the Liu military household was originally registered.
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Obviously, a place like Taozhou—where people continued to suffer from food
shortage, cold weather, ethnic animosity, and loneliness—was not an ideal station in
the eyes of Liu Shun. But the request was turned down by the emperor, followed by
another imperial edict that forever changed the fate of the Liu lineage. In 1392, the
Liu household was bestowed, or we may even say forced, to accept a hereditary
military position in Taozhou, meaning the lineage had to live there permanently.
Probably as a form of compensation, the emperor bestowed a piece of fertile land on
Liu Shun and renamed the region Liushun Chuan (劉順川), meaning the Riverside of
Liu Shun.95 The name still persists today.
Knowing that returning to Datong was not an option anymore, Liu Shun could only
live with the status quo. The first thing he did was to build himself a place to live.
Although not implied in any historical material, my personal fieldwork suggests it
reasonable to assume that Liu Shun chose the location for his fortress, Liushun Fort
(劉順堡), following the same logic for Taozhou guard city. Liu Shun’s fortress sits
right in front of a mountain pass which connects the Taozhou guard city to the Tao
river (see Map 1). This indicates that the Liu Shun’s concern was strategic: to keep
Taozhou safe. Meanwhile, the fort was built within the vicinity of the Yuanjue
Monastery (Chi: 園覺寺 Tib: yer ba dgon bsam grub gling), a Tibetan Buddhist
monastery with great influence among the locals.96 When I talked with Mr. Liu, the
local village leader and the direct descendent of Liu Shun, he constantly attacked the
capriciousness of the Tibetans in the region and claimed that the existence of this fort
was the only reason that these Tibetans had been relatively well-behaved. Despite the
fact that there is no way to verify whether Mr. Liu’s 14th century ancestor understood
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his mission in this way, the relationship between the indigenes and the newcomers, as
shown in the previous section, was undoubtedly tense.
Having built a fort in a strategic location, Liu Shun’s next mission was to gather
enough able-bodied men to guard the place. Just like his father who had to hire
soldiers by himself, Liu Shun was also required to do so on his own. The way Liu
Shun did this was through land. He must have known that in the mountainous
Taozhou region, a relatively fertile riverside land was quite attractive. Therefore, he
advertised his plowable land and convinced people to stay.97 Moreover, Liu Shun
wanted people who came and worked the land to be not just short-term military
tenants but permanent settlers. Therefore, he required that regular soldiers bring their
wives and supernumeraries with them.98 Liu Shun hoped that, with the help of
farmland, the new soldiers could treat the region as home, just as he had done.
With the hard work of Liu Gui and Liu Shun, the Liu lineage gradually put down
roots in Taozhou and still live there today. But their life stories are but one drop in the
ocean. Scholars have estimated that by the end of Hongwu’s reign, there were
approximately 17,000 soldiers registered in the Hezhou, Taozhou and Minzhou
armies as regular soldiers (正軍), and another 34,000 stationed as military household
housemen or supernumeraries (舍人/軍余).99 In comparison, only 12,000 were
registered as civilians.100 It is not an overstatement to say that at the end of the 14th
century, the region had already become a military hub.
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Summary
This chapter has charted the tremendous change that took place in the highland
society from the 1370s to the 1390s as part of the Ming dynasty founder Zhu
Yuanzhang’s imperial designs. Connecting the Chinese heartland to the vast Inner
Asian world, the highland was the strategic gate through which the Yuan dynasty
administrated many Tibet-related affairs during the Mongol era. The area’s
geopolitical role was also valued by Zhu Yuanzhang, who greatly relied upon the
highland region to act as a diplomatic bridge to build connections with Tibetan
religious and secular hierarchs, as well as an outpost for intelligence collection. To
protect the Ming’s communications with Tibet and to prevent Mongol’s continuing
interaction with its Inner Asian allies, the Ming further mounted a series of military
campaigns against Mongol remnants in the area. Successfully eliminating the
influence of Dorjibal, the Ming force had the highland non-Han leaders under control.
The third stage for the Ming’s penetration of the highland revolved around changing
the region’s settlement pattern. After implementing large-scale military migration, the
Ming emperor extensively reconfigured the ethnic makeup of the highland population.
Many Han soldiers flocked to the region, settled down in Han-exclusive military
towns, and thus contributed to ethnic segregation.
The social and political landscape of the highland considerably changed within the
two decades of the late 14th century following the Yuan-Ming dynastic transition. This
chapter points out that Ming China’s imperial project and the arrival of Ming forces in
the highland indeed provided the driving force for the changing of local power
dynamics. These reconfigurations of the social order paved the way for the highland
region’s further economic, religious, and social development.
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Chapter 3: Lords

The mountainous highland was not an easily accessible world to the Ming soldiers.
Although they were able to muscle their way into the region and occupy important
transportation intersections, towns, and other strategic spots, these new players of the
highland’s geopolitical game could not penetrate deep into the realm in the early 15th
century. The mountain society in the highland, therefore, was quite on its own.
However, this does not necessarily mean that the mountain inhabitants did not interact
with the Ming; on the contrary, they had maintained frequent contact with the Chinese
dynasties for centuries. In the 10th and 11th centuries, the highland inhabitants carried
out active tea-horse trade with the Song dynasty primarily because the great, tall
mounts raised in the highland were considered fine warhorses from Song China’s
perspective.101 In the 12th and 13th centuries, multiple highland communities
acknowledged the authority of the Mongol suzerain by accepting official titles, seals
and letter-patents granted by the Yuan authority.102 The highland society, unlike that
of the Zomia world in the Scottian sense, maintained various types of interaction with
lowland political entities.
In that regard, how then should we measure the influence of these Chinese
dynasties on the mountain society? The short and sweet answer is that the impact was
quite dynamic: when the Chinese dynasties were relatively strong, their presence in
the highland were also much more visible; when the Chinese dynasties weakened,
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their authority, as the reasoning goes, was less recognized by the highland indigenous
rulers. In the early 14th century when the Mongols’ influences began to dwindle in the
region, the highland leaders were allowed more control over their local subjects,
which was a change that Petech Luciano claims to have “apparently implied an
increased degree of local autonomy.”103 Such considerable autonomy of the highland
society, I argue, did not change much in the early 15th century.
This chapter examines the power dynamics of the northwest Sichuan mountain
society from the perspective of the highland indigenous leaders. I investigate how and
why various lords of the mountain regimes understood inter- and intra-community
relationships in the local society and how the introduction of Ming politicaldiplomatic norms created new changes for the power structure in the mountains. In
other words, this chapter adopts an local history perspective to scrutinize how the
highland lords themselves understood the mountain society and their relations with
the outside world.
Power Structure of the Mountain Society
In this chapter, I will explore the indigenous vision of the highland through the lens
of two local regimes: Dongbuhanhu (董卜韓胡) and Zagu (雜谷), with the former as
the protagonist. In late imperial Chinese sources, regimes like Dongbuhanhu and
Zagu are usually deemed as tusi (土司), which could be literally translated as local
office, because of their indigeneity and semi-autonomy within the administrative
system of different Chinese dynasties. In the contemporary Chinese government’s
minzu discourse, such historical political entities in northwest Sichuan A’ba and
Ganze Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures (阿壩&甘孜藏族自治州) are mostly
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identified as small chiefdoms of Gyalrong Tibetan (嘉絨藏族), a Tibetan subgroup
living in the eastern Kham region. However, this label has been constantly denied and
challenged by the locals who instead claim themselves to be an independent ethnic
group of Gyalrong people. In the mid-15th century, both regimes attracted much
attention from the Ming dynasty. But that does not mean their early histories were
unknown. One local gazetteer of Yanzhou (雅州), modern-day Ya’an county (雅安),
documents a brief but informative record. It reads:
Dongbuhanhu used to be a subordinate of Jinchuan (金川). During the
Yuan dynasty, Leduo (勒朵, most likely the leader of Dongbuhanhu at
the time) paid tribute on behave of Jinchuan to the Yuan court.
Completing the mission, Leduo returned with a seal specifically for
Dongbuhanhu. Taking the bestowal of the seal as a recognition from
the Yuan court, Dongbuhanhu broke away from Jinchuan, annexed six
hamlets, and became a tributary of the Yuan on its own.104
This brief line on Dongbuhanhu points to three characteristics of the power
dynamics of the mountain society: hierarchical structure, political alliance, and
external source of legitimacy. These three traits, respectively, correspond to the intraregime relationship and inter-regime relationship in the mountain society and the
relationship between mountain society and the outside world. The record indicates
that during the Yuan era, Dongbuhanhu had its own intra-community hierarchy with
Leduo being the de facto leader. Meanwhile, it was a political ally of Jinchuan, yet the
alliance soon broke down as Dongbuhanhu managed to acquire supports from
stronger external political forces. These three traits of political order were quite
important as they determined the power dynamics in the mountain society before the
Ming’s large-scale penetration and the ensuing reshuffling of regional geopolitics in
the 16th century. This section will characterize these three traits briefly, and the
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following sections will use the rise of Dongbuhanhu and its interactions with Zagu as
further illustrations.
Hierarchical structure:
One of the easiest ways to characterize the political structure of the mountain
regimes is to separate their members into two groups: the rulers and the ruled. The
ruler was the head of the ruling class. In the highland society, most regime rulers
ascended to their positions through military merits or with religious sacredness, and
their authority was hereditary within a particular lineage. Although most mountain
regimes followed the patriarchal rule, primogeniture was not always the case. Instead,
it was quite popular that secular and religious authority were equally distributed
between two brothers, and whether the elder inherited secular or religious power
varied regime by regime. In addition to the ruling house, there were also a number of
households whose leaders were generals, clergy, or advisors to the ruler of the regime.
These military, civil, and religious aristocrats, together with the ruling house,
constituted the ruling class of the regimes.
Despite having a recognized ruler, most mountain regimes were not autocratic.
Instead, the power structure was quite de-centralized in these communities. This, I
argue, largely resulted from the region’s topographical condition. The ragged terrain
of the highland considerably limited the scale of local settlements. While some
indigenes dwelled in the intermountain basins, many local settlements were on the hill
slopes, and even those relatively larger ones boasted only several hundreds of
households. Because many settlements were scattered across a wide array of
mountain ranges, making communication and transportation quite difficult, a regime
ruler had to rely on noble underlings to govern on his behalf. Fiefs were thus granted,
and vassals within the regime gradually took shape. In certain scenarios, strong
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vassals were also able to challenge the authority of the ruler when the latter became
weak. This power dynamics constituted a quasi-feudal system of hierarchical, but not
autocratic, mountain regimes. Such a structure allowed space for political reorganization, especially when trans-regime political alliances were quite prevalent in
the region.
Political alliance:
As topography considerably shaped intra-regime relationships, it also affected how
relationships between different regimes and communities were adjusted in the
mountain society. The ways in which terrain molds settlements has been quite
consistent throughout history. 7th century Chinese sources indicate that the region was
of remote mountain and deep valley, and there was no supreme leader.105 One 18th
century observer also commented on the correlation between settlements and
mountain topography, writing that “the land is divided and guarded respectively as if
such separations are heaven’s mandate to keep the locals from annexing each
other.”106 In this scenario, forming political alliances with other regimes or
communities was a political norm. But what makes political alliance in northwest
Sichuan quite peculiar was its binary character. In other words, the local regimes
tended to side with one group or another when it came to transregional competition,
and common binary grouping categories include Big-surname and Small-surname (大
姓-小姓), Ox-tail and Sheep-tail (牛尾巴-羊尾巴), and Black and White (黑-白).
Such dichotomic categories, according to Wang Mingke, resulted from the intense
interpersonal relations in a resource-scarce society in which segmentary opposition
was a basic social norm. People tended to imagine common ground with one another,
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most often shared ancestry, in order to strengthen a sense of belonging and separate
self-groups from other-groups.107 During the Ming dynasty, mountain regimes
frequently clashed with one another, and the binary principle was an important
consideration when they sought allies. Some scholars referred to such imagined
communities in the 15th century northwest Sichuan as groups of clan-surname (族姓
zuxing);108 this dissertation will interpret them as ‘proto-clans.’
Although they functioned as important references for social grouping, binary
taxonomies were not always the only decisive principle in alliance-making. Under
certain circumstances, the binary norm could be outweighed by other factors, such as
religious concerns, personal ambitions, or money. It was usually the emergence of
powerful external threats which prompted the formation of mountain confederations
that transcended the dichotomic social distinction. When Tibetan Buddhist forces
began to spread and develop in the mountain society, the trans-regional Bön alliance
took shape, and when the Ming dispatched its huge army to the mountain, the Bigsurname and Small-surname communities first cooperated to fight off the encroaching
enemy. Attracted by material wealth or summoned by ambitious leaders, different
proto-clans were also able to form temporary coalitions. The entanglement of all these
social mechanisms constituted the fundamental, yet sophisticated political landscape
of the mountain society.
External source of legitimacy:
The mountain society was never completely isolated. The constant interactions
between the mountain society and the outside world, in this case the Chinese
dynasties, would further complicate the power structures mentioned above. As part of
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the Chinese-Tibetan borderland, the mountain society sat at the outmost reaches of
both the Chinese and the Tibetan cultural-political realms. Such a geopolitical
position allowed the mountain society to interact with the outside in a much more
flexible and even creative manner. Elsewhere I have published an article on Muli, a
small kingdom in south Sichuan mountain, which illustrates how such borderland
regimes used the geopolitical struggle between the Chinese, Mongols, Tibetans and
Yunnanese in the late 16th and 17th century to its own advantage.109 It is exactly in
such interactions with external, oftentimes stronger, political powers that we can see
clearly the agency of mountain regimes.
The impact of the Chinese dynasties on the mountain society was two-fold. On the
one hand, it had the potential to consolidate the mountain society’s hierarchical
relationship because the sanction from external political powers would strengthen
regime rulers’ authority within the community. On the other hand, just as the
Dongbuhanhu-Jinchuan case indicates, support from the outside world could provide
a shortcut for petty mountain regimes to gain power and thus disturb the presumed
hierarchical order. The way that external political powers influenced the binary social
structure was quite similar. Sometimes the Ming dynasty would strive to maintain the
balance between the two proto-clan groups so that they would each check the
development of the other; but in other scenarios, the binary proto-clans would choose
to cooperate first in the face of external threats before they resumed their rivalry.
Needless to say, all these dynamic modes of interaction were contingent, and their
impact on the mountain society has to be analyzed case by case.

109

Hu, “Ruling the Land of the Yellow Lama: Religion, Muli, and Geopolitics in the 17th Century Sino-Tibetan
Borderland.”

53
This introductory section has identified three characteristics fundamental to the
power structure of the mountain society. As these three factors frequently
intermingled and their relationship was quite resilient, exactly how they strengthened
and undermined each other or contributed to the mountain society’s power dynamics
is subject to specific contexts. The following sections will identity the power structure
of Dongbuhanhu, how it rose to power in competition with Zagu based on the binary
theory, and how its empire-building enterprise created a frontier crisis for Ming China
at one of the dynasty’s weakest points.
The Mountain Regime and its Political Structure
The rise of Dongbuhanhu was probably the most urgent frontier crisis that Ming
China faced on its western side in the 15th century. However, Dongbuhanhu was not a
regime with intrinsic geographical and geopolitical advantage. Quite removed from
major overland and water transportation and hemmed in by various neighboring
polities (Fig. 3.1), Dongbuhanhu did not demonstrate much potential as a major threat
to the Ming if one considers its geographical and geopolitical conditions. The relative
isolation of the regime probably explains why the pre-Ming history of Dongbuhanhu
largely remains obscure: its outside contact was severely limited.110
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Fig. 3.1: Dongbuhanhu hemmed in by multiple regional regimes, detached from
major water and land routes that were guarded by Ming military garrisons (green
squares)
Topography was another factor which contributed to Dongbuhanhu’s strategic
disadvantage and impeded the region’s economic development. Landlocked in the
deep mountains of northwest Sichuan, different Dongbuhanhu communities were
most likely practicing “vertical trade,” a term coined by Wim Van Spengen to
describe a barter form of transaction between animal products of the plateau-dwelling
nomads and agricultural products of the sedentary residents.111 In comparison with
inter-community exchanges that was relatively self-sufficient, non-local raw materials
and goods had to be imported from places beyond the mountain ranges. But the
sustainability of such supplies relied on one condition: functional routes. However,
routes in mountainous northwest Sichuan were quite vulnerable. Mountain trails were
not only few, but could also be easily blocked by either natural environmental causes
such as storm, earthquake and landslide, or human factors like robbery.
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In fact, Dongbuhanhu’s very first appearance in Ming texts simply mentions a road
blockage incident. In 1411, an armed conflict broke out between Ronglongmeng (容
隆蒙) and Diaomen (碉門), two neighboring regimes to the south of Dongbuhanhu.112
Their struggle blocked Dongbuhanhu’s access to the Sichuan-Tibet route, which had
been the major transportation route through the western Sichuan mountains and
connecting Sichuan to Tibet since the Mongol era.113 Losing this passageway and
access to the region’s most important trading network undoubtedly worried
Dongbuhanhu’s leader, Namkha (南科/喃葛), who appealed to the Ming’s military
intervention to solve the road-blocking issue for him.
It is likely unsurprising to modern readers that the Ming emperor did not act on
Dongbuhanhu’s request. After all, mounting a military expedition to clear the route
for a mountain regime located on the empire’s westmost frontier was of little interest
to the Ming. But at the same time, I argue it is exactly such geographical and, in
particular, political remoteness which would do Dongbuhanhu a favor: the regime
was not under the close watch of the Ming, and it enjoyed more space to act on its
own.
A comparison of Dongbuhanhu with other local regimes such as Zagu and
Longzhou in terms of the ranks and tiles they received from the Ming speaks to how
Dongbuhanhu’s distance from the Ming territory and imperial apparatus was
advantageous for its development. When the Ming army firstly marched into the
northwest Sichuan mountains in 1374, the ruler of the Longzhou regime was
bestowed a 3B rank of Grand pacification commissioner (宣慰使).114 This was quite a
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high-ranking official title, as during the Yuan dynasty the entire northwest Sichuan
region was merely a 3A administrative unit, and Longzhou was just one among
several local regimes.115 Considering the fact that Longzhou was one of the first local
regimes to submit to the Ming, it is clear that the bestowal of the high rank was a
political gesture to reward its quick submission. Therefore, as the Ming gradually
gained control over the region with its settled military, the regime was downgraded to
a 5B unit.116 Although the Longzhou leader requested to reclaim the 3A rank in 1427,
the petition was rejected.117 Other regimes such as Zagu, due to their proximity to
Ming’s territory and closer supervision by the Ming military, were designated as 5B
administrative units as well.118
In contrast, Dongbuhanhu was able to acquire and, most importantly, keep a highranking title because of its distance from the Ming’s imperial apparatus. When a
Dongbuhanhu envoy reported to the Ming court on the road blockage issue in 1411,
Namkha was still addressed as a local headman (地面頭目).119 But four years later in
1415, Namkha was granted the 3B title of Grand pacification commissioner.120 This
assignment should have been a case quite similar to that of Longzhou in which an
early-submitted regime was granted complimentary high position. But the difference
is that Dongbuhanhu’s title was not later downgraded. This is most likely because
Dongbuhanhu was quite far away from the Ming’s substantial sphere of influence,
and from the Ming’s perspective, a high-ranking title would work as a reminder to
Dongbuhanhu of the privilege and trust it gained from the Ming, as well as its
responsibility to maintain peace in the region for the heavenly kingdom.
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While bestowing various types of titles to mountain regimes supported the Ming’s
constructed world order in which its peripheral regions were guarded by loyal nonHan vassals, such endorsements meant something different for Dongbuhanhu. From a
mountain regime’s perspective, a prestige title from the Ming indicated one’s political
and strategic weight.121 The higher the title from the Ming, the more important and
powerful the regime should be. According to this reasoning, once mountain regimes
acquired high ranking titles from the Ming, they were justified to intervene in
territorial and jurisdictional disputes between inferior title bearers or exert influence
in other regimes’ domestic politics. Peter Schwieger has pointed out that the imperial
titles and seals from the Chinese played a crucial role in the legitimization of political
authority in 15th century central Tibet, and “perhaps the Tibetan headmen were even
more eager to ask for imperial seals than that the emperor was interested in granting
them.”122 These symbols of recognition from external powers most likely functioned
in a similar manner in northwest Sichuan and to some degree laid the very foundation
for Dongbuhanhu’s later development in the mid-15th century.
In addition to geographical, topographical, and geopolitical conditions, it is also
important to examine the political configuration of the regime: this provides essential
knowledge for understanding the power dynamics in the mountain society when
Dongbuhanhu’s rise threated neighboring regimes. A standard mountain society
political structure existed in Dongbuhanhu, as introduced in the previous section, in
which the ruler acquired legitimacy through both military and religious approaches,
was backed up by external powers, employed a hereditary system for authority
succession, and relied on elite underlings for quasi-feudal governance.
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Let us first look at how Dongbuhanhu perceived secular and religious legitimacy in
rulership. In 1415, when Namkha received the 3B title from the Ming, he also
managed to have the Ming recognize his religious authority by sanctioning the
establishment of a Prefectural Daoist Registry (道紀司),123 the supreme office for all
Daoist-related affairs in the region. One must note that in the context of 15th century
northwest Sichuan, the terms ‘Daoism’ and ‘Daoist’ did not refer to the Chineseorigin indigenous philosophical tradition and its practitioners, but the Bön religion (苯
教). Though I will examine the prevalence of Bön in the region in detail later on, here
it is more important to know that Bön functioned as a religious pillar of
Dongbuhanhu’s rulership, and it was also recognized by external powers.
Both secular and religious authority provided legitimacy for Dongbuhanhu
rulership, with the latter likely predominant. This is partially revealed by how the
Dongbuhanhu ruler distributed power among his sons. In 1430, before his retirement,
Namkha sent one of his sons, a Bön practitioner, to the Ming court. The so-called
Bönpo Lama delivered Namhka’s wishes for the Ming’s sanction to allow his elder
son, Panden Yeshe (班丹也失), to take charge of the religious population within
Dongbuhanhu and his second son, Gelek Gyaltsen (克羅俄監粲), to rule the subjects
in a civil capacity.124 As the Ming granted him these permissions, we see that in many
other highland regimes, such as Zhuoni in southern Gansu, it was always the elder son
inherited secular authority and the younger one the religious,125 the opposite happened
in Dongbuhanhu. While it is not sufficient to argue that religious authority was more
important to Dongbuhanhu rulership simply from the fact that it fell into the elder
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son’s hands and secular authority to those of the younger, the significant role of
religion to Dongbuhanhu regime was already evident.
Another feature of local political structure was the hierarchical relationship in
which dominating regimes enjoyed lordship and subordinating regimes were vassals.
This may be seen in both Dongbuhanhu and Zagu’s administrative organization. In
the initial stage of Dongbuhanhu’s rise, Biesizhai (別思寨) was probably one among
few vassal regimes under its governance. According to Map 2.1, we see that Biesizhai
was a region to the northeast of Dongbuhanhu and functioned as a buffer zone
between Dongbuhanhu and Zagu. Therefore, it was a distant but strategically
important region for Dongbuhanhu. The fact that Namkha assigned Wu’re
Duoerzhijian (兀惹朵兒只監), probably a military commander, to rule the region on
his behalf indicated the quasi-feudal principle in the mountain society. But by that
time, this Biesizhai community was not recognized in the Ming’s administrative
system because it was only a later request made by Wu’re Duoerzhijian’s son, an
action that led to severe punishments and caused his death.126 Such a situation
rendered both Wu’re Duoerzhijian and his son as headmen (頭人) of Dongbuhanhu, a
status that an early 20th century scholar summarized as “hereditary, but only refers to
those who rule a small territory and do not process ranks and titles from imperial
courts.”127
Such a lord-headmen hierarchy also existed between Zagu and Dasiman (達思蠻).
Zagu was a regime to the east of Dongbuhanhu. It took shape during the time of
A’piao (阿漂), a petty hamlet head who gradually rose to power and recognition in
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local society in the late 14th century.128 In his initial expansion, A’piao was assisted by
a military commander, Yan Tai, who was another hamlet head. After several decades
wherein A’piao became the de facto leader of Zagu regime, Yan Tai was named the
headmen of Dasiman, a vassal under Zagu’s rule.129 Therefore, similar to
Dongbuhanhu, Zagu also implemented hierarchical governance. Moreover, it relied
heavily upon religion for local control as well. It was said that there were countless
monasteries within the domain of Zagu,130 and the vice commander of Dasiman was
also a religious specialist.131 Zou Libo speculates that Bön was the dominating
religion in Dongbuhanhu, and Zagu was a Tibetan Buddhist patron.132 But I argue that
Zagu, similar to Dongbuhanhu, was also a pro-Bön regime. One of my strongest
pieces of evidence is that Jinchuan, a stronghold of Bön, was one of Zagu’s vassals.133
Jinchuan’s Bön tradition was so persistent that even during the Jinchuan wars in the
18th century, it was still the foremost Bön enemy in the eyes of the Qing empire.
Although in the 1440s Jinchuan submitted to Dongbuhanhu and migrated to
Dongbuhanhu territory, a case we will examine later, this nevertheless points to the
fact that Zagu was heavily influenced by Bön in the early 15th century.
The Rise of a Bön Patron
As Dongbuhanhu and Zagu shared many common elements in their political
structure and religious characteristics, they both began their first round of expansion
in the name of Bön. Bön is an indigenous Tibetan religion. Yet its early history is
quite obscure. While many believed that its initial development predates the
introduction of Buddhism from India, others claim that the religion did not start to
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take shape until the 11th century.134 Many scholars became acquainted with Bön by
studying its clash with Tibetan Buddhist believers in 18th century northwest Sichuan
during the Jinchuan wars.135 But in the early 15th century, Bön was already quite
prevalent in the eastern Tibetan region, especially in modern-day northwest
Sichuan.136 Although modern Tibetologists have documented some victories in which
Tibetan Buddhists successfully defeated Bön competitors in the early 15th century,137
in general, Bön forces enjoyed much more popularity at the time. Tibetan Buddhist
monasteries in the region had to adopt many Bön religious elements in their interior
and exterior decorations,138 and even the author of mDo smad chos 'byung, the most
authentic chronicle of Tibetan Buddhism in eastern Tibet, recognized the region as a
spiritual realm of Bön.139
It is worth noting that in 15th century northwest Sichuan, while Bön is written in its
transliterated form Benbu (奔卜) in Ming court records, in contemporary Tibetan
materials as compiled by Zou Libo, bon (Bön) is used to translate the Chinese terms
Daojiao (道教, Daoism) or Daoshi (道士, Daoist).140 Such a mistranslation points to
the intriguing fact that when inhabitants in the mountain society imagined the
relationship between Fo and Dao (佛道 Chan Buddhism and Daoism) in the Chinese
heartland, the most suitable comparative reference they had in mind was the pair of
Tibetan Buddhism and Bön, as the former one shared much common elements with
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Chan Buddhism and the latter was much more indigenous. Therefore, Chinese texts
produced in the northwest Sichuan context, especially those translated from Tibetan
materials or transcribed from indigenous oral collections, adopted Daojiao or Daoshi
to describe Bön and its clerics.

Fig 3.2: Bön lama with protruding tongue holding trumpet, dagger, and bell and drum,
chopper, and hair of 100 dead and 100 living people in a state of trance.141
Since Bön prevailed in the mountain society, acquiring Bön support and the
ensuing religious legitimacy, to many local regimes, became a favorable approach to
consolidating power and authority. Such patronage of Bön, if not for religious
reasons, stemmed from the expectation of a rich return on investment: an identity as a
Bön patron made it easier to attract followers that could be potentially converted into
soldiers and accumulate wealth from religious donations. Dongbuhanhu was just one
among many regimes that understood this logic well and acted resolutely, and its first
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step was to annex Gyalrong, the most sacred Bön realm in the entire eastern Tibetan
region.142
The Gyalrong region’s religious significance derived primarily from Mt. Murdo, a
sacred mountain in Bön cosmology located in the center of Gyalrong.143 Although
large-scale cultural construction of Mt. Murdo’s sacredness primarily took place in
the 18th century when abundant religious texts and pilgrimage guidebooks were
produced,144 it was already a well-known religious landscape in the 15th century. Even
Tibetan Buddhists acknowledged its divine significance. According to the
hagiography of a 15th century Sakya sect Tibetan Buddhist, Mt. Murdo was a sacred
mountain where deities and evil spirits (lha gnyan) existed.145 It is not an exaggeration
to say that, in 15th century northwest Sichuan, whoever controlled Gyalrong and laid a
hand on Mt. Murdo would have his reputation spread among the Bön communities.
Although we are not crystal clear about how exactly Dongbuhanhu brought
Gyalrong to submit, whether through military actions or political-religious ruses, the
whole process is, as Roger Greatrex convincingly points out, revealed through the
changing bearer of a specific religious title.146 In 1425, one Gyalrong Bön master,
Dorje Gyaltsen (朵兒只監藏), went to the Ming court and received the title of State
Preceptor of Sublime Wisdom and Supernormal Awakening (妙智通悟國師).147 In
1427 and 1429, he sent a so-called Wenbu (溫卜) Sakya Gyaltsen (釋夏監藏) to
Beijing twice.148 While Greatrex identifies Sakya Gyaltsen as Dorje Gyaltsen’s bursar,
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I argue that the word Wenbu (溫卜) used in Ming texts as the prefix for Sakya
Gyaltsen actually denotes Sakya Gyaltsen’s identity as Dorje Gyaltsen’s potential
successor. This is because Wenbu (溫卜), similar to Wanbu (完卜), is the
transliteration of Tibetan word dbon po, which refers to the nephew of nobles or
religious masters.149 Choosing one’s own nephew as one’s religious successor was a
rather common practice among Tibetan religious specialists at the time, and they
indeed always sent their nephew-successors to Beijing to foster a relationship with the
Chinese patron before the nephews’ formal succession. Yet as Ren Xiaobo claims that
dbon po and the uncle-nephew principle were mainly used by Tibetan Buddhists,150
here the case of Gyalrong indicates that the term and practice were also adopted by
Bön masters.
Dorje Gyaltsen must have passed away in the early 1430s, because when Sakya
Gyaltsen’s own nephew showed up at the Ming court in 1434, Sakya Gyaltsen was
already addressed as the State Preceptor.151 However, when Sakya Gyaltsen’s name
emerges again in Ming court records five years later in 1439, he was described not as
the State Preceptor, but as the disciple of the demised State Preceptor Dorje
Gyaltsen.152 It seems that he had already lost the title, which is exactly the case.
Because another Ming court record indicates that one year prior, in 1438, the title of
State Preceptor of Sublime Wisdom and Supernormal Awakening was given to
Panden Yeshe, the religious leader of Dongbuhanhu.153 In other words, by the late
1430s, Dongbuhanhu had already taken away the privileged title of the Gyalrong Bön
leader, indicating its annexation of the Bön sacred realm. Although Sakya Gyaltsen
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filed a complaint with the Ming court and requested to resume the title, he only
received denial.154
Once grasping religious authority in hand by having Gyalrong under its control,
Dongbuhanhu’s further religious expansion became quite smooth: it mounted
religious warfare against multiple communities that followed Tibetan Buddhism in
1440,155 subordinated the Bön-supporting regime in Khro-skyab to Gyalrong’s
northwest in 1444,156 and in this process encroached on a new territory of
considerable size and boosted power and authority in the mountain society. However,
such an expansion strategy that combines military and religious approaches was not
unique to Dongbuhanhu. Zagu was rising in the same manner. In 1431, the Zagu ruler
murdered the head of a neighboring regime and forcefully occupied its territory;157 in
1432, it invaded another several hamlets in significant strategic locations;158 in 1441,
Zagu dispatched a Bön master to lobby in four hamlets and successfully gained their
submission.159 The mountain society witnessed the rise and expansion of two
powerful regimes in the 1430s, and hence an eventual clash between the two was
unsurprising.
Competition in a Binary World
As both Dongbuhanhu and Zagu were expanding in the 1430s, a conflict between
the two seemed inevitable. This section charts their competition in the 1440s
northwest Sichuan and highlights how the local binary social structure played a role in
this power dynamic.
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The previous section explored how in the 15th century, Zagu was a 5B regime in the
Ming’s administrative system, and Dongbuhanhu held the rank of 3B. While the
rulers of Dongbuhanhu might have perceived this difference as an objective reflection
of their distinct political weight and geopolitical significance, from a researcher’s
perspective, it does not mean Zagu was weaker; rather, it was merely the effect of
Zagu’s proximity to the Ming military, as the Ming felt it unnecessary to use a highranking title to flatter the regime. Moreover, Zagu had one geopolitical advantage that
Dongbuhanhu desperately desired: the control of major passageways that linked
northwest Sichuan to the broader region.
Transportation routes in the mountainous area, as one can imagine, were limited
and quite fixed in terms of passageway. Restricted by topographical conditions,
movement in the northwest Sichuan mountains had to follow either river valleys or
mountain trails, thus rendering certain ferries or mountain passes significant strategic
spots. Sitting between Dongbuhanhu and the Ming territory, Zagu clearly understood
how vital outbound access was to the development of Dongbuhanhu and took full
advantage of its geographical and geopolitical position. In 1432, ignoring the Ming’s
constant warnings, Zagu occupied six hamlets in Bao county. This was a pivotal move
to check Dongbuhanhu because the hamlets were located along an important
mountain route on which Dongbuhanhu heavily relied to dispatch envoys to Beijing.
Keeping the route under control, Zagu effectively blocked Dongbuhanhu’s outbound
contact.160
The competition between Dongbuhanhu and Zagu intensified in the 1440s as both
regimes expanded. Routes remained at the center of their power struggle. In 1441,
Zagu again chopped down numerous trees on a mountain trail in order to block
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Dongbuhanhu envoys. Although the latter eventually made their way to the Ming’s
Sichuan office, Zagu successfully kept more than 200 horses in the mountain that
Dongbuhanhu envoys were supposed to bring to Beijing as diplomatic gifts.161
Despite promising to look into this conflict, the Ming obviously had not done much to
resolve the situation because one year later in 1442, Dongbuhanhu was still in need of
a functional route, and it was even forced to quell a local rebellion for the Ming in
order to send the envoys to the other side of the mountain ranges.162
In the 1440s, the de facto ruler of Dongbuhanhu was the young and ambitious
Gelek Gyaltsen, Namkha’s second son. Faced with Zagu’s blockade, Gelek Gyaltsen
initially set his hopes in diplomatic channels. He wished to invite the Ming to
mediate, just as his father did in 1411 when a route-blocking incident arose, but the
result was similarly disappointing. In 1442, after crushing the rebellion for the Ming,
Gelek Gyaltsen filed a report to request the opening of a new route since Zagu had cut
off the old ones.163 But from the Ming’s viewpoint, the mountain passageway
Dongbuhanhu asked for was of strategic importance,164 and since envoys from
Dongbuhanhu had made it to the court in 1441 and 1442 after all, there was no need
for new routes.165 As the road-opening request was denied, Dongbuhanhu’s next
diplomatic mission in 1443 was again unsurprisingly sabotaged by Zagu.166
Gelek Gyaltsen’s failure to gain the Ming’s support resulted from the different
expectations of the two sides. For Gelek Gyaltsen, functional routes to the Ming realm
function primarily not as a conduit to send envoys to Beijing to pay homage to the
Ming emperor, but as an entrance to a trans-regional commercial network. Therefore,
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what Zagu blocked was not Gelek Gyaltsen’s opportunity to be a loyal subject, but
Dongbuhanhu’s opportunity for wealth. However, what the Ming valued more was
the political implication of the Dongbuhanhu envoys’ arrival – that Dongbuhanbu
submitted to the Ming’s heavenly authority and dispatched envoys periodically to
show its respect. As long as the envoys managed to get to Beijing, the Ming would
not expend much effort to intervene in a clash in a distant frontier region. In this
regard, both sides acted accordingly based on their understandings of the mutual
relation. However, Gelek Gyaltsen overestimated Dongbuhanhu’s political weight to
the Ming.
When the Ming refused to substantially intervene against Zagu’s unfriendly
actions, Dongbuhanhu was left on its own to deal with their competitor. And
Dongbuhanhu’s strategy, in the 1440s, was to form a transregional anti-Zagu alliance
based on the binary principle of the mountain society.
The major allies that Dongbuhanhu sided with were two Bön communities: one
was Jinchuan, the other Shangba (商巴). As briefly mentioned earlier, Jinchuan was a
vassal regime under Zagu’s control in the early 15th century. It was at first located to
the east of Zagu and well known as a Bön stronghold. In 1439, Bön practitioners from
more than 800 hamlets complained to the Ming court that their routes were blocked
by some raw barbarians. And the Jinchuan Bön master was most likely the leader of
the group, as it was him who drafted the correspondence.167 Similarly, Shangba was
also a Bön center. Located to the south of Songpan, it was powerful enough that even
the Ming hesitated to confront it directly. In a skirmish in 1440, the Ming military
captured and jailed the Shangba religious leader who seemed to be calling for a raid
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on the Ming’s grain caravan and a siege of a Ming fortress. These actions soon led to
large-scale retaliation, as Bön followers occupied mountain passes, blocked routes,
and razed many Ming fortresses and postal stations.168 Despite the pressing requests of
the local military officers to dispatch a sizeable army to tame the unrest, the Ming
instead executed the top commander of the Songpan military and exiled the vice
commander. In the meantime, the Shangba Bön leader was released and even given
the tile of State Preceptor in appeasement.169
What seemed to exist between Dongbuhanhu, Jinchuan, and Shangba was a
religious alliance. But was that the case? It should be noted that while Dongbuhanhu
was well-known as a Bön patron, Zagu also maintained a supportive attitude toward
the religion since Jinchuan was just one of its vassals. In this regard, why did
Jinchuan and Shangba then side with Dongbuhanhu? The answer to this question lies
in the binary proto-clan social structure in northwest Sichuan.
As briefly discussed in the introductory section above, the binary structure of the
mountain society, according to some historical anthropologists, derived from the
intense interpersonal relationships in a resource-scarce society. Such a social structure
could have existed since the late 14th century. One late Ming author points out that
when an early Ming general, Ding Yu (丁玉), came to the region, he noticed the
binary distinction that indigenes adopted to distinguish one from another. Some
indigenes called themselves “Ox Hair” or “Ox Brain” (牛毛/牛脑), and others
“Sheep Hair” or “Sheep Brain” (羊毛/羊脑). Probably finding these designations
strange and ridiculous, Ding Yu renamed them “Big Surname” and “Small Surname”
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(大姓&小姓).170 In another undated Ming dynasty source, they were also recorded as
the “Big Clan” and “Small Clan” (大族&小族).171
The relations between these binary proto-clan groups were dynamic. In peace
times, the dichotomic distinction seemed to play little role. Different proto-clans had
their inhabitances interdigitated in the mountain.172 They continued to intermarry,173
and they even cooperated to fight common enemies from time to time.174 But when
tension erupted, even in skirmishes, the idea of binary distinction surfaced and hence
became a decisive factor in ally-making. It was exactly in this context that Jinchuan
and Shangba cliqued with Dongbuhanhu: not for religious reasons, but for their
shared, even if primarily imagined, blood ties. It is recorded that Dongbuhanhu and
Jinchuan were both Small Clan communities, while Zagu and Dasiman were both Big
Clans.175 This shared proto-clan background, I argue, was the primary reason that
Jinchuan was expelled from its original settlement under Zagu to a location in
Dongbuhanhu’s territory.176 In this case, even if Jinchuan was an important Bön
center that could boost Zagu’s religious authority, the proto-clan code came first when
tensions were escalating.
A similar situation in which the proto-clan principle outweighed religious values
was also seen in a clash involving Shangba. In 1441, when an interpreter was
dispatched by the Ming court to northwest Sichuan to investigate the growing tension
on the ground, he noticed that what was behind a seemingly religious clash between
Shangba, a Bön community, and Liba, a Tibetan Buddhist community, was actually a
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proto-clan power struggle in which Shangba was the Big Clan and Liba was the Small
Clan. Therefore, in his report to the court, the interpreter suggested that the Ming
intervene to settle the conflict by dividing the local communities according to their
proto-clan background. This way, the interpreter claimed, would restore peace in the
region.177
Reminded by the interpreter that proto-clan distinctions were a deeper layer of the
social structure of northwest Sichuan, did the Ming act accordingly by striking a
balance between the two proto-clan groups so as to use one to check another? The
short answer is no. The Ming did not care much about the conflicts on the ground as
long as it did not threaten the Ming’s imperial integrity, and thus the court did not
adopt any sophisticated strategy to solve frontier tension. Such an attitude is most
typically illustrated in its response to the Dong Min-Wang Yong vendetta.
The blood feud between the Dong Min (董敏) and Wang Yong (王永) cliques
lasted almost two decades in the mid-15th century, during which the several years
from 1443 to 1447 witnessed the most intensified clash. Both Dong and Wang were
members of influential households in the local society of northwest Sichuan.
Although they were from Big and Small Clans respectively, the two households kept
the peace and even maintained continued to intermarry for generations.178 But since
Dong Min was a proto-clan ally with Dongbuhanhu and Wang Yon was aligned with
Zagu,179 Dong Min and Wang Yong were also dragged into the chaos when the
relationship between Dongbuhanhu and Zagu soured.
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In 1443, Dong Min was appointed by the Ming to be the chief of Baozi Pass (保子
關), an important mountain transit point. His brother-in-law, Wang Yong, went to the
celebration banquet to congratulate him on his promotion. But for some reason, the
two began to fight after several rounds of drinking,180 and the whole situation went
out of control when Wang Yong murdered Dong Min’s son in addition to more than
twenty family members of Dong.181 While Dong Min himself managed to escape and
went into hiding in Guan county,182 Wang Yong managed to get Dong Min’s seal and
usurped the coveted mountain pass chief position.183
Shortly after murdering the Dong family, Wang Yong planned the murder of a
second mountain pass chief, the chief of Hanshui Pass (寒水關). In 1443, Wang Yong
instigated Jiawu (加悟), the leader of the so-called Caopo hamlet (草坡寨), to mount
an attack on Hanshui Pass and kill the mountain pass chief and more than 500 of his
family members and underlings.184 After the massacre, Jiawu himself rushed to Zagu
and hid under the ruler’s protection. These two bloodbaths were not random incidents:
I argue that they were part of a well-planned vendetta carried out by the Big Clans—
the Zagu, Wang Yong and Caopo clique—against Small Clan communities.
Moreover, the mountain pass chiefs were not chosen as targets without reason. Their
murders were part of a clear political agenda, as Zagu made every effort to control
strategic transportation point in the mountain.
The Ming received reports of these violent outbursts soon after they happened. But
once again, the Ming did not intervene to punish the perpetrators. Instead, the Ming
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absolved both of the culprits only several months later. In 1443, Wang Yong was
pardoned after he sent his nephew to Beijing to plea for mercy.185 In 1444, Jiawu was
also exonerated when the Zagu ruler went so far as to plead for him.186 Quite
ironically, it was Dong Min, the victim of the feud, that was reported as wanted by the
Ming because he refused to let things go.187 At last, Dong Min was hunted down by
the Ming military in 1447.188 Gelek Gyaltsen, sent a memorial to the Ming court to
plead mercy for Dong Min, just as the Zagu ruler did for Jiawu. Yet it was turned
down, and Dong Min was executed by the Ming later that year. 189
The Dong Min–Wang Yong struggle is a great case for examining the role Ming
China played in the power dynamics of the binary mountain society and the Chinese
dynasty’s perception of the region. First, what concerned the Ming the most was
whether its suzerainty received sufficient respect: it cared a lot about its mighty
heavenly lordship but showed little interest in acting as a fair judge. The way that
Ming China settled Dong-Wang disputes was measured by how deep the mountain
regime rulers bowed down: when Wang Yong and Jiawu pled guilty shortly after they
committed the crime and sent envoys to Beijing to show their submissive obedience,
the Ming acted the magnanimous overlord and soon pardoned them. But for Dong
Min, the real victim who believed he did nothing wrong and refused to seek the
Ming’s forgiveness, the Ming accused him of disturbing the regional order and
eventually had him executed. In other words, the Ming perceived those who dared to
challenge its authority the dangerous troublemaker, while those who shed real blood
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merely made forgivable mistakes. It held a condescending view toward dealing with
mountain society affairs.
Relevant to the first feature, a second point one may argue about Ming’s role in
1440s mountain society was its passive and indifferent stance. The Ming did not pool
many resources, be it military, personal, or economic, to this western mountain
frontier. As long as there was no critical social unrest, the Ming court was willing to
compromise, even if it meant executing a few military officers or pardoning several
murderers. While one might interpret this as meticulous calculation, I argue it was
more of an aloof attitude that points to the Ming’s carelessness toward the region. The
Ming demonstrated little interest in penetrating the local society and thus made little
use of the taxonomic information collected by the interpreter about the mountain
society. Such an attitude, I argue, resulted from two reasons. On one hand, the
exhausting war in 1420s northwest Sichuan had made it clear to the Ming court that
ruling the mountain society was too costly to bear. Instead, a passive style of indirect
rule was much more appealing. On the other hand, in the 1440s, the Ming court was
busy with other frontier affairs, as both the Ming- Mongol trade in the north and the
Luchuan wars in the southwest created huge political and economic burdens for the
Ming. Therefore, the clash between two frontier figureheads and their cliques was of
little importance from the Ming court’s perspective.
In the 1440s proto-clan competition, the Zagu clique was undoubtedly the winner.
This is clearly shown through diplomatic frequency: while there was only an average
of 0.8 Dongbuhanhu emissaries traveling to Beijing each year in the 1440s, Zagu
envoys presented at the Ming court four times just in 1447. The changing power
balance in the Dongbuhanhu-Zagu competition even created fissures in the proto-clan
alliance. As Zagu rose to power, the ruler of Biesizhai, as one of the oldest and
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supposedly loyalist allies to Dongbuhanhu, began to have second thoughts. The
Biesizhai ruler not only forged a seal and claimed himself to be the Grand pacification
commissioner, the 3B rank which equaled to the Dongbuhanhu ruler, but also sided
with Zagu and other Big Clan groups to attack Dongbuhanhu communities. This was
seen as a direct challenge to the authority of Dongbuhanhu, the nominal leader of the
Small Clan clique, and tremendously upset the Dongbuhanhu leader Gelek Gyaltsen.
Through a series of tactics, Gelek Gyaltsen captured the Biesizhai ruler, found his
fake seal, and gouged out his eyes.190 The torture was certainly for punishing the
Biesizhai ruler’s betrayal, but should also be understood as an indication of Gelek
Gyaltsen’s fury related to Zagu’s rise to power.
The Tributary System in the Mountains
As the underdog in the power struggle in the 1440s, Gelek Gyaltsen must have
been furious about the situation. Therefore, when he was informed of the domestic
strife in Zagu, Gelek Gyaltsen took radical but resolute moves. In 1447, the concubine
of the ruler of Zagu, for some reason, poisoned her husband and son, resulting in the
death of the Zagu ruler and his potential successor.191 At the same time, the new Zagu
regent was obviously not very good at ruling. He not only humiliated the leader of
Dasiman and other important members of Zagu’s ruling class, but also failed to stop
them from leaving Zagu to submit to Dongbuhanhu.192 Gelek Gyaltsen saw these
geopolitical changes as great opportunities. He thought the greatly weakened Zagu
could not check him anymore, and his joy is obvious in the memorial he sent to the
Ming: “Now, we have prepared horses and local goods as tributary gifts and are about
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to set off. We will open a new route that traverses the Zagu mountain. Please have
officials and our escorts wait on the other side of the mountain.”193
In what sounds like a notification rather than a plea, Gelek Gyaltsen caught the
Ming in a moment of weakness as the empire was mired in the Luchuan campaign.194
Moreover, I argue that Gelek Gyaltsen did not report the domestic calamity of Zagu’s
ruling house for no reason: it points to a taboo that the Ming cared about in frontier
society. Although the Ming maintained an indifferent attitude toward the power
struggles in the mountain society, one thing that it did pay attention to was rulership
succession. The Ming emperor perceived himself as the overlord of the mountain
regimes and thus the only superior who could justify or nullify the legitimacy of
mountain regime rulers. Therefore, when the Zagu ruler’s concubine killed her
husband and son, it not only directly challenged the Ming’s hegemony over
succession affairs, but also violated the Ming-promoted Confucius orthodoxy in
which women should obey men. This on all accounts undermined the legitimacy of
Zagu and also justified Dongbuhanhu’s further anti-Zagu actions.
Gelek Gyaltsen’s claim to open up a new route in the mountain, pointed out by a
Ming official, was just a smokescreen for Dongbuhanhu’s invasion of Zagu.195 And
indeed, Gelek Gyaltsen did invade Zagu. In 1448 and 1449, Dongbuhanhu mounted a
series of attacks and successfully occupied a not insignificant amount of Zagu
territory.196 The Ming did not react in any substantial way because it was busy with
the Ming-Mongol struggle and the ensuing succession crisis when the emperor was
captured alive by the Mongols. But this does not necessarily mean that Zagu did not
try to get the Ming involved. In fact, Zagu sent an envoy to bring important political
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messages to the Ming, but the court failed to address them. But before we dive into
this diplomatic incident, it is important to first introduce how we should understand
the so-called tributary system in the context of Ming-highland interactions.
The tributary system was a cosmological, ideological, and diplomatic framework
that many Chinese dynasties employed when interacting with the outside world, and
the Ming dynasty is often singled out as the model.197 Power asymmetry forms the
core of the system: it assumed China’s top position in the inter-polity hierarchy,
which other participants of the system had to acknowledge if they sought to establish
trade and diplomatic relations with China. For the Ming, the system embodied the
empire’s superiority and hegemony, and Chinese historical materials always
document it as the predominant framework that provided basic principles for the
Ming’s foreign communication.198
Research on the tributary system is abundant, and many scholars would agree that
most historical materials we have reflect a China-centric view and thus can disguise
certain aspects of the cross-regional contact. Peter Schweiger, in one of his recent
papers, convincingly suggests that Tibetans never used the word dpya, which had
been the Tibetan term for “tribute” (贡 gong), to describe their historical interactions
with China, even though this narrative is commonly adopted in Ming and Qing court
records.199 This supports the argument that the Tibetans, and probably all participants
of the tributary system, might have their own interpretations for the tributary
interactions with China.

197

Wills, Embassies and Illusions: Dutch and Portuguese Envoys to Kʻang-Hsi, 1666-1687, 14.
Wills, Embassies and Illusions, 14.
199
Schwieger, “Tibetan Hierarchs and the Qing emperor,” in Jeannine Bischoff and Alice Travers eds., Commerce
and Communities: Social and Political Status and the Exchange of Goods in Tibetan Societies, 37.
198

78
This section examines the so-called tributary interactions between the Ming and the
northwest Sichuan mountain society from the perspective of material culture. Instead
of court narratives, it pays more attention to the on-the-ground ramifications of the
transregional diplomatic framework. In other words, it focuses on how mountain
regime rulers and inhabitants perceived their interactions with the Ming, and what
exactly the tributary system brought to the mountain society. Two cases will be
analyzed in detail, the first one related to Zagu and the second to Dongbuhanhu.
In 1448, Zagu sent a monk called Nangezang (南哥藏) to Beijing. In Ming court
records, Nangezang’s arrival was documented as a tributary mission, and the
materials he brought along with him—some swords and armors—were hence
recorded as tributary gifts.200 In Ming official records, formal diplomatic contacts
such as tributary activities were always documented carefully, and tributary items—
be it religious objects, horses, or local goods—were usually clearly laid out. In this
regard, swords and armor were the only tribute gifts Nangezang presented to the
Ming. Faced with such items from the mountain society, the Ming reception official
commented that the swords and armor were of little value, and thus Nangezang was
nothing but a petty swindler who sought to trade the Ming’s rewards for some scrap
metal. Therefore, the Ming officials reduced the return rewards and harshly criticized
Nanggezang. This humiliation tremendously outraged Nangezang, who then refused
to kneel down to accept the downgraded rewards.201 Because of such a reaction,
Nangezang was eventually thrown into jail for disgracing the Ming emperor. 202
In Ming court records, nearly all foreigners from abroad were documented as
tributary envoys, and their arrivals were perceived as gestures of subordination to the
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Ming’s supremacy. In this regard, Nangezang seemed to be quite greedy and rude for
offering inferior tributes and confronting the Ming court. This was exactly the
message the Ming source intended to convey. But I argue that the confrontation
caused by Nangezang’s behavior could be understood differently from a borderland
standpoint. First, the timing and geopolitical context here are particularly important:
Nangezang came to the Ming court in 1448. It was only several months after the Zagu
leader suddenly died at the stake in the Zagu and Dongbuhanhu competition. Relying
on the Ming’s support to compete with Dongbuhanhu for years,203 the Zagu ruling
class immediately dispatched an envoy to Beijing since the regime was in great need
of the Ming’s support. Therefore, it is less likely that Nangezang, who was chosen to
carry out such an important mission, would bring the Ming a pile of trash.
The gifts of swords and armor further prove that the Ming misunderstood
Nangezang. These seemingly strange “tributary gifts” were not traditional tribute
items one might expect, such as horses, Buddhist statues, or spices, and they were not
even locally made, seeing as in other places they were also designated as Ming-made
swords and armor (明刀劍、明甲). From the Ming official’s perspective, they were
nothing more than scrap metal that frontier swindlers used to trick the Ming in return
for rewards. But in the mountain society, swords and armor had specific political
meaning: they were tokens of political alliance and symbols of submission and peacemaking. Sending weaponry was a symbolic action that expressed one’s wish for nonviolent dialogue and peaceful submission. When Gelek Gyaltsen was trying to call for
an alliance, he sent envoys to bring armor to his potential allies to demonstrate his
sincerity.204 When Jiawu wished to plead for mercy from the Ming for his brutality at
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the Hanshui Mountain Pass, he also sent six sets of iron armor to the Ming court to
ask for forgiveness.205
In this regard, Nangezang was not disrespectful at all: he brought along the most
important and appropriate token for such a scenario at a time when Zagu was
desperate for Ming’s support to compete with Dongbuhanhu. But this intention was
beyond the Ming’s comprehension: on the contrary, the Ming accused Zagu of
lacking sincerity, even though they were a regular tribute payer. Similar
misunderstanding also applied to some Ming officials’ scornful comments when they
describe the Buddhist statues and relics (舍利) that some Tibetan Buddhist monks
brought to the Ming court as valueless scrap.206 However, in a Buddhist society like
Tibet, religious items were considered the most precious things. And even the fine
fabrics and silk that the Tibetans received from the Ming were tailored to make huge
Thangkas for rituals or added to the raw materials to make Buddha statues.207 Such
cases prove that the tributary interactions might mean quite differently to different
participants. Downgrading their reward was the Ming’s reaction after evaluating the
economic value of Zagu’s “tributes;” but from Nangezang’s point of view, it was the
indicator that suggested the breaking of a long-term friendship between the Ming and
Zagu at a fatal moment. Of course, Nangezang was greatly outraged by this response.
When this diplomatic mission failed, Zagu gradually withdrew from the competition
with Dongbuhanhu as well.
While the rise of Zagu abruptly halted in the late 1440s, Gelek Gyaltsen developed
a taste for aggression and pushed further on. In 1450, he wished to send a delegation
to Beijing, and the tributary gifts he prepared were horses, swords, and armor. Horses
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had always been a top tributary item that the Ming lacked and hence desired to
receive from northwest Sichhuan. Swords and armor, in this context, most likely
indicated Gelek Gyaltsen’s intention to use a peace-making token to lessen the
Ming’s vigilance. But Gelek Gyaltsen’s wishful thinking failed as his delegation
proposal was rejected by the Ming’s Sichuan officials, who could not tell Gelek
Gyaltsen’s real intentions based on his recent bold and illegal actions.208 Yet Gelek
Gyaltsen was not someone who easily gave up. In 1451, he requested to send a tribute
delegation to Ming court again. But when the Ming officials approached the envoys to
communicate their second denial, the tribute envoys replied: “Alas! It is too late. The
horses were already on the way.”209 This clearly shows that Gelek Gyaltsen had
already decided to ignore the Ming’s regulation since the Chinese empire could not
check him anyway. Quite by coincidence, this arrogant envoy was killed shortly after
he took the horses into the Zagu territory, and all the horses were forced back to
Dongbuhanhu’s territory.210 This incident provided Gelek Gyaltsen an ideal catalyst to
escalate his aggressive actions. Later that year, he ordered more than 2000 soldiers to
march into Zagu territory, and the justification for this action was to escort a mere 100
tribute horses.211 In this case, we can see that going to Beijing to pay tribute had
become an excuse that provided Gelek Gyaltsen a legitimate reason to move armed
soldiers around and march into the territory of neighboring polity.
The Tumu incident in 1449 and the resulting political turbulence at the Ming court
forced the Ming to adopt a smoother way to interact with Dongbuhanhu. Comparing a
1450 imperial edict with one from 1447, we see that outright rebukes were already
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replaced by gentle and cautious suggestions.212 Moreover, since the Ming still had the
impression that Gelek Gyaltsen was a mere mountain regime figurehead thirsty for
power and money, the court kept raising Gelek Gyaltsen’s ranking and granting him
many tribute rewards in exchange for frontier peace. In 1452, the court decided to
raise Gelek Gyaltsen to the level of a regional Military Commissioner-in-chief (都指
揮使), which was a 2A ranking in the Ming’s bureaucratic system. In return, the Ming
wished that Gelek Gyaltsen would return the territory that he had annexed back to
Zagu.213 When Gelek Gyaltsen seemed to have followed the Ming’s instruction, the
Ming emperor was quite delighted and even praised Gelek Gyaltsen as the “number
one iron mountain guarding the empire’s west.”214 At the same time, the court granted
preferential treatment to tributary groups from Dongbuhanhu. In 1452 and 1453, a
total of eight Dongbuhanhu embassies went to Beijing. This is exactly the privilege
that only Zagu could enjoy several years ago. Although these envoys behaved quite
rudely on their way to Beijing and frequently conducted illegal activities, the court
decided to pardon their criminal behavior.215 After all, from the Ming court’s
perspective, Gelek Gyaltsen was just a greedy barbarian who only pursued material
benefits from the tributary system.216
In 1453, a Ming official filed a complaint to the Ming court about Dongbuhanhu’s
tributary group and how they had disturbed the social order along the route. This
document allows us to, on one hand, get a sense of what kind of scene the
Dongbuhanhu envoys had made in the Chinese heartland, and on the other hand,
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investigate what exactly Dongbuhanhu had gained from such tributary trips. The
memorial reads:
Li Shi, Grand Coordinator and Right Censor-in-chief in Huguang (巡
撫湖廣右都御史) submits the following memorial:
When the fan monks (番僧), State Preceptors (國師), Meditation
Masters (禪師) and Lama (剌麻) from Sichuan Dongbuhanhu Grand
Pacification Commission (四川董卜韓胡宣慰司) completed their
tributary mission, they were allowed to bring tea back. With this
permission, [these envoy monks] purchased over ten thousand catties
of tea as well as articles made of copper, tin, iron, and porcelain. [The
envoys] requested boats to transport all the goods to Chengdu and then
hired porters to carry them into the mountains. Certain areas along
their return path, such as 10 li in Qiong county (邛縣), 2 li in
Mingshan County (名山縣), 4 li in Yingjing County (滎經縣) and 10
li in Yazhou (雅州), were primarily dwelled in by Bo-Yi indigenes (僰
夷⼟⺠). [These non-Han people] were not used to shouldering loads,
but preferred to hoist them on their back. For places where proceeding
was difficult, even women were required to help lift the goods for as
far as four to five hundred li. But when goods were delivered, these
porters were to be blamed [by Dongbuhanhu envoys] for stealing and
were forced to pay for the loss. Moreover, the regions [these envoys
and porters travelled through] were of precipitous terrain and scarce
population. The envoys and their retinue travelled and rested in the
wilderness day and night, and hence disturbed the honest Hua-xia
ethos with their barbaric and vulgar customs. When passing through
postal stations, these people always asked for copious wine and food
and tended to harm people with their weapons when their needs were
not met. Even those chiliarches and centurions appointed [by the Ming
court] as their accompaniment could not stop such behaviors. Noticing
the material benefits of such tributary missions, our frontier subjects
began to encourage their sons to learn the foreign language so as to
sneak into tributary groups as fan monks and interpreters. Now I
propose that the Investigation Bureau (都察院) should ban behaviors
such as private contacts with fan monks, trading tea and other articles
made of copper, tin, iron, and porcelain with them, and sending their
sons to be monks and interpreters. Anyone who dares to violate should
be banished beyond the northern border to be frontier soldiers, and his
neighbors who fail to report [the outlaw actions] would be punished
accordingly as well.217
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This lengthy but rich memorial highlights at least three aspects of Dongbuhanhu’s
participation in the tributary system. First, it indicates that the interaction between the
Ming and the mountain society had already affected regions beyond the highland
world. The memorial was written by an official who stationed at Huguang, which was
an important distribution center for trans-Yangtze trade. According to Chen Zhigang,
in the mid-15th century, the price for tea at Huguang was much cheaper than that of
Sichuan,218 and this was most likely why Dongbuhanhu envoys chose to purchase tea
at Huguang. Although Huguang was quite far away from Dongbuhanhu, the envoys
did not need to worry about the shipping cost; according to the Ming’s regulation, all
expenses for the tributary envoys’ round trip, including lodging, accommodations,
and transportation, were at the Ming’s cost. Technically the envoys had to buy and
transport things on their own; but oftentimes, as this memorial demonstrates, the
Ming had to take care of the shipment of goods that envoys acquired through private
trade as well. It is reasonable to speculate that the Dongbuhanhu envoys must have
bought a tremendous amount of goods at Huguang and requested the local
administrative office to summon labor for transportation, to the great annoyance of
the local official.
Second, the memorial indicates that what really worried the Ming officials was the
disturbance such tributary groups caused to the social order in Chinese heartland. Not
only did it create a financial burden for regional governments to host the tributary
envoys and additional workload for commoners’ corvée labor, but the official also
claimed that the tributary groups had generated considerable bad influence on the
Ming’s subjects and culture as a whole. He argued that the tributary groups’ frequent
travel along the Ming’s postal network and their alleged barbaric behaviors had
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become a landscape that stained Confucius culture, and more importantly, corrupted
those who lived near the frontier region. As many of the Ming’s frontier subjects
began to engage with the tributary groups illegally, either by faking their identities
and sneaked into the tributary groups or conducting private trade with them, the Ming
lost not only potential taxpayers but also regulation on frontier affairs. Therefore, in
the eyes of this official, the Donbuhanhu envoys, probably together with other
mountain regime tributary groups that enjoyed court privileges, had done China no
good whatsoever.
Third, this memorial paves the way for my discussion of the meaning of the
tributary system for the Dongbuhanhu regime’s own development. There are, again,
three points on this issue. The first, as explicitly revealed in the memorial, has to do
with Donghuhanhu’s economic development. One conventional narrative about the
tributary system is that while the Chinese dynasties acquired political and ideological
satisfaction when the tributary regimes came to pay homage, the tributary regimes
were mainly interested in the material benefits behind the interaction. Such an
interpretation, I argue, is somewhat oversimplified. On one hand, as my examinations
above have demonstrated, participating in the tributary system also benefited
mountain regimes politically, as they could have their authority recognized by an
external source of legitimacy. On the other hand, few studies discuss what the
material benefits meant to tributary regimes. This is not a self-evident question;
rather, it points to the issue of how tributary regimes spent the wealth they had gained
after they returned from their trip.
In the case of Dongbuhanhu, we see that the envoys primarily brought two types of
goods back to the mountain: tea and metal items. Widely believed by the Ming people

86
to contain the basic nutrition to keep various kinds of barbarians alive,219 tea actually
carried important social functions in the mountain society as well. It firstly helped
mountain regimes like Dongbuhanhu consolidate patronage over religious
communities. Religious groups in the mid-15th century Tibetan world had huge
demand for tea. One source indicates that one monastery requested 50,000 catties of
tea from the Ming.220 Another documents that one monk alone sought to purchase
6,000 catties of tea in the Chinese heartland.221 Therefore, Dongbuhanhu could use
the huge amount of tea that it acquired through tributary missions to win the support
of the religious communities to strengthen local governance. Moreover, it indicates
that religious communities under Dongbuhanhu’s rule could enjoy higher tea
purchase quota from the Ming court.222 This, undoubtedly, would provide incentive
for more religious communities to submit to Dongbuhanhu.
In addition to appealing to religious communities, tea in the mountain society was
also used in transactions. Although we do not have 15th century sources, a study on
18th century eastern Tibet shows that tea, because of its broad acceptance, easy
preservation, and wide circulation, was in fact used as currency in barter exchange.223
It is highly possible that tea was already used in this way several centuries earlier by
the mountain regimes to compensate the labor of their subjects. Therefore, the more
tea these regimes acquired from the Ming, the better they could control the local
economy.
There are few sources dealing with how Dongbuhanhu rulers made use of the metal
articles that the envoys bought back. But here are some of my speculative hypotheses.
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In addition to daily instruments such as cooking utensils and farming implements,
iron articles were most likely recast to make weapons, and this was a tactic frequently
adopted by the Mongols at the time.224 In the same manner, copper and tin articles
could either be used as everyday items or smelted into bronze for weaponry, religious
items such as Buddhist statues, or decorative ornaments. In terms of porcelain, I argue
it was more of a social status marker in the mountain society. For most mountain
inhabitants at the time, porcelain from the Chinese heartland was not easily
accessible. Therefore, they were most likely precious items circulated among the
ruling class to highlight their elite identity. As this reasoning goes, porcelain, together
with other tributary rewards that I will examine in the following paragraphs, might
also have functioned in making political alliances for their luxury value.
The second aspect of the tributary system’s local meaning is that it facilitated transregional communication and interaction among multiple mountain regimes. Going to
Beijing to pay tribute became an important and legitimate reason for regime rulers
and their reliable agents to travel to other regimes, and thus these trips were a good
opportunity to strengthen social networks or form political alliances. The memorial
reveals that while Dongbuhanhu envoys travelled through the mountainous areas on
their way back, they interacted closely with the so-called Bo-Yi indigenes. Another
memorial vividly illustrates how tribute missions allowed Dongbuhanhu and its close
ally, Shangba, to dispatch messengers between themselves for various types of
conspiracies.
In 1452, before the Dongbuhanhu tributary envoys’ departure for Beijing, the
Shangba leader sent an underling named Lazhong (臘仲) to bring 120 horses to
Dongbuhanhu. Lazhong’s mission was to assume a Dongbuhanhu envoy identity so
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as to bring the horses to Beijing as tributary horses and thereby take a share of the
rewards. Using the fake identity of an interpreter named Sonam Rinchen (鎖南領占),
Lazhong traveled to Beijing, presented the “tributary horses,” visited the palace of the
Shu Prince (蜀王府) in Chengdu on his way back, and was at last detected by the
Ming military and captured. After torturing and executing Lazhong, the Ming military
on one hand made up a certificate of Lazhong’s death by illness and informed
Dongbuhanhu, and on the other hand learned that Lazhong had using taken advantage
of multiple tribute missions to frequently travel between Dongbuhanhu and Shangba
as a messenger.225 Such a function of the tributary system was most likely beyond the
Ming court’s imagination. Moreover, since the Ming required all tributary envoys to
stay at Huitong Guan, the Ming’s official site to accommodate diplomatic
delegations, tributary envoys from the mountain society had many chances to interact
in Beijing, probably even more than when they were in northwest Sichuan. For
highland inhabitants who had fewer chances to interact with strangers from other
regions, delivering tribute horses in Beijing, the great metropolitan city, had
undoubtably opened a new world for them. Of course, there was also a downside to
such interactions, as one fight between western Sichuan and Ryukyu envoys resulted
in some serious injuries and Ming’s ensuring punishments.226
The third way that the tributary system affected the Dongbuhanhu regime’s
development is that it functioned as a model which Gelek Gyaltsen could mimic when
building a Dongbuhanhu-centered regional hierarchical system, and the tributary
rewards and all kinds of material goods that Dongbuhanhu envoys acquired in the
Chinese heartland in turn became Dongbuhanhu’s material basis to construct its own
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regional order. One 1452 memorial reveals how Dongbuhanhu was creating its mini
tributary system in the mountain society. At the time, a Tibetan Buddhist monk was
wandering around among mountain communities to lobby them to go to Beijing to
pay tribute, and in return, the monk himself might be rewarded by the Ming court for
such merits. But later he noticed that the so-called raw barbarians he successfully
convinced were stopped halfway by Dongbuhanhu henchmen. In addition, the
henchmen promised those who were about to go to Beijing that if they paid tribute to
Dongbuhanhu, instead of to the Ming court, each person in their communities would
receive four bolts of Sansuo cloth (三梭布). For the community leaders, their needs
for gold seals, silver seals, or high-ranking official titles might also be satisfied.227
This message, though probably not the intention of the Tibetan Buddhist monk,
revealed the wealth Dongbuhanhu had at the time. Sansuo cloth was primarily made
in the lower Yangtze delta region, the center for Ming China’s textile industry, and
hence was of supreme quality. One reference here is that while Gelek Gyaltsen
promised those who joined him would receive four bolts personally, the Ming could
only reward those who refused Dongbuhanhu’s offer with one bolt of Sansuo cloth
per person.228 Undoubtedly, Dongbuhanhu had acquired a huge amount of such
products through the tributary system, together with other gold and silver items. In
that regard, the Ming’s tributary system not only served as a geopolitical model for
Gelek Gyaltsen to imagine the hierarchical order in the mountain world, but also
provided him with the capital to build such a system. But one must note that Gelek
Gyaltsen was not constructing an identical system to the Ming model: he was mixing
the Ming’s tributary system with the religious order that had dominated the mountain
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world for quite a while. In 1452, an Ming interpreter reported to the court that
Dongbuhanhu had dispatched an underling to a community called A’sigong (阿思貢)
with a set of armor, and the Dongbuhanhu envoy told the A’sigong leader to convert
from Tibetan Buddhism to Bön.229 If he agreed to do so, Gelek Gyaltsen would build a
Bön temple in A’sigong and allocate five hundred Bön monks under his command.230
This message not only proves my earlier argument that armor and weaponry were
widely used in the mountain society to make political alliances or show an intention
for peace talks, but also indicates that building an empire featuring Bön religion had
always been at the center of Gelek Gyaltsen’s vision.
By the early 1450s, Gelek Gyaltsen had successfully eliminated the Zagu threat that
had haunted him for quite some time, accumulated a considerably amount of wealth
through its tributary interactions with the Ming, and started his empire-building
enterprise that feature a combination of the Ming-style tributary system and
mountain-style Bön belief. His next move was to break through the barriers of the
mountain and invade the Ming.
The War that Never Happened
While the Ming still saw Gelek Gyaltsen as a greedy barbarian who was only
interested in the material benefits of the tributary system, his ambition had only
grown larger by the early 1450s. He started to plan an invasion of the Sichuan plain,
the most important and economically developed region in the empire’s west.
In 1452, Gelek Gyaltsen wished the Ming to provide him some books and gave a
list to a Ming frontier official. The list began with some works from the Confucian
canon, such as Zhou Yi (Book of Changes 周易), Shangshu (Book of Documents 尚
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書), and Mao Shi (Book of Songs 毛詩). But two geographic guidebooks appear at the
end: Fangyu shenglan (Travelogue to Sites of Scenic Beauty 方輿勝覽) and Chengdu
ji (Records of Chengdu 成都記). Although Gelek Gyaltsen’s requests were made with
a modest and respectful tone, as the Ming official remarked, there was more behind
the book list. The Ming official pointed out that the Confucian classics that Gelek
Gyaltsen requested could be easily purchased at any bookstore. Therefore, this was
merely subterfuge to mask the last two titles on the list that contained important
geographical information on the Chengdu plain and could thus be referenced for
military purposes.231 Figuring out this rebellious intention, the official did not give
Gelek Gyaltsen what he asked for.
Together with the book list, Gelek Gyaltsen also sent some valuable items,
including a silver wine jar and a gold pearl, for the official personally.232 This was
obviously a bribe, a way of interaction that was prevalent at the time between
mountain inhabitants and Ming officials. Ming records documented many cases in
which corrupt Ming officials were caught and punished for extorting bribes from the
locals.233 Gelek Gyaltsen even knew how to take advantage of the Ming’s low
tolerance for frontier corruption at times for specific purposes. When he reported the
Zagu incident to the Ming court in which the Zagu ruler was poisoned by his
concubine, he also claimed that this lady had bribed a Ming chiliarch to slander
Dongbuhanhu, a rhetoric that might further damage Zagu’s image as a loyal regime.234
When the Ming military commander, Kou Shen, repeatedly rejected Gelek Gyaltsen’s
requests to open up new routes in the mountain, the Dongbuhanhu ruler sent
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memorials to the court to impeach Kou Shen for taking bribes from Zagu, abusing
underlings, and adultery.235 Although there is no way for us to discern whether Gelek
Gyaltsen’s accusations were founded or not, these claims did cause the Ming to
investigate those who leaned toward Zagu or created obstacles for Dongbuhanhu and
temporarily suspend or remove them from their positions.
Collecting geographical information on Ming territory and sabotaging the
credibility of Ming officials, Gelek Gyaltsen also challenged the Ming’s authority by
re-opening the Dong Min-Wang Yong case. Feeling that the Ming was far from fair in
settling the disputes, Gelek Gyaltsen promised Dong Min’s nephew that he would
hunt down Wang Yong and get revenge for Dong Ming who received wrongful
treatment and died in vein.236 This decision greatly upset the Ming court because
Gelek Gyaltsen was openly questioning the Ming’s role as the highest authority and
arbiter of justice. Gelek Gyaltsen’s ambition to take up hegemony over social order in
the mountain society is also seen in the process of Shangba succession: when the old
Shangba religious leader passed away, it was Gelek Gyaltsen who addressed the Ming
that he had picked the next Shangba religious leader in the Ming’s stead.237
Tension between the Ming and Dongbuhanhu also escalated over territorial
disputes. At first, the Ming wished to act out its role as overlord by requesting Gelek
Gyaltsen to return the territory he occupied in recent years. Gelek Gyaltsen indeed
gave the land back to Zagu and Dasiman following the Ming’s instructions. The Ming
was at first satisfied with this result and praised Gelek Gyaltsen for his cooperation,238
but later found out that Gelek Gyaltsen in fact had withheld the seals of those
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regions,239 which means that Zagu and Dasiman only regained their rulership
nominally, while Dongbuhanhu still controlled these regions in the jurisdictional
sense. In other words, Gelek Gyaltsen still maintained control over a large portion of
Zagu and Dasiman territory.240 Moreover, worried that those who lived in Zagu and
Dasiman territory might reveal strategic information to the Ming military, Gelek
Gyaltsen forcefully relocated many of the inhabitants to the hinterlands of the
mountain society.241
Compared with the territories of Zagu and Dasiman, Weizhou (威州) was an asset
Gelek Gyaltsen refused to give up. From the Ming’s perspective, Weizhou was of
strategic importance and a significant spot to control the northwest Sichuan mountain
region.242 Before the 1450s, the Ming had sanctioned Zagu to implement indirect rule
over the region until Dongbuhanhu took it over. The Ming was quite sensitive about
Dongbuhanhu’s control over Weizhou because it allowed Dongbuhanhu’s army,\
during wartime to come down from the mountain from all four directions
simultaneously, an advantage the Ming was unable to curb.243 But when the Ming
court requested the return of Weizhou, Gelek Gyaltsen replied in an extremely
offensive tone: “We took Weizhou from the hands of the Zagu people, not you Han
people. For nine days and nine nights, I could not figure out [the logic] of this
imperial edict [that asks us to give it back to the Ming]. Weizhou is merely a rocky
mountain smaller than a fist, you’d better not keep pushing to take it back. If you
insist on taking it back, a bloody war that can last one thousand years awaits you!”244
These lines clearly demonstrated that Gelek Gyaltsen did not take the Ming’s
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political superiority seriously anymore and refused the court’s further intervention of
regional affairs, and he obviously was not afraid of military confrontation. Faced
with such a resolution, the Ming court ordered frontier officials to drop the case for
the time being.245
While Gelek Gyaltsen was busy building his empire and new regional world order
in the mountain, the Ming was not just sitting around waiting for Dongbuhanhu’s
further moves. In response to the near completion of Dongbuhanhu watchtowers just
outside the west gate of Songpan and more and more spies watching the Ming’s
military deployment,246 the court began to gear up for a seemingly inevitable clash.
In 1452, the Ming was on one hand trying to divide the Dongbuhanhu alliance by
surrendering or killing some of Gelek Gyaltsen’s allies, and on the other hand
acquiring support from Gelek Gyaltsen’s old foe, Wang Yong, who agreed to mount
a flank attack on Dongbuhanhu once the war started.247 From 1453 to 1455, Ming
soldiers and military logisticians were dispatched to strategic locations,248 military
meetings and personnel rearrangements were frequent,249 and a new battalion in
Guanxian county, the place the Ming officials thought to be the site of
Dongbuhanhu’s first attack, was quickly whipped into fighting shape.250 The war
could break out at any moment.
In the summer of 1455, after years of preparation for the Dongbuhanhu invasion,
the Ming court suddenly received news of Gelek Gyaltsen’s death. No one saw this
coming. The news came so abruptly that even senior court officials did not believe it
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at first and hastened their underlings to double check.251 Several months later, a
memorial in the name of Gelek Gyaltsen came to court. However, neither the tone
nor the addressed title looked like Gelek Gyaltsen.252 This confirmed the court
officials’ supposition that something unusual had taken place in the Dongbuhanhu
ruling house: Gelek Gyaltsen might really be dead. Yet historical materials never
specify the true reason for the unexpected death of this ambitious leader.
With Gelek Gyaltsen’s death, the threat that Dongbuhanhu posed to the Ming
gradually faded away. In retrospect, the Dongbuhanhu turmoil was one of the biggest
crises that took place in the Ming empire’s western frontier; the next one did not arise
until the arrival of the Mongols one century later. The Ming-centered tributary
system, ironically, contributed considerably to this mid-15th century frontier
emergency. The vicissitudes of the Dongbuhanhu regime closely correlate to its
participation in the tributary system: among all the Dongbuhanhu tributary missions
to the Ming from 1415 to 1626, around one quarter of them took place within the two
decades of the 1440s and 1450s. Dongbuhanhu’s rise, as a local consequence of the
tributary system, was most likely unexpected to the Ming: after all, the system was
originally perceived and designed to consolidate the empire’s authority, not to
undermine it.
Summary
Through the lens of a group of mountain regimes, Dongbuhanhu in particular, this
chapter has examined how the locals of northwest Sichuan understood the mountain
society and its relationship with the Chinese dynasty. In the early to mid-15th century
when Ming China’s infiltration was still limited, the mountain society was largely on
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its own, and it had peculiar social organization modes, secular and religious
hierarchies, and norms and principles for inter-community interactions. When
interacting with Ming China, the mountain regimes spoke fluently in the language of
the tributary system but acted primarily to their own benefit.
The mountainous geomorphology of northwest Sichuan considerably shaped the
region’s geopolitical power dynamics: because of the ragged terrain, the indigenous
regimes were limited in terms of growth and they frequently clashed with one
another. Yet due to logistic, communications, and military difficulties and the ensuing
high cost in managing a centralized regime, the mountain society demonstrated a
rather scattered power pattern in which multiple regimes frequently clashed, yet were
unable to fully annex each other, and therefore were forced to co-exist. Certain
elements, such as religion, blood ties, or ambitious leadership might transcend the
social and natural boundaries to foster cross-regional confederation, but such alliances
were usually quite fragile and hence not perennial.
By analyzing the features of early to mid-15th century mountain society, I hope to
further dialogue with the literature in two ways. First, my argument positions itself in
relation to the so-called Zomia model. It is tricky to say whether northwest Sichuan
belongs to what James Scott identifies as the Zomia region. After all, Scott only
claims that “parts of Sichuan” fall into his Zomia category, but he does not specify
which specific parts he is referring to.253 But even if northwest Sichuan is only the
margin of Zomia, it still indicates certain elements that might revise Scott’s
characterization of the Zomia world. First, while Scott claims that Zomia features
anarchy, in northwest Sichuan we see a highly hierarchical society where rulership
was legitimized in many ways. For both Dongbuhanhu and Zagu, the rulers managed
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intra- and inter-regime relationships with sophisticated techniques and proactively
promoted such ruling norms to other mountain regimes. Secondly, while Scott
highlights the agency of highland inhabitants as they proactively escaped from
lowland states, in northwest Sichuan the mountain regimes were not escaping at all.
Quite the opposite, they approached the lowland Ming China for various reasons, and
Dongbuhanhu even wished to invade and occupy lowland territory. Such a highlandlowland relationship as that we see between Ming China and the mountain society
might expand Scott’s Zomia model to some degree.
The frequent interaction between the mountain world and Chinese dynasties
points to the second intervention of this chapter: the studies on the tributary system.
Historiographically speaking, scholarly focus on Ming China’s tributary interaction
has been quite unbalanced. Most previous research centered on foreign polities but
seldom paid attention to the Ming’s frontier regimes. Such a vacuum in the literature
disguises important historical facts such as the local ramifications of the tributary
system and how exactly frontier regimes perceived and made use of it. This chapter
has addressed these issues from two vantage points. The first one is material culture.
Above I have highlighted how different material goods, whether they were called
tributary gifts or not, carried different cultural connotations as they flowed within the
transregional network. Therefore, misunderstandings likely occurred, and those socalled tributary items functioned differently in different scenarios. Such minor yet
nuanced details have been largely omitted in the previous macro-historical narrative
about the tributary system. Secondly, I have pointed out how the supposedly Mingcentered tributary system could backfire on the Ming when participants in the system
made use of it in ways that beyond the court’s expectations. In the Ming’s eyes, the
system was a network designed to implement indirect control and pacify the distant
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frontier; but from the perspective of the mountain regimes, the system was a supply
line through which they could acquire political capital and material resources for their
own benefit. Wealth and power provided by the Ming not only caused competition
between various mountain regimes, but also nursed the ambition of highland rulers
who eventually aimed to invade the Chinese dynasty.

99

Chapter 4: Monks

Tibetan Buddhism, in late imperial Chinese and Inner Asian history, was a
religious belief, an identity marker, an administrative device, and a source of
legitimacy for rulership. The spread of Tibetan Buddhism was initiated in many ways,
and various individuals and communities patronized the religion for different
political, ideological, and economic reasons. This chapter investigates the activities of
Tibetan Buddhist monks in the highland and their perceptions of the region from the
1430s to the late 15th century. It examines how Tibetan Buddhism spread and
gradually gained power in the early 15th century, experienced rapid development in
highland society under the patronage of the Ming court in the mid-15th century, and
continued to prosper in the late 15th century, even when Ming support was substituted
by strict regulation. In this regard, this chapter takes a local history perspective to
examine Tibetan Buddhism’s development in the highland. Instead of understanding
it as an instrument of the imperial center for the control of the frontier region, this
chapter considers Tibetan Buddhism as a significant social mechanism that provided
the driving force that changed the course of the highland’s historical development.
Some clarifications about terms and concepts must first be made. This chapter
includes extensive discussion of religious and ethnic terms, many of which have
similar English translations. Two Chinese characters, 漢 and 番, frequently appear in
in this chapter’s primary sources. But in Chinese texts, they can refer to either ethnic
or religious concepts depending on the context. Hence in this chapter, when indicating
ethnic concepts, the characters will be presented in their direct transliteration forms,

100
Han and Fan, to refer to the ethnic groups of Han people (漢人) and Fan people
(番人). But when used as religious concepts to refer to 漢傳佛教 and 藏傳佛教 (or
番教 Fanjiao in Ming documents), the concepts will be translated as Chinese
Buddhism and Tibetan Buddhism. In this regard, phrases such as “Tibetan Buddhist”
would merely point to one’s religious identity. If the Tibetan Buddhist’s ethnic
background needs to be emphasized, I will use “ethnic-Han Tibetan Buddhist” or
“ethnic-Fan Tibetan Buddhist” to specify the difference.
Domino Effect in the Eurasian World
Sitting at the easternmost fringes of the Tibetan plateau, the highland region has
long been the periphery in the Tibetan world. Throughout history, it intermittently
received cultural and political influence from central Tibet, but was mostly a world of
its own. However, the geopolitical role of the highland was redefined by one marked
break: Islam’s eastward expansion.
From the 13th century on, a macro-scale geopolitical reshuffling in eastern Eurasia
triggered by the development of Islam considerably affected Tibet’s outreach
interactions. To Tibet’s north, the spread of Islam had reached the eastern Chagatai
Khanate by the early 14th century, competed with Buddhist communities, and
converted a considerable portion of the local population by the end of the 14th
century.254 As Buddhism to a great extent bridged Tibet with its northern neighbor,
such interaction soon became marginal when Buddhists were expelled from the
region. Similar changes took place in regions south and west of Tibet. With the mid14th century rise of Tamerlane, who established Islam as the ideological pillar of his
reign and extended his military forces south to northwest India,255 Tibet’s western gate
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was closed, and its spiritual influence could reach as far west as Ladakh but never
beyond the Hindu Kush.256 In the south, ever since the Delhi Sultanate took over north
India and destroyed the Buddhist bases there, Tibet was treated no differently than a
land of infidels in the eyes of the Islamized Indians.257 It is only natural to assume that
the trade volume between Tibet and India diminished at the same time as their
tenuous religious contacts.
Facing the Islamized and thus estranged regions to its north, west, and south, Tibet
gradually turned its outreach efforts to the east. This does not mean Tibet’s interaction
with the east only started at that time. But still, the geopolitical reconfiguration
undoubtedly intensified such communications. When more and more Tibetans began
to migrate to the east and thus intensified trans-regional interactions, the demographic
pattern of the Tibetan world changed as a result. As Elliot Sperling describes, “the
once marginalized region was integrated with the Tibetan core.”258 The growth of new
market towns in eastern Tibet, most famously Dartsedo, was just one phenomena that
emerged out of these geopolitical changes. What followed this growing contact
between eastern and central Tibet was a changing of geographical perception within
the Tibetan world. Historical materials indicate that by the early 14th century, the two
sub-divisions of eastern Tibet—Mdo-smad (later widely referred as Amdo) and Mdokhams (Dokham, also known as Kham)—had officially taken shape, which marked
the ultimate formation of the so-called three Tibetan regions.259
As the contact between central and eastern Tibet strengthened in the mid-14th
century, a growing religious population also began to move eastward. Because of the

256

In 1447, the Muslims even mounted a jihad to invade Tibet from its west. For details, see Petech, “Ya-Ts’e, GuGe, Pu-Ran: A New Study,” 385.
257
Elverskog, Buddhism and Islam on the Silk Road, 175-227.
258
Sperling, “The Szechwan-Tibet Frontier in the Fifteenth Century,” 39.
259
Shi, “Zangzu Sanda Chuantong Dili Quyu Xingcheng Guocheng Tantao,” 54.

102
religious domination of the Sakya school in central Tibet, many other sects chose to
open new religious realms in the east. For example, Rangjung Dorje, the religious
leader of the Kagyu School traveled to places as far as Mt. Kawagerbo and Mt. Konka
in the Chinese-Tibetan borderland. In these far-east Tibetan regions, Rangjung Dorje
not only actively participated in monastic construction and organized religious
gatherings, but also mediated conflicts among local figureheads.260 These contacts
exposed many eastern Tibet inhabitants to Tibetan Buddhism.
It is noteworthy that the eastward movement of many Tibetan Buddhist communities
did not necessarily lead to its religious booming in the highland region. Tibetan
Buddhism’s impending popularity in the area was not spontaneous or unconditioned.
Instead, it was the product of a series of negotiations, competitions and even
coincidences. This chapter argues that Ming China’s frontier policies pertaining to
Tibetan Buddhism played a significant role in facilitating the religion’s dissemination
and penetration in the highland. These Ming policies’ unexpected ramifications on the
ground eventually changed the highland society’s religious landscape.
A Humble Start for Tibetan Buddhism: The Case of Songpan
As a proclaimed Han-Chinese empire, Ming China has long been perceived as
unable to wield Tibetan Buddhism as an instrument to rule the empire’s margin,
especially in comparison to its predecessor, the Mongol Yuan empire, and its
successor, the Manchu Qing empire.261 But some recent scholarship has begun to
challenge this cliché. Some scholars point out that the early Ming court was in fact
quite active in patronizing Tibetan Buddhist monasteries along its Tibetan frontier as
one form of pacification.262 Others claim that Tibetan Buddhism was also a significant
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diplomatic tool that Ming China employed to interact with the East and Inner Asian
polities that were immersed in a transregional network of monastic Buddhism.263 Yet
all this scholarship mainly takes the top-down perspective of the court and seldom
sheds light on what exactly happened on the ground in the highland. In other words,
we know little about how and why Tibetan Buddhism was employed as part of the
Ming’s pacifying-frontier agenda and what ramifications such religious policies had
in the local society. This section uses the establishment of religious offices in
Songpan as a case study to illustrate how Tibetan Buddhism was incorporated in the
Ming’s frontier policy as a pragmatic administrative tool.
Songpan (松潘), also known as Zungchu-kha or Sharkhog in Tibetan, is located in
modern-day northwest Sichuan. In the Ming dynasty, it was one of the most important
strategic strongholds in the Chinese-Tibetan borderlands. But even if Songpan was
where the Ming held the heaviest army in northwest Sichuan, the military there, as
Elliot Sperling astutely argues, was incompetent in governing the region.264 In fact,
they often made things worse. In 1427, the local Ming army intentionally provoked a
rebellion that consisted of more than ten thousand indigenes just because the military
needed to find an excuse to keep them from redeployment.265 In 1430, a military
officer who was praised as a hero for suppressing the 1427 rebellion was exposed for
severe military abuse, lynching, and conducting unremitting violence against the nonHan inhabitants. He was eventually executed.266 Moreover, the Songpan military
frequently meddled in local conflicts, played various communities against each other,
and pillaged the locals’ property. Simply put, the malfeasance and low efficiency of
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the Ming’s military at Songpan prevented them from implementing effective control
in the region.
Since the military was unable to keep the peace in Songpan, the Ming began to
assign religious officials as supplementary authorities to maintain social order.
Appointing religious officials was a policy widely applied in many regions of the
highland. In some places, such as Hezhou and Xining, religious officials were
dispatched as early as 1389,267 and most of the dispatched religious officials were
Tibetan Buddhist monks. These Buddhists were deemed Buddhist clergy (僧官) in the
Ming’s bureaucratic system. Buddhist clergy at the prefectural level were registered
in the Prefectural Buddhist Registry (僧綱司) as Prefectural Buddhist (Vice) Superior
(都綱/副都綱), and those at subperceptual and county level were designated as
Subprefectural Buddhist Chief (僧正) and District Buddhist Superior (僧會).
Technically, the major duty for Buddhist clergy was to govern and administrate local
Buddhist communities and educate non-Han highland inhabitants with Dharma
doctrines.
The first Prefectural Buddhist Registry in Songpan, the Prefectural Buddhist
Registry of Civilian & Military Guard Commands of Songpan and its Vicinity
(松潘等處軍民指揮使司僧綱司), was established in 1431.268 The fact that this office
was set up less than one year after the corrupted military officer’s beheading is most
likely a reflection of the Ming court’s disappointment with the Songpan military and
also its high expectations for religious officials to pacify the region. The Songpan
Buddhist Registry was instituted at Dabei Monastery (大悲寺), right outside the walls
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of Songpan city.269 At first, the monastery abbot, as well as the Buddhist clergyman,
was a certain Buddhist Master called Yueguang (月光). Later, the Dharma throne and
official seal were passed to Master Zhizhong (智中).270
The religious training and professional experience of both Yueguang and Zhizhong
speak to certain peculiar features of this institution. Yueguang’s personal background
is not specified in historical materials. But he was not a Songpan native and was
transferred to the region and appointed the Songpan Prefectural Buddhist Superior.271
Yet as a total outsider, an ethnic Han monk who practiced Chinese Buddhism,
Yueguang was said to be able to pacify the region and guide the local non-Han
inhabitants toward good.272 This might not be an exaggeration in Chinese sources
because even a local ethnic Fan chose to take him as Dharma instructor. Ming texts
record this Fan person as Yuandan Zangbu (Yonten Zangpo遠丹藏卜). But the first
two characters of his name are the Chinese transliteration of the Tibetan word Yontan (ཡོན་ཏན), which literarily means wisdom, or zhi in Chinese (智). This attests
precisely to the fact that he was a disciple of Yueguang because he shared the same
generational designation of Zhi with Zhizhong, another disciple of Yueguang. In fact,
some Chinese texts just refer to this Tibetan as Zhi-Yonten Zangpo (智遠丹藏卜),273
which is redundant from a semantic perspective but solid evidence to prove his
relationship with Master Yueguang and Zhizhong.
Compared with Yueguang or Yonten Zangpo, Zhizhong left more of an impression
in historical documents. As an ethnic Han born in Zhejiang surnamed Jiang (姜),274
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Zhizhong became Yueguang’s disciple at the age of twelve and later followed his
mentor to Songpan.275 Probably because of his young age, Zhizhong was capable of
speaking Tibetan as he was described as having mastered “bird language,” a
convention in Chinese historiography to refer to non-Han languages. 276 When
Yueguang retired, Zhizhong filled his position and did quite well.277 He boosted the
influence of the Dabei Monastery and incorporated other regional temples as Dabei
Monastery’s sub-monasteries.278 Later, Zhizhong himself turned to Master Chushan
Shaoqi (楚山紹琦) for Dharma instruction and thus was recognized as one of the
carriers in the 28th generation of the Linji Chan lineage.279
In addition to the religious aspect, Zhizhong is praised in Buddhist texts for
pacifying the rebellious non-Han locals.280 As one Ming scholar observed: “The Fan
people rebelled and fought with each other all the time. But once the Buddhists
approached them, the Fan people would immediately prostrated themselves, swore an
oath, and dispersed.”281 However, in comparison with this description of the
Buddhists’ mild actions, another primary source indicates that Zhizhong was once
dispatched to devise a night strike on a community the Ming military considered a
threat. Zhizhong was described as gallant and swift in the military action, and he
personally led the troops to eliminate the entire community.282 In this regard, the
Buddhist clerics were indeed taking over the Ming military’s job. Although such
actions obviously violated Buddhist officials’ commitments to abstaining from
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killing, to the Ming, the value of these clergy lay precisely in their capacity to keep
the frontier safe, rather than their religious achievement. After years of service in
Songpan, Zhizhong retired and moved to one Fazang Monastery near Chengdu, just
as Yueguang did,283 and the position of registry superior was filled by Yonten Zangpo
and then a certain Master Zichang.284
Many aspects concerning this Buddhist Registry remain unclear to scholars today.
For example, although both ethnic Han and ethnic Fan monks lived in the monastery,
did they practice Chinese Buddhism or Tibetan Buddhism? In Contesting the Yellow
Dragon, Xiaofei Kang and Donald Sutton claim that the religious background of both
Master Zhizhong and the Dabei Monastery was somewhat hybrid with Tibetan
Buddhist features that indicate “Ming tolerance of Tibetan religion.”285 This
observation, I argue, derives from their misreading of the materials. So far, no
material could attest to the Tibetan Buddhist characters of either Zhizhong or the
Dabei Monastery. When Master Zhizhong received a Zangjing (藏經), Kang and
Sutton translate it as Tibetan scriptures, but in fact Zangjing refers to Tipitaka and
thus has nothing to do with Tibetan scriptures. For the alleged Tibetan theme of the
Dabei Monastery, the evidence the two authors give is the scripture-turning pavilion
(轉經樓) in the monastery where a revolving sutra bookcase was installed. But this
was not a distinctly Tibetan Buddhist feature and was widely used in Chinese
Buddhism as well.286 In contrast to these scholars’ opinions and judging from the
existing materials as well as Yueguang and Zhizhong’s training, I argue it is almost
certain that the Dabei Monastery was a Chinese Buddhist monastery (漢傳佛寺). But
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still, this does not rule out the possibility that many Dabei Monastery monks had
developed a certain level of knowledge about esoteric Buddhism, and many of them
were bilingual.
Setting up shortly after the Ming military in Songpan was proven incompetent, the
first Songpan Buddhist Registry and its clergy maintained social order in the region to
a certain degree. But as the previous chapter points out, there were also other two
religions prevailed in the 1440s northwest Sichuan: Bön and Tibetan Buddhism, and
their followers were in constant and intense competition. Facing such a situation, the
Ming, granted more support to the Tibetan Buddhist monks with the purpose of
checking Dongbuhanhu clique.
In 1440, the Ming dispatched a translator to Songpan to investigate the charged
situation on the ground between Bön and Tibetan Buddhist communities. When he
returned, he filed a report with the court. In the report he pointed out that the Bön
followers led by State Preceptor (國師) Zhangpa Lodrö Gyaltsen and the Tibetan
Buddhists led by meditation Master (禪師) Chörin had been engaged in fierce
conflicts for a long time. Hence, the Ming should take action to ease the tension.287
Only two weeks after receiving the report, the Ming court made a swift decision to
upgrade Chörin, the Tibetan Buddhist leader, from Buddhist master to State
Preceptor.288 By doing this while the Bön master was happened to be at the Ming
court, the Ming conveyed a clear signal: the empire now recognized Tibetan
Buddhism in northwest Sichuan as high as Bön in terms of religious status and
importance.
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It is in this context that the Ming set up the second Buddhist Registry in Songpan.
In 1441, roughly around the same time when Chörin was promoted to state preceptor,
the Ming announced the establishment of the second Prefectural Buddhist Registry in
Songpan, the Prefectural Buddhist Registry of Songpan Guard (松潘衛僧綱司).289
But unlike the one in Dabei Monastery where Chinese Buddhists without local roots
took charge, the new office was established for an indigenous religious leader,
Sangerzhe Xianjie (桑兒者先結), who had provided military information and local
guidance to the Ming troops.290 Unlike Yueguang and Zhizhong, Sangerzhe Xianjie
was a practitioner of Tibetan Buddhism. But similar to the relationship of Yueguang
and Yonten Zangpo, he had one disciple named Zhang Heshang (長和尚), who was
very possibly an ethnic-Han judging from his name. One could even speculate that
this Zhang Heshang was the translator for Sangerzhe Xianjie’s interaction with the
Ming military. As the Ming granted seals and imperial edicts that legitimized
Sangerzhe Xianjie’s clerical position, the indigenous leader was also permitted to
build a monastery and govern fellow Buddhists on his own.291
Tibetan Buddhism in Songpan, as this section has demonstrated, was not always
popular and powerful in the highland region. It is only around the 1440s that Tibetan
Buddhist groups in the region began to gain more support from Ming China as higher
ranks of titles were granted and new institutions created. The purpose of these actions
was to uplift Tibetan Buddhism to check the powerful Bön communities. Tibetan
Buddhism’s further development in the region, as the next sections will show, only
came later with the Ming court’s support as the major incentive.
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The Ethnic Features and Institutional Affiliations of Tibetan Buddhist
Communities in the Highland
Within ten years, the Ming had set up two Prefectural Buddhist Registries in
Songpan, indicating the empire’s intention to wield religion to govern its frontier. The
reasons for establishing the two institutions were unquestionably different. But do
they have other differences and similarities? And more importantly, what can they tell
us about the religious landscape of the highland as a whole?
In terms of similarities, the ethnic hybridity of both Songpan Buddhist Registries
allows for an investigation of how the correlation between religion and ethnicity was
perceived in the early 15th century highland. Some people would probably feel
confused when they learn that the non-Han highland local Yonten Zangpo would take
an ethnic-Han Buddhist monk such as Yueguang as master to learn Chinese
Buddhism. From a modern-day perspective, this might seem quite strange as many
people tend to presume that Tibetan Buddhism was intrinsic to the ethnic Tibetans.292
But in the early 15th century, religion transcended both ethnic and linguistic
boundaries. As Hoong Teik Toh reminds us, “a ‘Tibetan monk’ or a lama in the Ming
period could refer to any Buddhist monk who practiced Tibetan Buddhism regardless
of his actual ethnicity.”293 One’s Buddhist training did not have correlate with his
ethnicity. Buddhist officials’ appointments followed a similar logic. In the ethnic
regard, at Songpan we have cases that Han Buddhist monks from Zhejiang, Ming
China’s coastal area, were appointed to a position in the empire’s outmost west region
where the ethnic Fan were the majority. In the religious regard, elsewhere we also
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have examples that a northwest native Tibetan Buddhist monk was named the
Prefectural Buddhist Superior of Suzhou (蘇州),294 a place that has always been, to
my knowledge, a stronghold of Chinese Buddhism. What these seemingly strange
imperial orders precisely point out is that the early 15th century Ming court did not
necessarily assume a correspondence between religion and ethnicity. It is highly
possible that for Ming emperors at the time, the two religions were after all both
Buddhist branches, and thus there was no need to take their distinctions too seriously.
From the Ming court’s viewpoint, as long as the religious official was competent, his
ethnicity or religious denomination would not pose any obstacle. Projecting modernday views into pre-modern scenarios is ahistorical.
In contrast, what really differentiates the two Songpan Buddhist Registries were
their different positions in the Ming bureaucratic system: they corresponded to two
types of officials that the Ming usually set up in frontier regions. Those who were
transferred to a highland office from the Chinese heartland should be understood as
Ming China’s liuguan (rotating officialdom 流官), while those indigenous religious
leaders fall into the category of tuguan (native officialdom 土官). Compared with
tuguan, liuguan was a relatively common title by the Ming’s standard. They were the
empire’s regular bureaucrats who usually received systematic training before being
assigned to specific institutional positions. A civil official in this meritocracy, for
example, required years of learning Confucian classics and success in the laborious
civil examination system. A military or religious official was expected to meet certain
criteria and pass evaluations as well. In a certain sense, liuguan were institutionally
closer to the Ming’s imperial apparatus. Judging from Yueguang and Zhizhong’s
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professional traits, they were definitely liuguan at Songpan, and this is precisely why
the contemporaries designated their institution at Dabei Monastery as the “inner
Buddhist Registry” (內僧司), which conveys a sense of belonging and direct
governance under the Ming.295
As the designation of “inner Buddhist Registry” implies otherwise, the second
Buddhist Registry was relatively distant from the Ming’s imperial apparatus: it falls
into the tuguan category. Tuguan, or native officialdom, was a Ming bureaucratic title
passed down from the Yuan dynasty. But unlike the Yuan dynasty during which such
offices were considered as part of the standard bureaucracy, the Ming separated the
category from the regularly appointed officials,296 and only set up tuguan positions in
non-Han areas along the empire’s frontiers or certain inland mountainous regions
occupied by non-Han groups. Therefore, tuguan were not required to go through the
Ming’s meritocratic examinations, and their position and power were mainly
hereditary. Because of its somewhat autonomous nature, tuguan were usually granted
power to preside over their own subjects, constituting what John Herman called “dual
sovereignty in the internal frontier.”297 The indigenous religious leaders in Songpan
met precisely these criteria. Ming texts dedicate less than 100 characters to Sangerzhe
Xianjie and the second Songpan Buddhist registry, pointing to a tenuous relationship
between this religious institution and the Ming’s normal bureaucratic structure. In
addition, the fact that Ming records never specify this office’s location speaks exactly
to its nature as an institute quite beyond the Ming’s direct reach.
Coexisting as parallel offices, the two Songpan Buddhist Registries served the
Ming’s frontier policies well in their initial implementations. This situation was not
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unique in Songpan. From the late 14th to the mid-15th century, such juxtapositions
prevailed in many places in the highland region (Table 4.1-4.4). But the relationship
between the two offices varied in different places. In Songpan for example, the
function of the two Buddhist Registries was differentiated along a jurisdictional line.
While the first office, Prefectural Buddhist Registry of Civilian & Military Guard
Commands of Songpan and its Vicinity (松潘等處軍民指揮使司僧綱司) would be
partially affiliated with the region’s civil affair system, the second office, Prefectural
Buddhist Registry of Songpan Guard, was under the military’s direct administration.
Such a division also existed in Taozhou. In other places like Hezhou and Minzhou,
the two offices were divided by religious denomination and designated as Prefectural
Buddhist Registry of Chinese Monks (漢僧僧綱司) and Prefectural Buddhist Registry
of Tibetan Monks (番僧僧綱司). Similar divisions existed in Ningxia and Turpan as
well.298 By 1440, the dual-track Buddhist Registries were set up in Hezhou, Minzhou,
Taozhou and Songpan parts of the highland, as is shown in Table. 4.1 to 4.4:
Prefectural Buddhist Registry
of Hezhou
Hanseng河州漢僧綱司 (1393)
Han Buddhism

Prefectural Buddhist Registry
of Hezhou fanseng
河州番僧綱司 (1393)
Tibetan Buddhism

Buddhist
Denomination
Institutional Feature
Rotating Officialdom
Native Officialdom
Table. 4.1: Dual Track of Clerical Bureaucracy in Hezhou (河州) 299

Buddhist
Denomination
Institutional Feature
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Prefectural Buddhist Registry
of Minzhou
Hanseng岷州漢僧綱司(1428)
Han Buddhism
Rotating Officialdom

Prefectural Buddhist Registry
of Minzhou fanseng
岷州番僧綱司(1429)
Tibetan Buddhism
Native Officialdom
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Table. 4.2: Dual Track of Clerical Bureaucracy in Minzhou (岷州) 300
Prefectural Buddhist Registry of
Songpan dengchu junmin zhihuishi
si (松潘等處軍民指揮使司僧綱司)
(1431)
Han Buddhism

Prefectural Buddhist
Registry of Songpan wei
(松潘衛僧綱司) (1441)

Prefectural Buddhist Registry of
Taozhou wei junmin zhihuishi si
(洮州衛軍民指揮使司僧綱司)
(1427)
Tibetan Buddhism

Prefectural Buddhist
Registry of Songpan wei
(洮州衛僧綱司) (1440)

Buddhist
Tibetan Buddhism
Denomination
Institutional Feature
Rotating Officialdom
Native Officialdom
Table. 4.3: Dual Track of Clerical Bureaucracy in Songpan (松潘)

Buddhist
Tibetan Buddhism
Denomination
Institutional Feature
Native Officialdom
Native Officialdom
Table. 4.4: Dual Track of Clerical Bureaucracy in Taozhou (洮州)301
One can see from these religious offices that although Tibetan Buddhism tended to
be more well-received in certain regions, in general there were no overly unbalanced
power dynamics between Chinese Buddhism and Tibetan Buddhism by the 1440s.
Yet things started to change from then on, especially with the intervention of the
Ming court. While the development of Tibetan Buddhism in mid-15th century
northwest Sichuan was devised specifically for the purpose of checking the Bön
forces, Bön did not prevail in the entire highland. In most parts of the region, the

300

The Prefectural Buddhist Registry of Minzhou Hanseng was established in Guangfu Monastery (Vast Blessing
Monastry 廣福寺). The monastery was built sometime between 1426 to 1428 by the Ming prince of Han (韓王),
who just moved from Kaiyuan (開原) in northeast to Pingliang (平涼) in northwest in 1425. Tibetan Buddhism
was not popular in northeast China until the rise of the Manchus in the early 17th century. it was less likely for
Prince Han to be attracted to Tibetan Buddhism either in Kaiyuan or in the short time since his settlement in
Pingliang. Therefore, Guangfu Monastery should be a Han Buddhism monastery. For Guangfu Monastry’s
location, see Minxianzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui bangongshi, Minzhou Zhi Jiaozhu, 104. For Prince Han’s
movement to Pingliang, see Ming xuanzong shilu, juan 19, 1st year, month VII, gengxu. For the construction of
Guangfu Monastery, see Taozhou lishi jiapu, 59. The Prefectural Buddhist Registry of Minzhou Hanseng was set
up in Dachongjiao Monastery, which will be examined in the following section.
301
Prefectural Buddhist Registry of Songpan wei (洮州衛僧綱司) was set up in 1427, and Prefectural Buddhist
Registry of Taozhou wei junmin zhihuishi si (洮州衛軍民指揮使司僧綱司) was established in 1440. Both offices
were led by Tibetan Buddhist monks who were also recognized as indigenous clergy. In fact, there were in total 5
Prefectural Buddhist Registries in Taozhou during the Ming dynasty, and they were all controlled by indigenous
clergy who practiced Tibetan Buddhism. For details, see Wu, “Mingdai Taozhou Wei Senggangsi Yanjiu.”

115
spread of Tibetan Buddhism was facilitated by a series of privileges granted by
several mid-15th century Ming emperors out of personal interest in the religion.
Religion and Lineage: The Case of Minzhou
One question left unanswered from the Songpan case is which of the two offices
was more well-received on the ground. In hindsight, it was the native officialdom.
Although after Zhizhong’s retirement, his two successors, Yonten Zangpo and
Zichang, were also credited for being recognized as competent clergy by the
indigenes and capable frontier officials by the Ming,302 their contemporaries did not
remember further Songpan court clergy after 1470s. However, one should not quickly
reduce such a diminished influence to an ethnocultural-essentialist explanation. It
could be ahistorical to assume that mid-Ming ethnic Tibetans would naturally choose
Tibetan Buddhism over Chinese Buddhism simply because they were Tibetan. The
following two sections argue that a series of Ming policies in the mid-15th century
extensively contributed to the development and flourishing of Tibetan Buddhism in
the highland. Through two more case studies, the following sections historicize a
process in which Tibetan Buddhism outweighed Han Buddhism because of specific
institutional causes. In this regard, it was the Ming itself that made the liuguan’s work
harder and harder, but not an inherent ethnoreligious Tibetan force built in the
highland.
The Ming court’s patronage of Tibetan Buddhism has received considerable
scholarly attention in recent years. Reexamining conventional narratives about the
Ming court’s lack of religious engagement, scholars argue that Tibetan Buddhism
retained its privilege after the Yuan-Ming dynastic transition and was of particular
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importance during the Ming at least before the 16th century.303 But in these revisionist
works, most attention has been given to the reigns of Emperor Hongwu and Yongle,
leaving the court’s engagement of Tibetan Buddhism in the mid- to late 15th century
largely untouched.304 In fact, Ming emperors in this period, including Emperor
Xuande, Zhengtong, Jingtai, and Chenghua, all devoted tremendous passion to
Tibetan Buddhism, if not as fully-fledged practitioners.305 They frequently invited
Tibetan Buddhists to court for religious affairs, and many of these Tibetan Buddhist
hierarchs in fact came from the highland region.
Tibetan Buddhism was present in the Ming capital from the dynasty’s beginnings,
yet its prosperity began in the early 15th century. During the 1430s, three strongholds
of Tibetan Buddhism gradually took shape in Beijing, and they each were favored by
a specific Tibetan Buddhist sect: Geluk sect monks tended to station at Daci’en
Monastery (大慈恩寺); Kagyu sect monks usually stayed at Dalongshan Monastery
(大隆善寺); and Da’nengren Monastery (大能仁寺) was always preferred by Sakya
sect monks.306 What is worth particular attention here is that all three monasteries had
strong connections with Tibetan Buddhists from the highland region. The leader of
Daci’en Monastery, Daci Fawang Shakya Yeshe (大慈法王釋迦也失), was buried in
Hezhou, and thereafter many Geluk monks from the highland began to travel to the
Ming court frequently.307 Dalongshan Monastery was where Dazhi Fawang Penden
Trashi (大智法王班丹扎釋) and his disciples stationed, and Penden Trashi himself
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was a Minzhou native. Da’nengren Monastery, similarly, was controlled by
indigenous clergy from the highland, specifically from Baota Monastery (寶塔寺) of
Lintao (臨洮), where a native monk Dondrup Rinchen was the first to establish
authority at the Da’nengren Monastery and acquire the title of Damin fawang
(大敏法王).308 In this vein, one can even say that the three monasteries had become
the religious outposts of the highland Buddhist communities in Beijing.
Having established religious bases in the Ming capital, Tibetan Buddhists from the
highland had the chance to build networks at court and even developed direct contact
with the Ming throne. Some of them frequently hosted religious ceremonies and gave
Dharma teachings for the Ming elites, and many others were hired to translate
Buddhist cannons specifically for court use.309 Meanwhile, from the 1430s, the
Tibetan Buddhists were allowed to stay in Beijing for quite a long time without any
limit on their stay.310 As a result, many of these special treatments from the Ming
court were subsequently used by the highland Tibetan Buddhist monks to accumulate
political capital and gain religious authority.
As more and more Tibetan Buddhist monks enjoyed privileges at the Ming court,
they began to project this power back to the highland society. In this process, the
monks’ personal connections in local society, especially blood ties, often played an
important role. One can even say that these Tibetan Buddhists’ local networks
functioned as irrigation canals that transported nutriments for the development of
Tibetan Buddhism on the ground.
The case of Dazhi Fawang Penden Trashi and the spread of Tibetan Buddhism in
Minzhou effectively illustrates how the religion took root in the highland society
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through genealogical connections. Born in rural Minzhou (岷州 modern-day 岷縣) in
1377 from the Hou (后) Lineage and ordained a monk at the age of 13, Penden
Trashi’s life changed for good when he was invited to the Ming court in 1405 to
prepare for the reception of Dezhin Shekpa, the fifth Karmapa of Kagyu school of
Tibetan Buddhism.311 In 1406, Penden Trashi was dispatched to Tibet to greet Dezhin
Shekpa and accompanied him all the way back to the Ming capital.312 From then on,
Penden Trashi played an active role in the religious diplomacy between Ming and
Tibet. He served as a middleman who brought numerous Buddhist statues and
scriptures to Tibetan hierarchs and delivered their requests and concerns back to the
Ming court. In 1423, Penden Trashi was dispatched to Tibet to inspect the authenticity
of the reincarnation of Dezhin Shekpa.313 Because of this successful mission, he was
promoted to Grand State Preceptor (大国师) and relocated to Dalongshan Monastery,
which later became the central base for Minzhou Tibetan Buddhists in Beijing. 314
After the trip to Tibet in 1423, Panden Trashi spent most of his time in Dalongshan
Monastery in Beijing. It was also during this period that he fostered an intimate
relationship with Emperor Xuande. Emperor Xuande’s interest in Tibetan Buddhism
has never been systematically examined in the scholarship of any language, but he
was most likely a devoted Tibetan Buddhist practitioner. He frequently attended
Penden Traishi’s Dharma instructions and ritual ceremonies, and he asked Penden
Trashi to translate Buddhist sutras solely for his private use.315 In 1428, Penden Trashi
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conducted a grand-wheel empowerment and an Amitāyus empowerment for Emperor
Xuande.316 From a religious perspective, this means that the emperor had officially
acknowledged Penden Trashi’s mentorship and was willing to follow his Dharma
instructions. In 1435, Penden Trashi’s disciples in Beijing made him a statue. In the
stele inscription of the statue, he was juxtaposed with Po-Śrīmitra, Vajrabodhi and
Amoghavajra, all eminent Indian monks who had brought Buddhist knowledge to
China.317 It is clear that in the 1430s, Penden Trashi already held extensive influence
at the Ming court.
Upon securing his position in the Ming capital, Penden Trashi began to extend his
religious authority and political power back into the highland society. In 1431, he sent
a Dharma edict (法旨) to his disciples at Dachongjiao Monastery (大崇教寺) in
Minzhou. Only recently discovered in rural Gansu, the Dharma edict was issued by
Penden Trashi as instructions for abbotship succession in Dachongjiao Monastery.
Built in 1417 under Penden Trashi’s order,318 Dachongjiao Monastery was expanded
in 1427 with the Ming court’s financial and labor support.319 But when Penden Trashi
found out he was too busy for the daily management of the monastery, he issued the
Dharma edict in 1431 and passed the abbotship to his disciple, Śākya Śrī Palzangpo.
However, in the same Dharma edict, Penden Trashi also appointed his own nephew,
Chödrup Zangpo, to be the next monastery abbot after Śākya Śrī Pel Zangpo. Such a
way of appointing successors created friction between the two candidates. When the
tension between the two successors was too intense to mediate, Penden Trashi issued
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a second Dharma edict in 1449 and announced a verdict of property division between
the two.320
One may think that Penden Trashi’s appointing two generations of successors at
one time was not a smart move to maintain stability in Dachongjiao Monastery. But I
argue this seemingly troublesome decision attests to Penden Trashi’s intention to keep
the control of Dachongjiao Monastery in the hands of his own lineage members. In
this vein, what the Dharma edicts indicate is a shifting pattern of abbotship
transmission from master-disciple succession to blood succession, and in this specific
case, between uncle and nephew. In a broader context, retaining secular and religious
authorities within the lineage was a common strategy for powerful northwest non-Han
households to build local influence, and it proved quite effective in areas with a large
Tibetan Buddhist population.321 As one of Penden Trashi’s most important religious
achievements in Minzhou, Dachongjiao Monastery was not something the monk was
willing to give away to non-lineage members, even to his own disciple.
Chödrup Zangpo, Penden Trashi’s nephew, became the abbot of Dachongjiao
Monastery in 1449. From then on, we see a gradual convergence between religious
privilege and lineage authority in Minzhou. This trend drastically shaped the power
structure of local society in which influential lineages became more and more visible
in the religious arena. In my fieldwork in the region from 2017 to 2019, I found that
16 monasteries I investigated were constructed during the Ming, and they all
preserved either paper documents or historical memory of the lineage of the
monastery abbot. The details are shown in Table. 4.5:
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Name of the Surname
Monastery
of the
Abbot
Chonglong/ Hou (后)
Lang Si
Qianchuan/
Xieduoer Si
Dachongjia
o Si
Hongjiao/D
azhan Si
Yuanjue Si

Hou

Cangjing Si

Chang
(常)
Chang

Gongbu Si

Construction
time

Hou

1417

Hou

Ming

Hou

Ming

Name of the Surname
Monastery
of the
Abbot
Yangjuan/Y Yang
angjia Si
(楊)
Yongan/Ya Yang
ngjia Si
Yongning
Bao (包)
Si
Sanzhu/Elu Bao
Si
Guangde/Qi Qi (祁)
jia Si
Hongfu Si
Qi (漆)

Construction
time
Ming

Ming
Ming
Ming
(Hongwu)
Ming

Shiya Si

Ming
Jin (⾦)
Chaoding Si Chang
Fazang Si
Ding
(丁)
Table. 4.5: Minzhou Tributary Monasteries and Family Background of Abbots
As the table indicates, five out of the sixteen monasteries belonged to the Hou
lineage. That is not surprising considering the fact that the Hou lineage was the family
from which Penden Trashi came. In fact, the Hou lineage should have controlled more
monasteries in the Ming because many monasteries originally owned by them were
sold to or taken by other lineages later. For example, Gongbu Monastery, whose
abbot bore the surname of Chang according to survey results, only began to associate
with the Chang lineage from the early Qing dynasty. According to a Qing dynasty
contract, it was originally a Hou lineage property built on a piece of land that Penden
Trashi purchased.322 Other monasteries, such as Fazang Monastery, should also have
belonged to the Hou lineage as it was only given to Śākya Śrī Palzangpo in 1449.323
Since many Tibetan Buddhist monasteries simultaneously functioned as political
arbitrators, religious mentors, estate managers, taxation collectors, and corvée
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enforcements, it is quite reasonable to speculate that the Hou lineage was the biggest
landlord in Ming dynasty Minzhou.324
The mutual reinforcement of religious and lineage organizations was quite common
in the highland society. It was also the case in Taozhou, as all five Taozhou
indigenous cleric offices were associated with and hereditary within privileged
lineages.325 This poses an interesting contrast with what was concurrently happening
in Central Tibet. As Peter Schweiger suggests, in 15th-century central Tibet, “the
degree to which individual aristocratic families were able to influence monastic
affairs was weakened, as was the dependence on the political and economic fate of a
single family.”326 But in the highland region, monastery-based networks overlapped
with the lineage-based social web. This convergence exemplified a Tibetan-style
rulership that featured the unity of religious and lay authority, rendering Minzhou a
society heavily charged with religious domination.
As the religious-genealogical organization in Minzhou rose to power, its
relationship with two other social groups in the local society, the Ming military and
Chinese Buddhist communities, also changed. Chapter 1 has already indicated how
the Ming military built many fortresses intentionally near Tibetan Buddhist
monasteries as a way to oversee non-Han dwellers and prevent possible rebellions.
But the situation started to change as the Tibetan Buddhist communities grew
stronger. As early as in 1429, one of the Hou lineage members was already using
Penden Trashi’s rising status at court as support to reclaim land and estates in
Minzhou that were taken away by the local Ming military earlier.327 The changing
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power dynamic is most typically indicated through the location of newly constructed
Tibetan Buddhist monasteries in Minzhou. Fig.4.1 indicates the spatial pattern of the
military infrastructure in Minzhou. As is shown, the Minzhou guard itself sat on the
intersection of the U-shape Min River and the Diezang River that runs southeast to
northwest, while other fortresses were scattered upstream of the Min River and the
Diezang River, indicating a strategic concern that protected Minzhou from possible
attack from the west. But the distribution of Minzhou monasteries demonstrates a
different pattern. From Fig. 4.2, it is clear that many monasteries were located
downstream of the Min River. Considering that most of the military stations were
constructed in the early Ming, prior to the religious sites, we may infer that the monks
intentionally chose regions with weaker military presence for religious expansion in
order to bypass the military’s surveillance. To keep their distance from the Chinese
military forces, even far-off and underpopulated regions such as Lü jing (閭井), a
steppe region with a relatively high altitude of 2600 meters highlighted in the Map,
had become fertile soil for the monks to spread Dharma seeds.
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Fig. 4.1: Military Forts in Minzhou

Fig. 4.2: Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries in Minzhou
Tibetan Buddhist communities’ relationship with the Chinese Buddhist groups also
changed as the former grew stronger. In 1428 and 1429, two Prefectural Buddhist
Registries of Chinese Buddhism and Tibetan Buddhism were established in Minzhou.
The registry for Chinese Buddhism was built and backed by the Ming prince of Han
(韓王), meaning that the clerk and staff in the princely palace constituted a great
proportion of the local Chinese Buddhist community. However, by at least 1441, the
Minzhou Chinese Buddhist registry had already been recorded as a Tibetan Buddhist
registry in Ming court documents with its Buddhist clergy showing up in Beijing as a
tributary monk.328 And the next year, the position of Prefectural Buddhist Superior
was given by a Chinese Buddhist to a Tibetan Buddhist monk.329
A similar situation in which Chinese Buddhists converted to Tibetan Buddhism is
also typically indicated in the case of Chongfu Monastery (崇福寺). Located in
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modern-day Dingxi (定西), a county not far from Minzhou, Chongfu Monastery was
an ancient yet dilapidated Chinese Buddhist complex. During the Hongwu reign, a
Chinese Buddhist named Liaorang (了让) started to rebuild the monastery. Later the
job was passed down to Liaorang’s disciple, Wumao (悟瑁), an ethnic Han surnamed
Kang.330 At first, Wumao relied on public donations to collect funding for monastery
construction. But this proved to be a slow and inefficient fundraising channel.
Therefore, Wumao began to make money by himself. Skilled at calligraphy, Wumao
hired himself out to copy Buddhist sutras for others and gradually won renown for
this work. From then on, not only social elites in the area, but also high-level patrons
in Beijing and Nanjing started to invite Wumao to copy sutras for them. Devoting
himself to his master’s unfinished work, Wumao kept pouring the remuneration he
received from his hard labor into the welfare of the monastery. From 1432 to 1444, he
gradually repaired old Buddhist halls or built new ones for the monastery, and such an
effort was highly praised in the local society. Yet in 1447, in one of his memorials to
the court, Wumao claimed Chongfu Monastery to be the sub-monastery of
Dachongjiao Monastery, and he himself the disciple of Penden Trashi.331 Because of
this new identity, the Ming court issued imperial edicts to the monastery and an ivory
seal to Wumao.332
Some people might find it reasonable to call Wumao a traitor. After all, he deserted
the Dharma lineage of his Chinese Buddhist master, re-submitted to a Tibetan
Buddhist master, adopted a Tibetan name as Yeshe Dondrup, and even converted a
Chinese Buddhist monastery into a Tibetan Buddhist one. But I argue that what
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Wumao did, though controversial, was for the best of the monastery and its
dependents. The time when Wumao subordinated himself and the monastery to
Tibetan Buddhism was the time that Pendan Trashi and Dachongjiao Monastery were
at their peak. The privileges and preferential policies, not to mention wealth they
received from the Ming court, were enormous, and it is wise for Wumao, whose
monastery was merely 100 miles away from Dachongjiao Monastery, to conform to
the trend of the times by joining them and thus prospering together.
This section, through a case study of Minzhou, portrays how Tibetan Buddhism
was able to penetrate deep into highland society via certain Tibetan Buddhist monks’
local connections. Chinese Buddhist monks, in contrast, did not enjoy such
advantages, and many of them even converted to Tibetan Buddhism in pursuit of a
better living. In this regard, I argue that the increasingly wide discrepancy between
the two groups’ divergent paths derived from social factors, not ethnocultural causes.
The next section, along a similar line, will illustrate how institutional factors such as
legal privileges further contribute to the development of Tibetan Buddhism in the
highland.
Spreading the Dharma Seeds: The Case of Wondering Monks
Lineage networks were important vehicles for Tibetan Buddhism to spread in the
highland. However, other privileges granted by the mid-15th century Ming court also
enabled Tibetan Buddhism to gradually outgrow Chinese Buddhism. Unrestrained
preaching activities, exemption from Ming law, and imperial protections over
monastic property all extensively contributed to these changing power dynamics.
Similar to the previous section, this section will also rely on local materials to
investigate the understudied historical process. The main focus will be on one group:
itinerate monks.
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Compared to other special treatments at court, the permission of free travel for
Tibetan Buddhists seems to be rather trivial. But in the mid-15th century, this was a
privilege given exclusively to the Tibetan Buddhists. Free travel by Chinese
Buddhists, in contrast, was severely restricted.333 Sanctioned by the Ming court as a
privilege, Tibetan Buddhists from the highland could travel freely and stay in any
monastery, be it Chinese Buddhist or Tibetan Buddhist, for Dharma practice.
Numerous indigenous clergy brought such demands to the Ming court, and many
were allowed to dwell in Chinese Buddhist monasteries in and near the highland,334
resulting in the spread of Tibetan Buddhism over a wider geographical area.
While the primary sources do not offer enough detail for a full scan of how such
“visiting monk” programs worked and what their religious lives were like in those
stationing monasteries, it is certain that many Tibetan Buddhist monks were quite
interested in monasteries with rich religious backgrounds which for some reason were
damaged or long abandoned. For such monasteries, the wandering monk would just
occupy the space, repair the buildings, and then claim to be the monastery’s new host.
What they gained in return was enormous political and economic capital. By restoring
the religious complex, the monk could acquire not only fame and followers, but also
wealth, influence, and authority.
One example of Faquan Monastery (白銀法泉寺) in modern-day Baiying of Gansu
indicates how such processes took place. As a famous religious complex dating back
to the Song dynasty, Faquan Monastery was largely ruined during the turbulent YuanMing transition. In 1439, one Tibetan Buddhist monk named Shakya Penden
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(桑迦班丹) came to the region and was immediately attracted by the place’s natural
environment and rich religious culture. Therefore, he decided to settle down and
reconstruct the devastated monasteries. As Shakya Penden’s renovation project
kicked off, many ethnic Han officials and Buddhist practitioners contributed either
financial or labor support, thus transforming the crumbling Faquan Monastery in a
grandiose religious symbol of the region.335 By hosting the restoration of Faquan
Monastery, Shakya Penden accumulated much repute and religious authority in the
region, and his disciples thereafter held the abbotships of Faquan and other local
monasteries for nearly one hundred years.336
Some other materials not only point to how free travel enabled certain monks to
spread Tibetan Buddhism, but also indicate how such preaching tours were tacitly
sanctioned by the emperor even if they violated imperial law. One stone tablet in
Jianfu Monastery in Xi’an (西安薦福寺) offers an interesting example. Located in
modern-day central Xi’an and attracting thousands of tourists with its worldwidefamous Small Wild Goose Pagoda (小雁塔), Jianfu Monastery seems to have nothing
to do with Tibetan Buddhism judging from the description in local gazetteers.337 But
one stele erected in the monastery tells us differently. The inscription on the stele
records a conversation between Emperor Zhengtong and an official from the Ming’s
Ministry of Rites, and the dialog was centered around a Tibetan Buddhist’s violation
of imperial rites. The protagonist of the story is a certain monk named Chökyi
Gyaltsen (勺思吉監參) who claimed to be a Tibetan Buddhist monk from the
Hongjue Monastery of Xining Guard in Shaanxi (陝西西寧衛弘觉寺). The monk
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received his ordination certificate in 1426. But after that, instead of staying at
Hongjue Monastery, he began to wander around the region, and eventually ended up
at Jianfu Monastery, which was over 500 miles away from Xining. Being a timehonored ancient monastery notwithstanding, Jianfu Monastery was in a shabby state
in the early 15th century. Therefore, the monk started to donate his own savings and
raise additional funds for the monastery’s reconstruction. It is unclear how long the
repair work took, but in 1449 the monk sent a memorial to the Ming court to request a
name for the monastery so that he could host Buddhist rituals appropriately. Along
with the memorial, the monk also attached an architecture blueprint.338
Chökyi Gyaltsen must have never thought that the architecture blueprint he sent to
the court could cause trouble. As soon as the emperor received the memorial, he
found out from the monastic plan that the monk was using green-glazed tile
(綠琉璃瓦) to decorate the Buddhist halls’ roof, and immediately urged the officials
from the Ministry of Rites to investigate.339 This is mainly because of green-glazedtile roof’s symbolic meaning. It was a form of high-ranking architectural design used
mainly for royal monuments, thus not something common people were allowed to use
freely. Even within the Ming’s ruling house, green-glazed tile was somewhat
privileged. In 1443, when a Ming prince wished the court workshop to make some
green-glazed tiles for his deceased mother’s tomb, the emperor was unwilling to allow
it and asked him to use black tiles instead.340 Therefore, violating this type of imperial
rite could be construed as an act of defiance against the throne and would result in
severe consequences.
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The official requested Chökyi Gyaltsen’s immediate response after receiving the
imperial edict. And the monk soon sent one. But according to the monk’s defense, the
green-glazed tiles were not something he personally chose. Jianfu Monastery was
already a famous monastery in the Tang dynasty under the dynastic ruling house’s
patronage. Therefore, the green-glazed tiles were all Tang dynasty decorations and
were part of the roof since the 10th century. What the Tibetan monk did was simply
restore them. Confronting the throne was not his plan at all, and such justifications
seemed reasonable. But still, the official declared the monk guilty for overtly
violating imperial rites and suggested a punishment in his ensuing memorial.341 Yet
for the emperor, as soon as he realized that Chökyi Gyaltsen was not deliberately
challenging his imperial authority, it became of less an issue. Therefore, he dropped
the charge against the monk, officially recognized him as the abbot of the Jianfu
Monastery, and granted him permission to host Buddhist rituals.342 Although the
historical material does not specify, it is highly possible that the emperor did not even
ask the monk to remove all the green-glazed tiles.
Apart from indicating the breadth of the wandering monks’ range of activity, the
Jianfu Monastery case also demonstrates the degree to which Ming emperors were
willing to indulge Tibetan Buddhists: even severe misdeeds that violated imperial
rites could be pardoned, and whatever requests the misbehaving monk raised were all
answered as if nothing happened. Another aspect that is worth particular analysis here
is Chökyi Gyaltsen ’s request for a monastery name, which in other occasions was
described as plaque- or title-requesting (乞额/乞名). It is important to note that
neither Faquan Monastery nor Jianfu Monastery were constructed under imperial
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sanction. In other words, they were both constructed privately and thus, in a certain
sense, illegally. In this regard, sending memorials for a court-bestowed plaque/title in
this regard was not a superfluous gesture, but rather an important administrative
procedure to legalize the monastery. That is why Chökyi Gyaltsen was so eager to
have such a certificate from the court: the monk obviously did not want his monastery
inside the walled city of Xi’an to be illegal. More importantly, such court-issued
plaque/titles were often accompanied by an imperial edict that appoints as abbot the
one who filed the request to be the monastery and recognizes his legal rights over
monastic property. Therefore, rushing the registration of a monastery by requesting a
court-issued plaque/title became a channel for certain Tibetan Buddhists to lay claim
over others’ religious complexes.
In Mt. Xumi of modern-day Guyuan (固原須彌山), there are two stone tablets
inside a monastery called Yuanguang (圓光寺). The inscriptions on both stone tablets
were carved in 1468, yet their contents are completely different and even contradict
each other. The inscription on the first stone tablet is a 1443 memorial filed by a
Tibetan Buddhist to the Ming court. According to the memorial, the monk Chökyi
Wangchuk (綽吉旺速) was traveling in the region during Emperor Zhengtong’s reign
when he discovered the half-ruined Yuangguang Monastery. Feeling that the place
was one with Buddha’s blessing, Chökyi Wangchuk donated his personal savings and
hired workers to repair the monastery. With all reconstruction work completed,
Chökyi Wangchuk filed a report to the Ming court requesting a monastery plaque as
well as an appointment as the abbot of the monastery. As the Ming court found the
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requests reasonable, a plaque was bestowed, together with an imperial edict that
named Chökyi Wangchuk as the monastery abbot.343
If this stone tablet was the only one preserved in Yuanguang Monastery nowadays,
people might naturally believe that Chökyi Wangchuk was the legitimate religious
leader of the monastery. Yet other stone tablets reveal a much more complicated
picture. The inscription on the second stone tablet tells us a different story from
Chökyi Wangchuk’s version. It indicates that Yuanguang Monastery was already
functioning before Chökyi Wangchuk’s arrival. The monastery was founded by an
ethnic Han Tibetan Buddhist named Gufeng (孤峰) during the Hongwu reign. Later,
the abbotship was inherited by Dafang (大方), another ethnic Han monk, who most
likely practiced Tibetan Buddhism as well. Dafang received his ordination certificate
from the Ming court in 1440, and as he continued to hold the position as the
monastery’s abbot, he had many buildings in the monastery repaired or newly
constructed. Obviously Dafang did not file a request to the Ming court for a
monastery plaque until 1447, which is already four years after Chökyi Wangchuk
made the same move.344 One might suspect that there must be certain level of tension
between Dafang and Chökyi Wangchuk as both of them claimed to be the abbot of the
monastery, but it is a pity that the inscription does not reveal more information in this
matter. However, I argue that Dafang’s version of the story is most likely the more
accurate one. On one hand, other stone tablets on Mt. Xumi also record Dafang’s
reconstruction work but never mention Chökyi Wangchuk’s name;345 on the other
hand, the second stone tablet inscription demonstrates an undertone that redresses the
injustice for Dafang, praising him for being virtuous yet humble while others were
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using Buddhist affairs for private needs.346 Such a narrative is quite rare considering
the fact that it is carved in the inscription for a Buddhist monastery, and the way it
quite strongly implies that Chökyi Wangchuk was the one who unethically took
advantage of the policy of plaque/title requesting for his own benefit.
Even if Chökyi Wangchuk’s actions were indeed motivated by private needs, it is
understandable considering that there were also enormous economic benefits
associated with the position he sought. In the mid-15th century highland, in common
practice an imperial edict that clarified the abbot’s guardianship over monastic
property came along with the abbot appointment. The imperial edict granted to
Yuanguang Monastery does not survive nowadays, but those granted to other Tibetan
Monasteries in the highland might indicate how this mechanism worked.
By sorting out existing primary sources, I have found 17 Ming dynasty imperial
edicts in total issued to monasteries in the highland in response to title/name
requests.347 Here I will use one issued to Zhaoci Monastery as an example to illustrate
how such edicts functioned to insure the monastery financially.
The Zhaoci Monastery of Minzhou (岷州昭慈寺) received the imperial edict in
1448, one year before the Emperor Zhengtong learned about the green-glazed tile at
Jianfu Monastery. The edict begins with the emperor’s praise of Tibetan Buddhism
for spreading good deeds among frontier inhabitants and for its ability to keep the
region peaceful. Then, it introduces how the monastery abbot built the place for his
disciples and raised the request for an imperial plaque, and grants it the name of
“Zhaoci Monastery.” The most important part of the imperial edict for our analysis is
the third section. Here, the edict makes an explicit statement that no one is allowed to
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disturb this religious community, and any invasion of the monastery’s property—
including buildings, lands, mountains, forests, gardens, material wealth, and various
kinds of livestock—is strictly forbidden. Those who dared to make such disrespectful
attempts would receive severe legal punishment.348
Many imperial edicts bestowed to monasteries in the highland include the same
language which bestows their absolute rights over a wide array of property. For
example, similar wording also appears in the imperial edict bestowed to Chökyi
Wangchuk of the Yuanguang Monastery. And as far as I can tell, all such edicts were
issued to Tibetan Buddhist monasteries. Meanwhile, 16 out of 17 imperial edicts I
found were issued during the 15th century. This undoubtedly showcases the privilege
that Ming emperors granted to the Tibetan Buddhist community. These imperial
edicts functioned as legal umbrellas that rendered the monasteries immune to any type
of infringement, which largely equals tax exemption. Such privileges constituted a
form of autonomy that contrasted Tibetan Buddhist monasteries sharply with the
Chinese Buddhist monasteries in the Ming heartland that were registered in the lijia
system and thus had to take on tax and labor responsibilities.349 In the highland region,
as Paul Nietupski points out, the application of divine power to the physical realities
of economics or territorial sovereignty were arguably very real.350 With the imperial
order’s protection, Tibetan Buddhist monasteries had a comfortable nest in which to
hatch and grow. Probably this is also why the hard-working Chinese Buddhist monk
Wumao eventually chose to submit his monastery to Tibetan Buddhism: tax
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exemption was something Chinese Buddhist monasteries dared not to dream of, even
in the 15th century when monastic policies were already relatively loose.351
Combining privileges from the Ming court with local connections, the Tibetan
Buddhist monks converted the highland society into a Buddhist realm. As a result,
Tibetan Buddhism blossomed in the region. During the Yuan dynasty, only 23
monasteries were built in northern Sichuan and Southern Gansu, but the number
quadrupled to 95 newly built monasteries during the Ming.352 Regarding the eastern
Qinghai region, 45 and 131 monasteries were built in the Yuan and Ming
respectively.353 However, the overly favorable policies toward the highland Tibetan
Buddhist communities and their extensive development gradually led to social
turbulence in both the frontier region and the Ming capital, forcing the Ming to adjust
its court policies in the late 15th century.
Prospering under the Ming Regulations
The Ming throne’s patronage for Tibetan Buddhism was not unlimited. From the
1460s on, more and more court ministers began to pressure the Ming emperors by
blaming Tibetan Buddhism for causing various types of social problems. This section
examines how the Ming’s regulation was effective in checking the popularity of
Tibetan Buddhism in the Ming heartland, but counterproductive as it further
stimulated the spread of the religion in the highland.
The Ming court’s preferential policies in the mid-15th century enabled Tibetan
Buddhism to spread at an unprecedented speed, thus causing social unrest for the
Ming in both its frontier and capital regions. Thanks to the Ming emperor’s sanction,
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Tibetan Buddhists were able to go to Beijing as tributary envoys with an increasing
frequency. One Ming official recalled that while there were only 30 to 40 Tibetan
Buddhist monks who visited the Ming court in the 1430s and 1440s, the number
increased to 300 in the 1450s. By the late 1450s, every year 2,000 to 3,000 would
come.354 Such high frequency of travel to Beijing extensively promoted the popularity
of Tibetan Buddhism in the highland, where the excessive return of the tributary trips
exerted huge influence on the region’s ethnic Han inhabitants. Many Han commoners,
coveting the abundant material benefits, began to send their sons to learn to speak
Tibetan so as to join the tributary groups as Tibetan Buddhist monks.355 Others even
abandoned their duties under the Ming’s civilian and military household systems and
faked Buddhist identities to join the groups.356 This phenomenon echoes what Hoong
Teik Toh calls the “increased Tibetanization” among Ming subjects, which refers to
the fact that Han people made up an increasingly large proportion of the whole
population of the Tibetan Buddhist monks.357 But while Toh attributes such a
phenomenon to the attractiveness of esotericism, in the highland, the Chinese’s
conversion was most likely driven by the desire for the lucrative potential of the trip
to Beijing.
Various social problems emerged at the other end of the tributary route as well.
While it was difficult for Han people in Beijing to sneak into the tributary embassies,
they discovered other ways to benefit from the practice. One gruesome story indicates
exactly how crazy the tributary practice had become. Among all the tribute items the
highland monks brought along, there was one object called a Kapala bowl, which was
a cup made from a human skull to use as a Tibetan Buddhist ritual implement. But
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there were not enough skulls “produced” from the highland, a relatively sparsely
populated region, to meet the great need of the large volume of tributary monks.
Therefore, many Han civilians and military in the capital region began to ransack
tombs, steal skulls, and sell them to the highland monks!358 It was precisely this type
of social ramification that greatly annoyed Ming court ministers, who, for all their
differences, were still Confucian scholars who could not tolerate behaviors violating
their moral principles such as tomb-digging.
Because of the Ming throne’s leaning toward Tibetan Buddhism, more and more
highland monks came to Beijing, which even resulted in a shortage of translators at
court.359 Court officials began to criticize the frequent arrivals of Tibetan Buddhist
embassies. They bitterly complained that the Tibetan monks had created too much
trouble in both Beijing and the highland region. What made the court ministers worry
even more was the monks’ huge influence on the imperial ruling house, which could
turn into cause political burdens or ideological issues.360 Therefore, from the early
years of the Chenghua reign (1464-1487), the court ministers started to press for
reforms to control the tributary practice.
The main focus of the Chenghua reforms was on regulating the size of incoming
Tibetan Buddhist groups so as to reduce the court’s economic expenses. In hindsight,
the tributary activities were indeed considerably checked by the series of reforms in
the late 15th century. Ironically, these reforms also accelerated the spread of Tibetan
Buddhism in the highland region, especially among the ethnic Han communities.
Among many reform agendas, one reform measure that deserves emphasis here
was a restriction placed on the ethnic background of the tribute payers. In the eyes of
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the Ming officials, there were unquestionably many unqualified tribute payers in the
envoy groups, but who should be singled out became a question. In 1465, the Ming’s
Department of Ritual announced that “from the third year of Chenghua (1467), the
tributary payers must be the same category of [the tributary group leader], and the
total number cannot be too many.”361 But it was the term “category” (lei 類) here for
which different parties held different definitions. From the late 15th century Ming
officials’ perspective, the concept of “category” meant ethnicity. Therefore, they
proposed to draw a line that separated Han from non-Han within the Tibetan Buddhist
community. One high official from the Ministry of Rites proposed that if the monk
was an ethnic Tibetan, he could retain his religious identity but needed to be
repatriated to his place of origin, but if he was ethnic Han, he was no more than a liar
and thus should be forced to return to lay life and resume his tax-paying
obligations.362 What this proposal implies is that among the tribute monks from the
highland, only ethnic Tibetans were deemed eligible as tribute payers, not those who
were ethnic Han. They thought that the so-called Fan religion (番教) was something
that belonged exclusively to the Fan people (番人), and Han people should not
practice this alien religion. In this vein, ethnicity was necessarily a reference to
categorize religion and also became the criteria to classify the highland Tibetan
Buddhists. Such an emphasis on ethnicity, I argue, was likely tied to the xenophobic
sentiment among the Han officials following the humiliating Tumu incident.
In contrast, the Tibetan Buddhists understood the operating “category” differently.
They perceived it from a religious perspective: they thought that as long as the tribute
payers were in the same Buddhist denomination as the embassy leader, they belonged
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to one “category.” From their point of view, “category” referred to one’s religious
background, and Buddhist denominations did not have to correlate with ethnicity.
That is why when the Ming court ministers announced that more regulations would be
imposed on the tributary groups starting from 1467, one Tibetan Buddhist leader
immediately acquired as many as 3,400 ordination certificates in 1466 for his newly
converted monks.363 To him, as long as his followers received ordination certificates
from the Ming court, a symbol of court recognition, they should be treated as
someone who belonged to the same “category” with their leaders and thus be fine. To
be fair, we cannot be sure how many among the 3400 licenses were given to ethnicHan people. But I argue it is most likely that many of these licenses were given to the
highland Han inhabitants who were desperate to acquire a Tibetan Buddhist identity
in order to join the tributary missions, and it is from their court rewards that the
Tibetan Buddhist leaders took a share. Therefore, the court ministers’ proposal for
“purifying the Tibetan Buddhists,”364 without question, greatly upset the Tibetan
Buddhist hierarchs who began to draw upon examples of previous Ming emperors’
preferential treatment toward Tibetan Buddhists in order to keep their privileges.365
From the 1460s to 1480s, there had been a constant back and forth over the
definition of “authentic Tibetan Buddhists” at the Ming court. On one hand, the court
ministers were strong enough to press the throne to pass policies that “ethnic-Han
were forbidden from practicing Tibetan Buddhism” or “Tibetan Buddhist monks were
not allowed to travel freely anymore.”366 On the other hand, the Tibetan Buddhists had
the private support of the Ming emperor and thus were still able to enjoy their
privileges at the court. This, from the perspective of political history, could be
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understood as a clash between the Ming’s inner court, led by the emperor, and the
outer court constituted of Confucian scholars.367 Yet it is reasonable to believe that
Tibetan Buddhist leaders were able to use their last opportunity to convert as many
ethnic-Han followers as possible before the religion was completely politicized as an
ethnic marker in the last years of the 15th century.
Starting from the 1460s onwards, the Ming carried out a series of actions to check
the development of Tibetan Buddhism. The direct catalyst for these policies was the
growing economic burden that tributary Tibetan Buddhists imposed on the Ming
court, but what was behind that was the bigger picture of Tibetan Buddhism’s fast
spread in the highland from the 1440s. In retrospect, the late 15th century reforms
indeed eased the heavy economic burdens on the Ming created by the highland
inhabitants. But at the same time, it also ironically stimulated the further
dissemination of Tibetan Buddhism on the ground.
By the end of the 15th century, Tibetan Buddhism had already spread widely in the
highland. The degree of its dissemination is suggested in one of Qiu Jun’s (邱濬)
unprecedented proposals to completely abandon Songpan. As one of the most famous
mid-Ming intellectuals, Qiu Jun, in his 1487 publication of Daxue Yanyi bu
(大學衍義補), proposed to remove the entire Ming military from Songpan. Due to
transportation difficulties and endless local rebellions, Qiu Jun had no faith in the
military for effective control over the region. Therefore, he advocated to grant full
control to the indigenous clergy, building them a giant monastery in which to dwell
and govern and only stationing Ming troops hundreds of miles downstream of the Min
River at Weizhou or Maozhou.368 Although no evidence indicates that Qiu’s idea was
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supported by the court, his proposal unquestionably demonstrates how Ming elites
had adopted the idea that Tibetan-rite Buddhism was the best method for civilizing
Inner Asian savages.
In Qiu Jun’s eyes, the indigenous clergy not only replaced court clergy, but even
had the potential to completely substitute the Ming garrison system. One Minzhou
case indicates that the robustness of Tibetan Buddhism even began to encroach upon
the spiritual realm of the Han soldiers in the Ming’s frontier military. In 1497, one
Minzhou guard soldier named Zeng Wencai (曾文彩) transcribed a whole set of the
Prajnaparamita Sutra in Tibetan. The colophon of the scripture illustrates the
meaning of Tibetan Buddhism to a common Ming soldier. The colophon starts with
the soldier’s self-introduction. Originally from Xi’an, Zeng had recently moved to
Minzhou. However, the soldier’s recent life had not been smooth, as he was
exhausted by a concurrent lawsuit and illness. Soldier Zeng felt helpless. The absence
of the deities he used to worship back in Xi’an obviously made him quite insecure, as
there was “no god from whom he could seek protection” (無神可保).369 Therefore,
Soldier Zeng turned to Tibetan Buddhism, which to him was the most powerful and
efficacious religion in the local society of Minzhou. This story attests to the influence
of Tibetan Buddhism in the local context. More importantly, it provides a hard-won
private account that indicates a common Han soldier’s very religious motivation for
converting to Tibetan Buddhism. This story of Soldier Zeng resembles a similar scene
that Michael Szonyi examines in the empire’s outmost coastal frontier region “where
soldiers found themselves relatively isolated, their old gods were less likely to survive
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as objects of communal worship.”370 In late 15th century Minzhou, Tibetan Buddhism
seemed to have become an indispensable part of the highland soldiers’ daily life.
How can we be sure that Zeng’s experience is representative of those of other
soldiers? To be frank, we cannot, at least not completely. But other materials
convincingly show that Zeng Wencai was not alone. In Songpan, one stele preserved
in the rural setting records an inscription of blessing that celebrates the restoration of
a military fort, Gaotun Fortress (高屯堡). Gaotun Fortress was said to be the northern
gate of Songpan.371 But even in such a strategically important military base we see
how just how active certain Tibetan Buddhist monks were. The blessing first provides
the name, military ranks, and specific responsibilities of the supervisors and workers
in the fortress’ restoration project. It then lists several Tibetan Buddhist monks who
were in charge of praying, most likely reciting mantra, when the construction was
finished.372 From their names, it seems that certain Tibetan Buddhist monks were still
ethnic Han. The court ban seemed to have little effect in the highland society, and
Tibetan Buddhism continued to transcend ethnic boundaries. Moreover, although it is
impossible for us to know the exact attitude that Songpan military commanders held
toward Tibetan Buddhism, we at least know that they did not think it a bad thing to
invite some Tibetan Buddhist monks to give a blessing.
Tibetan Buddhism’s penetration into the Ming’s military system even became a
feature of the landscape in the highland society. During my fieldwork in the summer
of 2018, I found a group of precipice inscriptions several miles away from the
location of the Xiaohe Battalion of Songpan (松潘小河守禦千戶所). On the cliff,
huge Chinese and Tibetan inscriptions were carved side by side and painted a golden
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color (Figure 3.1). While the Chinese inscriptions on the east side praise the longevity
and prosperity of the Great Ming, the Tibetan inscription on the west side is the
famous six-syllabled mantra, “Om Mani Padme Hum,” which was the most frequently
recited mantra for Tibetan Buddhists and means that through “the practice of a path
which is an indivisible union of method and wisdom, you can transform your impure
body, speech, and mind into the pure exalted body, speech, and mind of a Buddha.”373
Since the Chinese inscriptions were carved in the early 16th century, it is highly
possible that the Tibetan mantra was carved around the same time. Today, the
precipice inscriptions are frequently used as excellent materials for the local
government to propagate the harmonious relationship between Han and Zang. As the
government officials interpreted the inscription as such to me, however, I doubted
whether the Ming dynasty court official would think in the same way.

Fig. 4.3: Chinese and Tibetan Precipice inscriptions in Xiaohe, Songpan
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Regulating Tibetan Buddhists’ activities and the religion’s popularity in the Ming
capital, the Ming court officials’ restraints had little effect on the highland society. By
the late 15th century, Tibetan Buddhism not only consolidated its control over the
local non-Han communities, but likely also exerted great influence over the Ming’s
ethnic Han soldiers. Its strong influence even made certain court officials propose a
complete withdrawal of Ming military from the region. Though its connection with
the Ming court was greatly diminished, Tibetan Buddhism remained robust in the
Ming’s highland frontier.
Summary
Through the activities of a group of Tibetan Buddhist monks, this chapter examines
the 15th century development of Tibetan Buddhism in the highland society. It
demonstrates that Tibetan Buddhism was not intrinsic to the highland region, and its
development was primarily prompted by Tibetan Buddhist monks who proactively
spread Dharma seeds in the region. From the mid-15th century on, Tibetan Buddhist
monks made full use of some Ming emperors’ personal interests in Tibetan Buddhist
practices, received various kinds of privileges from the court, and projected such
preferential treatments back to the highland society. Relying on lineage networks,
using institutional loopholes, or subterfuge, Tibetan Buddhists actively engaged
themselves in the mid-15th century highland society and thus led to the fast
dissemination of Tibetan Buddhism on the ground that reconfigured the local social
structure. Such a trend did not slow down even when a series of Ming policies were
put forward to check the development of Tibetan Buddhism in the highland society.
In this chapter, I also spoke to the “ethnicity paradigm” that has dominated the
field of Chinese frontier studies to a considerable extent, especially when it comes to
Ming China. Ming China has been long held as a proto-nationalist Chinese empire,
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and this grand narrative still takes ethnicity as a decisive element that affected Ming
China’s interaction with frontier regions. But in the highland, ethnic labels barely
affected how Tibetan Buddhism transformed the local society. Even if it was
considered a somewhat exotic religion in the top-down narrative, it was not an ethnic
marker at all locally. The religion transcended ethnic and language boundaries.
Equating religious taxonomy with ethnic categories obscures the highly fluid and
often ambiguous situation in the highland. In fact, as the next chapter will show, it
was oftentimes status distinctions pertaining to taxation, household registration, and
administrative jurisdiction that were useful for understanding social changes.
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Chapter 5: Deserters

Borderlands were porous spaces where the movement of people was less restrained
by modern state apparatuses before the implementation of border lines, the
demarcation between nation-states, and the reification of territorial sovereignty.374 The
highland was just one such place. As diverse communities flocked to the highland
with their languages, religions, commodities, and forms of knowledge in tow, the
region gradually became a crowded and contested contact zone. While some groups
enjoyed and took advantage of these movements, others wished to bring them under
control.
In Chinese history, across time and space, people frequently moved into and out of
borderlands. Historiographical interrogations for these borderland-crossings are as
diverse as the movements themselves. Just to name a few, Naomi Standen, focusing
on the fragmented north China in the 10th century, argues that political borders were
not fixed geographical divisions but a function of relationships between leaders and
followers.375 Therefore, when local leaders changed allegiance, the borderline moved
with them. Nicholas Tackett, situating Song China in an inter-state system, proposes
that the travels of diplomats and their contacts with non-Han communities played a
crucial role for the emergence of a new worldview and a sense of Chinese identity
among educated elites.376 Michael Szonyi takes a bottom-up perspective and argues
that the contingently changing identities of Southeast coastal inhabitants—alternating
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between soldiers, merchants, smugglers and merchants—best illustrate how the Ming
subjects practiced the strategy of regulatory arbitrage to take advantage of the
imperial apparatus.377 Siyen Fei, in her forthcoming monograph, suggests that crossborder captivity in the Ming-Mongol borderland, although coercive human
trafficking, was also the vehicle of information circulation and knowledge transfer.378
As there is no common pattern for borderland movements, scholarly examinations
focus on different aspects and come to different conclusions.
This chapter, building on the aforementioned literature, examines the movement of
people in the 16th century highland, particularly with the case study of northwest
Sichuan. It focuses on why an increasing number of Ming soldiers deserted and fled
into the deep mountain, how they perceived the highland region, what chain effects
were catalyzed, and how different groups intervened in and and negotiated over such
movements. By scrutinizing these deserters’ experiences, this chapter argues that
people were a type of resource in the highland, and it was such a resource over which
various social groups competed. Investigating how people were categorized along
different social taxonomies, this chapter also challenges the effectiveness of ethnicity
as a useful analytical category in borderland studies.
Wax and Wane
Many scholars of Ming China would admit that the garrison system began to
deviate from its original design from roughly the mid-15th century. Such changes,
although emerging in multiple segments of the institution and demonstrating great
regional distinctions, are loosely summarized in one classic work: “from a selfreplicating garrison system that supported three million men to a mercenary system
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whose costs fell entirely to the people and the dynastic treasury; from garrison troops
with quotas of men to mercenaries with no fixed numbers; from hereditary garrison
troops to hired mercenaries: this was central to the rise and fall of the Ming period.”379
The author of these lines, Wu Han, in his 1937 publication that has been generally
treated as the very first modern scholarly essay on the Ming military, attributes such
shifts to official corruption and misuse of military personnel. Although Wu Han’s
“decline” narrative has been widely shared by later historiography,380 some recent
scholarship, in contrast, perceives these changes not as deterioration but as
improvised responses to new challenges. David Robinson, for example, highlights the
correlation between the emergence of hired soldiers and the growing use of silver as a
medium of exchange, the monetization of labor and material obligations to the state,
and the decline of the hereditary occupation household system.381 While the causes for
these transformations are multi-layered and interpretations vary depending on
perspectives, the decades from mid- to late 15th century witnessed dramatic changes in
the Ming’s garrison system.
As Ming China’s military outposts in northwest Sichuan, the garrison system there
had been extensively worn out in the late 15th century. Multiple factors contributed to
its decline. Some of them were nationwide and others regional. First, logistics
maintenance was difficult due to the region’s environment and topography. Because
of the region’s mountainous terrain and high altitude, local grain production was not
sufficient to feed a large army.382 Therefore, rations needed to be shipped in from
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regions several hundred miles away, most commonly counties scattered across the
Chengdu plain, all the way into the deep mountains of western Sichuan.383 But the
sharply elevated terrain made such shipments extremely difficult. For example, the
distance from Maozhou to Songpan, the region’s military stronghold, is a mere 90
miles, yet the altitude rises over 1200 meters (Maozhou: 1580 m; Songpan: 2850 m).
Based on my personal fieldwork experience, such a steep slope makes even modern
vehicle transportation difficult, not to mention the terrible road conditions and harsh
climate that the porters had to suffer centuries ago. In the 15th century, grain shipment
was such exhausting work that even criminals were promised punishment expiation in
exchange for hauling grain.384 Supplying rations thus can be quite slow. Just as one
official calculated, it required two porters to walk one entire month to deliver just one
soldier’s monthly ration.385 Although the empire had tried multiple ways to maintain
stable grain supply in the northwest Sichuan mountains, such as issuing salt license
exchange programs,386 establishing fort granaries,387 and hiring local non-Han people
as escorts,388 none of these solutions really persisted. The difficult transportation
conditions made the attrition rate high,389 and the unscrupulous porters who dared to
replace grain with sand only made the situation even worse.390 Such difficulties
rendered constant shortage in grain replenishment for the northwest Sichuan military.
Second, the court’s general attitude, which leaned towards a conservative frontier
policy, limited and even undermined the proper functioning of the northwest Sichuan
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garrison system: they were given general instruction for defense instead of offense.
Unless out of absolute necessity, military actions would always be the last resort.391
After all, less armed conflicts meant less troop deployments and less ration supplies,
and thus less financial pressure for the Ming. One memorial points out precisely how
the court’s extreme policies pushed the frontier officials into a dead end. The
relatively peaceful period during the Hongzhi reign (1487-1505) catalyzed an
excessive anti-violence mentality among censorate officials. The result, frustrating
enough, was that whenever a soldier killed a non-Han person, the censorate official
would accuse the frontier commander of inciting rebellion; but if a soldier was
reversely killed by a non-Han person, the accusation would be dereliction.392
The court’s obstinate insistence on a defensive stance severely sapped the morale
of the frontier military. One document shows that the resentment among the soldiers
was so high that they even wanted to kill and eat the flesh of those non-Han villains,
but they were forbidden to attack and thus felt extremely depressed.393 Such
unreasonable policies left the frontier commanders no choice but to assume a false
peace by bribing the superiors and dumping responsibilities on underlings. Those who
were successful in disguising frontier conflicts long enough to earn themselves a
promotion were even praised by others for their wisdom and rich experience.394 The
nonfeasance in the local military rendered lax maintenance and low efficiency
throughout the institution in that much military infrastructure, such as forts, garrison
walls, and barracks was left crumbling,395 and even weapons and armor for soldiers
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who could not afford to bring their own were not enough.396 Not surprisingly, funds
for these fields were most likely embezzled.
Third, the Ming court’s institutional rearrangements further contributed to the local
military’s inefficiency. In the late 15th century, the local military bureaucracy suffered
from two problems: a lack of superior military commanders and the decentralization
of authority in the army. Before the 1460s, northwest Sichuan faced great pressure
posed by the Dongbuhanhu regime and hence high ranking court officials such as
censors-in-chief (都御史) and state department vice ministers (侍郎) were directly
dispatched to supervise frontier military affairs.397 Yet in 1470, the position of Subregional vice commander (分守副總兵), which was usually taken by top officials
from central or regional governments, was eliminated because of the relatively
peaceful situation on the ground, leaving the Left and Right Assistant Regional
Commanders (協守左右參將) to take charge of separate regions individually.398
Without a superior commander, the cooperation between these two officers, who had
different military concerns and agendas, was problematic, especially during transregional military emergencies.399 Although Surveillance Vice Commissioners in
Charge of a Military Defense Circuit (兵備按察副使) were assigned later to take the
supervising position, their relatively low rankings (3b-4b) rendered them incapable of
overruling local military affairs, considering the fact that those Assistant Regional
Commander positions were usually taken by Regional Military Vice Commissioners
or assistant Commissioners (都指揮同知/都指揮僉事), who were high-ranking
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commanders in the regional military system.400 In the late 15th century, the removal of
high-ranking officials from regional military office indicated the court’s neglect of the
northwest Sichuan frontier, and the interlocking bureaucratic system could only result
in less efficient and effective operations.
In addition to these three difficulties that more or less derived from local factors,
another two challenges were tied specifically to late 15th century social and political
changes nationwide. The first one was related to changes in the military institution.
From the mid-15th century, a rotating program was initiated to periodically transfer
soldiers from nearby garrisons to northwest Sichuan military posts.401 These soldiers,
in contrast to the locally stationed “host troops” (主軍), were designated as “guest
troops” or “rotating troops.” (客軍/戍軍). This was most likely to ease the complaints
of garrison soldiers who were supposed to station in the fortress perennially.
However, these guest troops were outsiders whose transfer was only temporary. They
were not familiar with local conditions, and hence less capable of effectively carrying
out their duties.402 One official commented that even the physical conditions of these
guest troops were considered weak by northwest Sichuan standards. And when
assigning military missions, those who were powerful, either physically stronger or
better at building social connections, would manage to have themselves deployed to
fortresses with less military pressure. In practice, this left strategic outposts, which
also faced more military pressure and thus quite dangerous, to the ones who were not
capable to do so. Many of these less fortunate soldiers came from poor families who
would use their military rice rations and salary to pay their debts, rather than keeping
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themselves fed and warm.403 Considering the quality of these soldiers, it is no wonder
that a frontier official disappointedly commented that even one thousand Sichuan
troops were no match for only one hundred or so non-Han rebels.404
The second new challenge came from the rising non-Han power in the highland.
While the soldiers had to worry about the most basic needs for survival, the non-Han
dwellers in the mountains, to use Donald Sutton’s words, were experiencing “rising
power and prosperity.”405 Such developments, I propose, resulted from the booming
tributary interactions between highland communities and the Ming court. As Chapter
2 introduced, much wealth was syphoned off from the Chinese heartland through
tributary channels in the 15th century and then poured into the highland society. In
addition, the rich mineral resources in the mountains, such as silver, copper, iron, and
lead not only attracted local miners but also stimulated long-distance trade which
connected the highland and lower Yangtze region.406 As the trading interactions
increased, more and more merchants came to the highland and thus turned timbered
passageways into busy trading routes.407 A major consequence of the economic
development of the highland was the changing power dynamics that was an inversion
of the Ming’s original plan. While in the late 14th century it was the Ming military that
occupied farmlands in the northwest Sichuan river valley, much of these fertile lands
were under the highland inhabitants’ control in the late 15th century.408 Some Ming
soldiers, who oftentimes starved from the slow grain shipments and low quality
rations, hired themselves out as tenants, but only found their earnings ripped off by
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the cunning highland inhabitants.409 In other scenarios, the rich highland inhabitants
played the role of loan sharks and lent money to the Ming soldiers, often colluding
with interpreters to make up fake contracts and claim ungrounded debts.410
One of the heaviest burdens that the highland inhabitants imposed on the miserable
Ming soldiers was the so-called “Fan reward (番赏/赏番).” Technically, this Fan
reward was a kind of honorarium to praise the loyalty and good behavior of the
highland inhabitants. When the strong and powerful highland inhabitants frequently
attacked and destroyed the Ming’s military infrastructure, slaughtered Ming soldiers
and raided supplies and livestock,411 the so-called Fan Rewards in fact functioned as a
type of protection fee that the Ming soldiers paid to buy peace.412 The highland
inhabitants came up with a lot of names, reasons, and methods to extort such Fan
rewards, among which the most life-threating one to the Ming soldiers was toll
collection during grain shipment. The highland inhabitants would implement
roadblocks in certain transportation spots, usually narrow passages by steep cliffs, and
whoever refused to pay for their passing-by would most likely be killed and their
caravans plundered.413 Therefore, many Ming soldiers would accept such extortion to
buy peace. According to one report, one single battalion garrison from Diexi had to
take on an annual payment in Fan rewards of 3,700 tael of silver.414 The grainshipment fee from inland Sichuan to Diexi, in contrast, was 0.78 to 1 tael per shi.415
Since one common soldier’s monthly rice ration was 0.8 shi, the grain shipped to
Diexi with 3700 tael of silver could have fed between 4,600 to 6,000 soldiers.
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However, all this money was given to the non-Han dwellers, and it all came out of the
common Ming soldiers’ pockets.416
In the late 15th century, Ming soldiers lived miserably in the highland. They had to
give away their allocated grain under coercion, almost as a form of tribute, to the
highland inhabitants. And if they refused to do so, what followed would be the
highland inhabitants’ attack on the forts or raids on the shipment caravans. Yet the
soldiers’ demands to resolve such problems through military campaigns were
rejected. This increasingly deteriorating relationship specifically in the late 15th
century, I argue, stemmed from the wane of the tributary system. As introduced in the
previous two chapters, the tributary system functioned as a major channel for the
highland society to accumulate wealth and gain necessities from the Chinese
heartland. Yet the entire practice was strictly restrained by the Ming court in the
1470s, particularly during the Chenghua reign, and thus resulted in a decreasing
volume and frequency of highland tributary groups as well as tributary rewards. For
the highland indigenes, this meant a diminished transfer of rich resources which put
their livelihood at stake. They had to turn to alternative ways to acquire living
necessities. The Ming military down in the river valley, which had become quite
weak, was thus targeted. As one contemporary commented: “After having seen the
rich farmland, the non-Han people would look down upon their barren land; after
tasting the delicious grains, the non-Han people would complain their barley was not
sweet enough. This is why our land and territory has been annexed day by day.”417
While the suspension of tributary diplomacy greatly eased the economic burden at
court, it was the Ming soldiers stationed at the frontier who paid the price.
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Table. 5.1: Numbers of Tributary groups from Northwest Sichuan418
This section has examined the transformation of the Ming military in the late 15th
century in northwest Sichuan. The development of the garrison system was very much
shaped by the local topography. Farmland was scarce in the deep mountains, making
imported rice the major grain supply. But the mountainous terrain created much
trouble: constant transportation of shipments of rations and other living necessities
was slow, difficult and expensive. To reduce military operational costs, the Ming
maintained a conservative frontier policy in northwest Sichuan that led to sapped
morale and crumbling infrastructure in the military. In contrast to the worn-out
garrison system, the highland communities were better off due to the wealth
accumulated from their tributary interactions with the Ming. But the halt of the
tributary system in the late 15th century transformed the rich highland inhabitants into
aggressive neighbors who frequently bullied the Ming soldiers for money and food.
This power dynamic created many changes in the social structure in the mountain.
One of these changes was the massive migration of Han people into the mountains.
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Heading into the Mountains
Border-crossing in the highland, as in other borderland spaces, was not a new
phenomenon in the 16th century. However, this was not something that the Ming ruler
would wish to see his frontier troops practice. Therefore, as soon as the Ming troops
settled down in the highland in the late 14th century, they were ordered to stay within
walled cities with their daily activities strictly regulated.419 Many walled cities and
fortresses in the highland, in this sense, became reifications of the Ming’s imperial
presence in the frontier.420 Yet the Ming soldiers could not be restrained within the
Ming enclaves forever, especially when their living conditions in the military stations
were deteriorating. Therefore, in the late 15th century, many Ming soldiers in
northwest Sichuan whose living conditions were dreadful chose to abandon their
military duties completely when they had the chance.
The late 15th century decline of the Ming’s military, as well the ensuing growing
number of deserted soldiers, was part of a nationwide phenomenon. Kenneth Swope
points out that “by 1500, Ming military strength may have been as low as 3 percent of
prescribed levels in some garrisons, with desertion rates as high 85 percent in some
areas despite numerous efforts by the government to ameliorate the problem.”421
Although the desertion rate in northwest Sichuan was not that high, it is still a
reasonable estimation that at least several thousand Ming soldiers deserted and
crossed the border. Why were the Ming soldiers able to desert successfully without
being chased back by the military? Again, the topography of the region played an
important role. As mentioned earlier, rations for the Ming army in northwest Sichuan
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relied heavily on grain shipments. But the rugged terrain in the mountains posed great
difficulties on logistics. Therefore, the Ming military was not able to build their forts
too far away from the river valley where the grain shipment routes lay. Topography,
in this way, affected the spatial pattern of Ming China’s military infrastructure in its
westmost frontier. The correlation between terrain and imperial power even offers one
unique and inspiring way to conceptualize the distinction between the Chinese and
non-Chinese realm. While in most frontiers, the advance of state power was
conducted horizontally, the Ming’s expansion was carried out vertically in northwest
Sichuan. As the Ming army entered the region, they only occupied river valleys and
left the mountains to the indigenes, as indicated in Fig. 5.1. In that regard, what we
have from northwest Sichuan is an interesting picture in which Ming China is below a
certain altitude while the non-Ming world sits amid the clouds and mist. Therefore,
when the Ming soldiers decided to desert, they could just climb up along the
mountainside or follow mountain valleys to go upstream. Because all the forts were
concentrated in the river valley near the main transportation line, it was quite easy for
them to elude Ming supervision.
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Fig. 5.1: Sphere of Influence of Ming China in the Highland422
In northwest Sichuan, Ming soldiers deserted either of their own volition or under
others’ compulsion, and both types of movements created much trouble for the Ming.
Based on their incentives, I categorize the fled Ming soldiers as either proactive
migrants or passive migrants respectively.
Proactive migrants deserted their military positions and resettled in the highland
mostly of their own free will for survival. In northwest Sichuan at the time, many
military men were in fact mere beggars who were hired as replacements to fulfill
others’ military obligations. But as soon as they arrived at the military posts, they
found it impossible to keep themselves fed and warm to survive the harsh conditions
in the mountain and simply deserted.423 In fact, in addition to these hired beggarsoldiers who could not survive, military officials also suffered grain shortages and
even starved to death.424 When a certain military official died, his entire family
collapsed with him: the wife was remarried to an underling of her deceased husband,
the son became a thief, and the mother begged for food from others.425 Such living
conditions left many Ming military personnel no other option but to desert.
Many Ming soldiers took shelter in the deep mountains as they provided a
possibility to keep away from imposed military duties and imperial tax and corvée
burdens. Some soldiers would bring tea and cloth to the highland non-Han
communities as a gift and then acquire permission to work in these communities as
either tenants or craftsmen.426 Many such hired hands with no ties back home would
also marry local women and thus blend into the highland society.427 Other fugitive
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Ming subjects formed their own communities instead of joining the non-Han groups.
One late 15th century memorial indicates that these deserted Han communities could
have included more than 800 people and were quite diverse in terms of the identity of
the community members. Merchants from lower Yangtze regions whose businesses
failed, military grain shipment porters from Sichuan, and deserted soldiers from
Yunnan all abandoned their previous lives and flocked to the highland.428 It was in
this context that the northwest Sichuan deep mountains appeared to be attractive to
Ming subjects from near and far.
Compared with those who left for the highland out of their own will, many other
Ming soldiers went into the mountains because they were captured and were kept in
the non-Han societies as slaves. Slavery was part of the social repertoire of premodern northwest Sichuan. To the non-Han dwellers, men were useful human
resources for heavy labor work such as farming, timber collection, and construction,
while women could be used for domestic labor or taken as captured wives. In addition
to slave labor, they were also used in political rituals. When the locals held public
ceremonies pertaining to political alliance, slaves would be buried alive as sacrifice,
indicating that whoever break the commitments would suffer the same fate.429
Because of such demands for slaves, highland inhabitants frequently kidnapped and
enslaved Han Chinese who were farming, woodcutting, or herding away from their
communities or took military captives when they defeated the garrisons or plundered
the caravans.430

428

Huangming Tiaofa Shilei Zuan, 716-717.
Hu, Hancun Yu Miaoxiang: Cong Ershi Shiji Qianqi Diandong Hancun Yu Chuannan Miaoxiang Kan
Zhongguo, 274.
430
Guo, Weimao Bianfang Jishi, juan 12, “chouyi,” 67a. Yuan, Quanshu Bianyu Kao, vol. 4, 107; Guo, Weimao
Bianfang Jishi, juan 12, “chouyi,” 44a.
429

161
Captivity became one major means through which the Ming lost its subjects to the
highland society. Some materials indicate that for one specific fort within a period of
two and a half years, while only 60 Han-Chinese were killed during a non-Han attack,
447 were captured.431 Another memorial points out that more than 2,000 Ming
subjects were captured within a short period.432 Once captured, many captives were
sold into the deep mountains so that the Ming troops were unable to retrieve them and
the captives could not escape.433 In the non-Han communities, the indigenes were
called “A-ba,” meaning “my lord” in Chinese; while the soldiers were called
“nuerzha” which meant “servant.”434 Compared with those who proactively joined the
highland communities, those who were captured unquestionably suffered a great deal.
Being captives in the mountains, the Han-Chinese were no longer Ming soldiers or
civilians but slaves that can be sold or exchanged. Some highland communities must
have captured too many Ming subjects because they even sold these captives in
exchange for cattle.435 This indicates that human trafficking was quite rampant in
northwest Sichuan. In other scenarios, the captives were used to demand ransom.
While regular soldiers could be redeemed for cheaper items such as lamb and wine,436
military officials could be very expensive. One memorial indicates that when the
highland inhabitants captured one guard commander, they asked for a ransom of 700
tael of silver to keep him alive.437 This amount of money, if measured otherwise,
equaled almost two years’ protection fee that the Ming military used to buy peace
from the highland inhabitants.438
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It should be noted that the value of captive women was quite high by highland
standards. In 1477, a company commander was captured by the highland inhabitants.
But instead of ransom, the dwellers required one Maozhou female civilian in
exchange for the captured commander. The female was once captured by the highland
inhabitants but had successfully escaped. To retrieve their colleague, the Ming
military officials agreed to such a demand. The Maozhou lady must have never
imaged that it was her compatriots who were theoretically her protectors that in the
end sent her back to the mountain that she had just made every effort to escape
from.439 Although we are not sure why the kidnappers desired her so much, in this
case, it is clear that a common woman was valued more highly than a military
commander from the highland inhabitants’ perspective.
The phenomenal borderland-crossing activities in northwest Sichuan suggests the
Ming’s weak presence in the region, which derived not only from the region’s
difficult terrain, but more importantly the late 15th century power dynamics between
the Ming military and highland society. Such phenomena greatly undermined the
Ming’s imperial authority and also sabotaged the solidarity of the Ming’s frontier
governance system. Given the situation, Ming officials began to calculate alternatives.
After all, the western frontier, unlike the northern frontier shouldering the heavy
responsibilities of defending against the Mongols, was less important to the Ming in a
strategic sense. The non-Han society in the mountains was decentralized and the
actual damage they could cause to the empire’s general populace was limited. In
contrast, it was the massive amount of money originally allocated for the frontier
soldiers but eventually taken by the non-Han locals in various ways that caused a
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greater burden for the Ming.440 Both ministers at court and officials on the frontlines
recognized this. Zhou Hongmou, a renowned court official, described the situation in
the region as “greatly damaging” to Sichuan and proposed to withdraw half of the
military to ease the pressure for grain shipments.441 Tong Xuan, a frontier-stationed
censor official, suggested a much more radical idea: the most troublesome area
between Songpan and Maozhou be completely abandoned. Listing all the pros and
cons, Tong described the region as the appendix, an organ that could be gotten rid of
without causing damage: “for the vast heavenly empire, keeping this route would add
no value, and giving it up would not be a loss either.”442 By doing this, the soldiers
and grain porters could suffer less,443 massive amount of grains could be saved to
prepare Sichuan for natural disasters,444 and the starving non-Han people might start
fighting among themselves and thus weaken each other.445 It seems that many Ming
officials had already lost confidence in this troublesome frontier.
In the late 15th century and early 16th century northwest Sichuan, a large number of
stationed soldiers left their military duties for various reasons, and many Ming
officials also proposed to give up imperial control over the region, at least partially.
The back and forth revolving around these issues illustrate the somewhat conflicted
role of northwest Sichuan in the Ming’s imperial blueprint: spending too much money
on the region was a waste, yet completely abandoning it was also a shame. This
situation changed in the early 16th century when the Mongols began to threaten the
region.
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In the Wake of the Mongols
What prompted the situation in northwest Sichuan to change was not court
officials’ sympathy for the poor frontier soldiers, but rather an exogenous cause: the
growing threat of the Mongols. In the 1510s, the Mongols began to traverse the
Ming’s northwestern walled frontier, settled down near the Qinghai Lake, and
threatened the highland region in eastern Qinghai and northwestern Sichuan from the
west.446 This greatly disturbed the local power dynamic. Although the highland
inhabitants had bullied the Ming soldiers for decades, they were not as powerful as
the Mongols. Therefore, many highland communities were annexed by the Mongols
with their land occupied.447 Although some members managed to flee, many others
were subjugated by the Mongols.448 Because these highland inhabitants were quite
familiar with the local situation, they also took on jobs as military guides and led the
Mongols to raid Ming villages and forts.449 Such a geopolitical shift imposed great
pressure on the Ming. In the 1510s, an increasing number of reports of Mongol
attacks on the highland began to show up in Ming court documents,450 and many
officials worried about the forthcoming attacks by a military alliance between various
individual Mongol and Muslim groups.451 Compared to the heavily guarded northern
frontier, the Ming’s western frontier was never fully prepared for threats from the
northern nomads. Thus, from the 1510s on, the Ming began to make an effort to
solidify its vulnerable borderland military system in northwest Sichuan.
The frontier policy in the northwest Sichuan in the early 16th century went from a
passive to a proactive stance. The transformation of Ming China’s general attitude
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toward its western frontier is demonstrated in three initiatives: the first two aimed at
refashioning bureaucratic structure, and the last one was mainly about military
infrastructure renovation.
First, more high-level bureaucratic positions in the military were restored or newly
established. For example, when the position of Sub-regional vice commander (分守副
總兵) was canceled in 1470, it was still treated as a high-ranking position; but by its
1515 reestablishment, it had already became a low-ranking office as officials
proposed to have top-level court officials such as censors-in-chief dispatched to
northwest Sichuan.452 Even Regional Commander (總兵), a position that had never
been established in Sichuan, was set up as a direct response to the growing Mongol
threat.453 The (re)establishment of these two positions signaled that the empire had put
more weight on the northwest Sichuan military. While a full-fledged military
apparatus was in shape, new commanders were chosen, and new military positions
were also created for specific areas with strategic importance.454 The problem of
corruption was considerably improved in that even embezzling a small amount of
silver was a crime subject to punishment.455
Improving the overall quality of the frontier military was also a significant part of
early 16th century military reform. To tackle the low quality of soldiers, most officials
and commanders agreed to suspend the rotating guest troops, but the best replacement
remained a topic for debate.456 Official proposals fell into three categories. The first
proposed to stick to the garrison system framework. Officials suggested to trace the
military households that were supposed to take on military duties, conscript more
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housemen, and then send them to the frontier together with their wives and
children.457 Although this seemed to be a most convenient solution as it was carried
out according to a framework that had been in use for over a century, such an idea
was the least pragmatic when the garrison system was crumbling in the early 16th
century nationwide.
In comparison, the second and third types of suggestions left of the garrison system
framework and proposed to hire able-bodied men instead of enlisting them by force.
The only difference between the second and the third approaches lies in where to find
candidates to hire. The second type of proposal suggested looking for military
candidates in locales where military households registered. To draw attention from
potential hired hands, the frontier military would prepare everything for them, even
wives, so that the soldiers would not miss home and the poor would be willing to
enlist.458 The third potential solution was to hire mercenaries locally in the frontier
region. Proponents reasoned that those who grew up in the highland were accustomed
to local conditions—including the food, climate, geography, and topography—thus
making them qualified fighters. More importantly, they were willing to enlist because
in northwest Sichuan rice rations and a salary from the military were “the only source
to keep people alive that a household of five would need two in military to remain fed
and warm while having one in military would still starve the rest of the family.”459
The third proposal was implemented in the end. Indeed, only those locally hired ablebodied men were feared by the non-Han people.460 One could even speculate that
many of these locally hired soldiers were actually former deserters who were willing
to sign back up if given decent pay for a change. And the Ming documents’ usage of
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the term “local soldiers” (土兵) further highlights how the Han/Fan distinction was
quite fuzzy and ethnic difference did not play a role in such scenarios.
The third prong of renovation in northwest Sichuan military was military
infrastructure. To provide a safer environment for the frontier military, new routes
impenetrable to arrows and rock attacks were carved out,461 fences protecting the
caravans from robbery were erected along the shipping route,462 and garrison cities
were enlarged.463 In addition, more fortresses were constructed. Table. 5.2
demonstrates in detail how military forts in different subregions of northwest Sichuan
were gradually built. It is clear that before the 16th century, most fortresses were
constructed in areas to the south and west of Maozhou, leaving the area to the north
and east less well-guarded. On one hand, this is because the regions to the north and
east of Maozhou were deep in the mountains where the severe topography retarded
the penetration of Ming forces; on the other hand, these areas were also closer to the
steppe where Mongol powers were quite active. But starting from the 1520s in the
early years of the Jiajing reign, more fortresses were built in these regions, indicating
the Ming’s strengthened will to extend imperial power into the highland.
Western
Region
西路
1435-44
1445-54
1455-64
1465-74
1475-84
1485-94
1495-1504
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Lower Southern
Region
下南路

4
4
4

1
11
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1535-44
1545-54
1555-64

1
5
1
1
2
1
4
1
Table. 5. 2: Fortresses Constructed near Maozhou464

3

The construction of new military forts demonstrated the Ming’s determination to
strengthen its defenses on the western frontier where the Mongol threats grew. With
more soldiers dispatched and fortresses constructed, the court gradually replaced a
conservative frontier policy with an aggressive one. A military guidebook composed
in the mid-16th century, Veritable Records of Defense in Wei-Mao Area, indicates that
within the 21 military actions launched in northwest Sichuan during the Ming
dynasty, 13 of them took place within the three decades from 1520 to 1550.465 The
scale of military campaigns also greatly escalated. While most previous military
clashes in northwest Sichuan were rather small, as many as 30,000 Ming soldiers
were deployed in certain campaigns in the early 16th century.466 Thus, the military in
northwest Sichuan was fashioned anew.
What followed the military refashioning project was an attempt by the Ming to
penetrate the frontier society ideologically. In the northwest Sichuan non-Han society,
people used a pair of colors, “black” (黑) and “white” (白), as references to moral
standards. Such a taxonomy was in use in northwest Sichuan least since the northern
Song era,467 and they were most likely reflections of indigenous knowledge of social
categories. To the indigenous people, “black” and “white” represented the two poles
of morality. While being called “white” implied kindness, compliance, and civility,
those who were troublesome, aggressive, and evil were often deemed “black” in the
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local context.468 Even today, there are still local customs in northwest Sichuan, such
as worshipping white stones, that derive directly from the cultural implication of
“white”.469 Put simply, “white” and “black” indicated how the locals distinguished
good from bad, and these two type of behavior undoubtedly could change in certain
circumstances, seeing as adjectives of “good” and “bad” are relative concepts.
When the Ming began to penetrate deeper into the local society starting in the
1520s, the imperial forces adopted these terms but twisted their connotations from
indicators of good and evil to signs of loyalty and disloyalty to the Ming sovereign.
One map collected in the Enlarged Terrestrial Atlas (廣輿圖) is of particular
importance for examining how the Ming played with this naming practice and
intended to impose it onto the indigenous society. The map was named the Frontier
Map of Songpan (Fig. 5.2 松潘邊圖), and it was compiled between 1538 and 1545.470
Although highlighting Songpan in its designation, the map actually covered the entire
area of northwest Sichuan. The most eye-catching feature of the map is the labeling of
“white people” and “black people” written next to each hamlet. On the map, there
were in total 112 so-called “black people” label (黑人), and 72 “white people” labels
(白人).
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Fig. 5.2: Frontier Map of Songpan
Frontier Map of Songpan was the only map in the atlas that includes such a feature.
Obviously, it should be viewed as a visualization of the local Black-White taxonomy.
But the map actually provides more. The map was made between Jiajing 17 and 24, a
relatively peaceful period when a large-scale siege of Maozhou in Jiajing 15 was
defeated and all the rebels destroyed.471 Therefore, the military leader had this map
made as a report on collected intelligence so as to prepare for possible future attacks
from the indigenes. Mid-Ming frontier military commanders preferred to have
intelligence maps drawn in order to make certain the potential alliances and potential
threats they were dealing with,472 and the Frontier Map of Songpan undoubtedly
served the same purpose. It was through this process that the meanings of “Black” and
“White” experienced subtle yet significant changes.
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On the platform Google Earth, I pinned the so-called “black” and “white” groups
separately for the sake of better visualization and analysis (Fig. 5. 4 & Fig. 5. 5).473
The resulting maps clearly show that most hamlets of “White” people were in
proximity to the three most important military strongholds in the Ming’s northwest
Sichuan frontier: the Songpan and Maozhou garrisons and the Diexi battalion. Yet
most “Black” ones were located relatively far away from the Ming’s military
apparatus.
In the local cosmology, “Black” and “White” were labels of bad and good
behaviors. However, it is unlikely that all evildoers lived in the deep mountains, while
all good people intentionally dwelled near the Ming military bases. A more
reasonable interpretation is that this map only indicates the good and bad from the
Ming’s perspective. While those living close to the Ming military were relatively
well-behaved, most likely as a result of the military’s intimidation, the Ming treated
them as “good” people and thus borrowed indigenous labels and designated them as
“white” communities. In contrast, those who lived in the deep mountains between
Maozhou and Songpan were treated as evil because Ming grain caravans were
frequently plundered there. That, of course, would render them “bad” communities
from the Ming’s perspective, and thus “black.” In this regard, the Ming borrowed
terms from the local value system, but applied them according to the Ming’s own
standard.
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Fig. 5.3: Hamlets with “Black” people Fig. 5.4: Hamlets with “White” People
In addition to using old local vocabularies, the Ming twisted them to match the
imperial will. This was a clear sign of attempts of imperial penetration. Having
constructed more fortresses and dispatched more soldiers in the mountains, the Ming
was able to intimidate the mountain inhabitants with military power to a certain
extent. The Ming further endeavored to exert ideological influence in the local
society. Trying to adopt indigenous taxonomies while substituting their connotations
with definitions that accorded with the Ming’s expectation was one typical move.
Moreover, what happened on the Ming’s western frontier was not a unique
phenomenon: in other frontier regions, we also see the Ming’s adoption of indigenous
taxonomies in tandem with imperial expansion. In his monograph on the Ming’s
southern frontier, Leo Shin examines a similar process that occurred during the
Ming’s conquest of Guangxi. As more interactions took place and the Chinese
officials developed better knowledge of the indigenous people, taxonomies used for

173
Guangxi locals became increasingly bifurcated and detailed maps drawn out.474 By
doing this, the Ming wished to amend social structures in a smooth way. Yet
questions still remain: To what extent did this practice affect the indigenes? Could the
Ming’s ideological imposition successfully reshape the local people’s perception of
social structure?
The short answer to these questions is no. Despite that northwest Sichuan was
largely Sinicized in later periods, in the mid-16th century, the empire had not yet
penetrated that deeply. For quite a while, local ideas co-existed with imperial
discourse. One official memorial speaks to the juxtaposition of the different
understandings of “Black” and “White” from the Ming’s and the locals’ perspectives.
In March 1545, several indigenous hamlet leaders relatively friendly to the Ming
forces sent messages to the military to inform them of a forthcoming attack. The
strike would be mounted by Qingpian hamlet inhabitants, who claimed that the Ming
soldiers killed some “White” people in their community, and therefore they were
about to take revenge.475 In the Frontier Map of Songpan, Qingpian hamlet was
labeled as the home of “Black people” because it frequently attacked Ming forts and
raided grain stocks. But the Qingpian hamlet villagers were less likely to know how
the Ming identified them; instead, what they understood was that some “White”
people in their community, probably community members who were honest and kind
in their daily lives, were killed by the Ming soldiers. Therefore, in the eyes of these
Qingpian people, it was those Han-Chinese armed murderers that were truly “Black.”
In this case, both the Ming and Qingpian inhabitants considered themselves to be
“white” and the other side “black.” Obviously, there was a gap between how the Ming
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understood these terms and how the locals perceived them. By the mid-1540s, despite
Ming attempts, the empire’s survey and categorization has little success in changing
in how the indigenes understood social relationships.
From the 1520s to the 1540s, the Ming drastically refashioned its northwest
Sichuan military by granting it more political weight, hiring more able-bodied men,
and constructing more military infrastructure in the face of Mongol threats. Yet these
changes were mainly made within the Ming’s military apparatus, and as the case of
“black” and “white” shows, the Ming’s reconceptualization of the region did not have
much effect on the ground. However, because of the intensive military actions starting
from the 1550s, we shall see more changes in the northwest Sichuan society,
especially in the ethnic constitution of its population.
Blurred Boundaries
Many historians of Ming China would agree that the reign of Emperor Jiajing
(1522-1566) was characterized by extensive frontier crises. In addition to the
oftentimes singled out ‘Southern Dwarfs and Northern Caitiffs’ (南倭北虜), the Ming
empire in the early 16th century was in fact haunted by social unrest on nearly all
sides. One common feature of these frontier turbulences is the intensified bordercrossing activities. Yet the local ramifications varied between different frontiers. For
example, on the empire’s northern frontier, the White Lotus practitioners deserted into
the steppe and helped the Mongol Khans to construct lordship on a religious basis, 476
while on the empire’s coastal frontier, the Han sailors colluded with the alleged
Japanese pirates and engaged extensively in raiding their own compatriots.477 On the
empire’s western frontier, as this section examines, the cross-border migrants created

476
477

Lü, “Shilun Andahan Dui Yishi Xingtai de Xuanze.”
Szonyi, The Art of Being Governed: Everyday Politics in Late Imperial China, 83-109.

175
an hybrid society which challenged the empire’s ethnic imagination of the region and
amended its ways of regulating imperial subjects.
Unlike in the empire’s northern and coastal frontiers where many border-crossers
were civilians, deserted soldiers constituted the majority of those who traversed the
Ming’s western frontier. This was most likely because the Ming’s western frontier
was under full administration of the military, while the northern and southeastern
frontier regions were co-governed by civilian and military systems and therefore had
more civilian inhabitants. Despite the series of reforms in the early 16th century,
desertion on the Ming’s western frontier was still a serious problem. And quite
ironically, the situation became even worse as the reforms deepened. I will examine
this process in detail through the case of He Qing.
He Qing (?-1555 何卿) was an experienced frontier general. He was known for
being a ‘hawk’ advocating strict frontier policy, holding a racist position toward the
local inhabitants, and successfully guarding the Ming’s western frontier region for
decades.478 One memorial even praised him as the most essential element for keeping
Sichuan safe because he alone was worth ten thousand armed soldiers.479 In the early
years of the Jiajing reign, He Qing was promoted to the position of vice-commander
of Songpan. Upon arrival, he was shocked by the decrepit fort structures and
demoralized troops, and thus he decided to bring back its military edge through
reform. Regulating military deployments, grain shipments, and personnel
appointments, He Qing also paid attention to military infrastructure maintenance. He
not only reconstructed many fortresses and built more than 20,000 barracks,480 but
also erected border walls hundreds of miles long to protect the grain shipment
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routes.481 However, when He Qing was determined to fully refresh the northwest
Sichuan military, the local situation ruthlessly struck him: as many soldiers were
dispatched to reinforce old and construct new fortifications, a large proportion simply
took this as a great opportunity to desert into the mountains.482
The mid-16th century desertions were quite different from those in the late 15th
century in context, process, and consequence. First, the continued movements of the
military population into the highland does not necessarily mean that the early 16th
century reforms were unsuccessful. The reforms did refashion the military apparatus
and adjust the power balance as the captivity and slavery of Ming soldiers by
highland inhabitants almost completely disappears from Ming texts thereafter. In that
case, why did the 1550s Ming soldiers still desert?
Zhao Shiyu proposes that the desertion in the mid-16th century should be
understood in the context of a nationwide migration toward the frontiers. He argues
that a booming population in the Chinese heartland prompted numerous Ming
subjects to flood into the empire’s margins where living pressure was lighter but had
more farmland, natural resources, and business opportunities.483 Therefore, quite
different from those in the late 15th century who were captured and taken into the
mountain, border crossings in mid-16th century northwest Sichuan were spontaneously
conducted by many Ming subjects in pursuit of easier lives. And they indeed had
better living conditions. As I have demonstrated in previous sections, many Han
people in the mountain lived miserably as unfree labors or even slaves in the late 15th
century; but in the mid-16th century, their living conditions improved. Many of them,
as shown in the Frontier Map of Songpan (松潘邊圖), converged in communities
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exclusive to Han people and thus were not subject to non-Han rulers (Fig. 5.5).
Others, although still taken in by the highland inhabitants, played much more
important roles in those communities, as they could provide military information to
help the non-Han groups compete with the Ming.484

Fig. 5.5: Hamlet of Han people (漢人寨) in Frontier Map of Songpan
Fully aware of the value of these defeated Ming subjects as both fighters and
laborers, He Qing realized the best and only way to stop the soldiers from deserting
was to eliminate the communities to which his soldiers were heading. Hence, when
the maintenance work was done, He Qing began to use violent means to stop
desertion. Starting from the 1550s, he launched several large-scale military campaigns
and achieved remarkable success. The bloodiest campaigns were fought with the
Baicao community. In a series of battles against Baicao, He Qing’s troops in total
destroyed 47 hamlets, burned down 4,800 Diao Houses (碉房), a northwest Sichuan
style of stone building that combined defensive and accumulation function, and took
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tens of thousands of livestock, grain stores, and weapons as war rewards.485 Countless
indigenes were killed or became homeless. It was also during this process that He
Qing started to “filter” the highland communities by teasing the deserted Ming
soldiers out.
Baicao (白草), as one primary target of He Qing’s campaigns, was long believed to
be an ethnic Qiang community in the Ming court’s narrative. Together with Baima
and Mugua, the three communities constituted the so-called ‘three Qiang of
Longzhou,’ and Baicao was considered the most villainous one.486 For a long time,
Baicao had created significant trouble for the Ming military. It frequently attacked
Ming forts, plundered grain caravans, and captured and enslaved Ming soldiers until
He Qing’s ruthless suppression. But according to those who participated in the battle
or were in charge of post-war reconstruction, Baicao was not a Qiang community at
all. Zhang Shiche, the civil official who commanded the battle together with He Qing,
pointed out that Baicao was in fact a community newly established by Fan migrants
who moved around in the highland.487 Yuan Zirang, a local official who was in charge
of post-war reconstruction, also wrote in his first-hand notes that “those who we used
to identify as Qiang in Longzhou such as Baima and Baicao are now all deemed Fan;
with the Fan expanding in all directions, the Qiang will be forgotten!”488 Yet contrary
to Yuan’s anxiety-ridden words, Qu Jiusi, another civil official working in the
northwest Sichuan frontier, noted completely different observations. Qu claimed:
“The three Longzhou Qiang communities each have around five hundred inhabitants.
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But most of them are actually ethnic Han. Taking shelter in the mountain, these Han
people have offered the indigenes much help!” 489
Instead of understanding these records as mutually exclusive narratives, I argue that
they together point to the hybrid nature of the Baicao community. Because of the
frequent flow of people in the region, the ethnic constitution of Baicao had already
became quite mixed. In other words, even if Baicao was a Qiang community at the
time of its first contact with the Ming, in the mid-16th century, Han people and
Tibetans had already become significant parts of the population’s makeup. Yet in the
Ming court’s records, the community was still documented as a Qiang group, thus
prompting Yuan Zirang’s and Qu Jiusi’s surprise. Here we see a gap between macrohistory narrative and local reality. On one hand, many Ming officials tended to
categorize highland communities with static ethnic labels and even debated whether a
community was essentially Qiang or Fan; on the other hand, such understandings
failed to capture the fluidity of the region: flexibility, contingency, and even
uncertainty. Thus, ethnic taxonomy, as an analytical framework, was of little help for
both Ming officials and modern historians. As a diverse array of populations
frequently moved around the highland, ethnic boundaries were easily transgressed and
transcended.
Ethnic terms were not very useful to characterize the hybrid highland communities
such as Baicao, and the terms were not applicable to categorize Ming subjects in the
highland either. He Qing’s post-war policy best attests to this point. During the
military contact, He Qing and other Ming officials noticed that many captured Ming
subjects were enslaved in the Baicao community. Therefore, by taming the rebellious
Baicao, He Qing must have thought that it was time for these Ming subjects to return.
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But to his surprise, many of these former Ming subjects simply refused to leave the
mountain. One memorial attributed such a seemingly incomprehensible situation to a
concern for the safety of the Ming captives. These Ming subjects, who were stuck in
the mountains under coercion, had stayed with the Baicao community for so long that
even their appearance and daily mannerisms had changed to the non-Han style.
Therefore, they were quite worried that the Ming troops would take advantage of their
unrecognizable appearance and kill them as barbarians for rewards. Many of them
thus chose to stay alive in the mountains rather than take the chance of being
misrecognized.490 Once informed of this situation, He Qing immediately took action.
He ordered white flags to be erected at every traffic intersections with “amnesty for
the “Han” people (招撫漢人)” written large in Chinese script. In addition, he
requested Ming officials to stand by these flags as supervisors to make detailed
registers and testimonials for the returners.491 The information that He Qing wanted to
deliver was quite clear: the safety of those who were willing to return would be
guaranteed. By doing this, He Qing believed that those who wanted to reclaim their
Ming identity would not just die in the woods or go back to the rebellious groups.492
What He Qing did was quite considerate, and I believe it is highly possible that,
although historical materials did not specify, many deserted Ming subjects were
convinced and returned to their previous lives. However, I argue that the Ming
official’s memorial only tells half of the story. It serves a specific political purpose to
create a benevolent and compassionate image of He Qing but disguises some other
information regarding fugitive Ming subjects in the mountains. In fact, other than
those being captured, many former Ming subjects in the highland were proactive
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deserters, just like those who deserted under He Qing’s nose when they were
dispatched for construction or sentry duty. In other words, these soldiers deserted of
their own volition. And they must have made this decision after clear consideration,
and thus would not easily answer He Qing’s call to resume their identity in the Ming
military. For those who refused to continue to be Ming subjects, it was easy to hide in
the mountains because, as the previous memorial showcases, it was not difficult for
people to change their appearance and lifestyle or pick up new languages. In that
regard, one may wonder: What exactly does ethnic label, such as Han, mean on the
ground? And how did people decide one’s ethnicity when classic ethnic indicators
such as language, custom and appearance all lose efficacy?
He Qing’s methods for retrieving “Han” people from the mountain address these
questions to some degree.493 As was written on his flags, those who answered his call
and resumed their imperial duties would be embraced as “Han.” As the reasoning
goes, those who chose not to return, although they were ethnically not different from
those who did return, were thus deemed “non-Han.” In this regard, I argue that one
important message He Qing’s policy reveals is the transformation of “Han” from an
ethnic label to a jurisdictional status marker. What separated “Han” from “non-Han”
did not lie in ethnic features, but whether the referent would serve the Ming in its
imperial apparatus. “Han” was used by He Qing as a pronoun for “Ming subject.” It
thus became a frame of reference to determine one’s political identity, according to
which being “Han” and being a Ming subject were one and the same. In this vein,
“Han” and “non-Han” were no longer ethnic concepts but were politicized into
jurisdictional statuses.
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The mid-16th century battles undoubtedly failed to draw all Han people out of the
highland mountains. Many of them stayed behind and kept playing important roles in
affecting power dynamics in the late 16th century highland. Some lived in non-Han
communities and taught tactics to their fellows in the community to deal with
incoming Ming invasions.494 Others stayed behind for religious reasons. Among the
Tibetan Buddhists living in Baima, another so-called Qiang community, many of
them were highly possible ethnic Han judging by their names. To be more specific,
within the 12 out of 18 hamlets in the Baima community where Tibetan Buddhists
dwelled, at least 4 had ethnic-Han Tibetan Buddhists. Chapter 3 has already pointed
out that after the Chenghua reign, ethnic-Han people were not allowed to practice
Tibetan Buddhism anymore. Therefore, many of them who were already Tibetan
Buddhists by then and chose religious belief over political affiliation moved into the
highland mountains where Ming laws were less effective. While these former Ming
subjects kept their Chinese surname, allowing modern historians to speculate about
their ethnic backgrounds, many other deserted soldiers successfully assimilated
themselves into the highland society. They changed their surnames, formed new
kinship relations in the mountain, and eventually de-sinicized themselves.495 As time
went by, the Han features in these deserters would only become more and more
tenuous.
In his monograph examining cultural contact between Ming officials and non-Han
groups in Guangxi, Leo Shin argues that the encounter with the somewhat barbaric
mountain dwellers catalyzed the formation of a sense of Chineseness among many
Ming elites and thus shaped the ideological contours of an ethnocultural China.496
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While Shin mainly pays attention to elite narratives, I have drawn on local highland
examples to portray a seemingly opposite historical process: as the Ming forces
interacted with the highland society, many ethnocultural concepts were gradually
deconstructed by the fluidity embedded in frontier migration. But this does not
necessarily mean that my argument contradicts that of Leo Shin. Rather, such a
contrast brings out the nuance embedded in the center-periphery paradigm and
reminds readers of the importance of examining the two sides of the story together.
Here, I have proposed that, in the highland society, ethnic identity, which can be
quite flexible and thus transformative, was not so important in the local power
dynamics; what was really at stake was one’s political allegiance, which determined
his or her social position. In this regard, the highland provides a space where
ethnicity, as the dominant analytical framework, may be revisited and the
multidimensionality of many seemingly well-established terms and concepts is
revealed.
Summary
This chapter focused on population movements in the highland. It demonstrates
how such movements were initiated, regulated, and negotiated by different parties as
their intentions and understanding were oftentimes at odds. In the late 15th century, the
highland was a place where indigenes overpowered Ming soldiers. Highland
inhabitants, whose stable supply of various resources through the tributary system
was terminated, became quite aggressive; Ming soldiers, who had enjoyed decadeslong peace and were unable to respond to such aggressions, could only maintain a
defensive position and behaved rather feebly. Many Ming soldiers were thus bullied,
killed, and captured by the highland inhabitants, making the region a hell to common
soldiers and a nuisance to Ming court officials. In the early 16th century, as the
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Mongols moved southwest to the other side of the highland, the Ming was forced to
reposition the highland in its strategic map. Large-scope military reforms were thus
carried out with the intention to bring back military morale to prepare for possible
attacks by the Mongols. Yet the limits of Ming China’s capacity for mounting
imperial expansion were also exposed through these reforms. As new fortresses were
built and more soldiers dispatched in the highland, military desertion prevailed. But in
the process of regulating such unwanted movements, the Ming empire found its
taxonomy based on ethnic categorizations outdated and useless. Therefore, many
seemingly ethnocultural labels began to adopt new connotations, morphing into
jurisdictional concepts and political markers. Tracing the behavior of Ming military
deserters, this chapter has illustrated how the flow of population played its role in
affecting the course of highland history.
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Chapter 6: Lands

In the modern era, territory is a twinned concept with sovereignty, and together the
two elements function as significant pillars to erect nation-states featuring clearly
marked border lines. For empires, in contrast, territories at the frontier act as
touchstones to reveal the extent and facility of imperial expansion. As Charles Maier
points out, “Empires… emerged from the interactions of frontier with the historical
center,” thus they were “created from the outside in.”497 This chapter examines the
role and function of the highland as a buffer zone territory in the geopolitical
interaction between East and Inner Asian regimes during the pre-modern era. It
examines how perceptions of the highland were affected by the negotiation and
contestation between Chinese, Mongol, and Tibetan regimes over the region’s
territoriality. Examining land utilization, natural resource extraction, and the attendant
jurisdictional disputes, this chapter argues that the late 16th century competition over
the highland played a key role in the region’s transformation from a borderland into a
border.
In the 16th century, the relationship between Ming China and its neighboring
regimes was more than what is described in the simplified binary framework of
“domination” and “resistance.” Rather, the mutuality between the so-called center and
periphery, as Kathlene Baldanze points out in her examination of the Ming-Vietnam
encounter, was defined by constant negotiation.498 This chapter further suggests that
the negotiation over territory-crossing played a major role in such interactions. As we
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can see from the scholarship reviewed below, it is oftentimes the back and forth
between attempts of regulating frontier territory-crossing and efforts that aimed at
challenging such attempts that characterized these interactions, leading to the
transformation of frontier territory from borderland to border. Eric Talizcozzo’s
Secret Trades, Porous Borders illustrates how the ability to regulate the unsanctioned
movement of goods over thousands of miles of coastline became the venue to test the
limit of imperial expansion and the scope of the imperial control of the Dutch and
British in their southeast Asian colonies.499 Seonmin Kim’s research on Qing-Chosen
interactions at their buffer zone speaks directly to the correlation between border
crossing and the nature of frontier territory. As the Qing sought to maintain a
monopoly over the production of ginseng in its Manchuria frontier, it put strict
regulations on the movement of people and wished to militarize a loosely charted
borderland into a clearly demarcated boundary. In these two cases, the attempts to
weaken, if not challenge, control over border crossing were all countered from the
bottom up by forces that intended to prevent the transformation of frontier territory
from borderland to boundary. While the European colonists’ idea of monitoring and
curtailing smuggling was confronted by coastal inhabitants for the sake of their daily
livelihood, the Manchus were persuaded by the Chosŏn Koreans through the rhetoric
of the tributary system and eventually dropped the idea of demarcating a middle
ground. In both cases, how to perceive, control, or take advantage of territorial
crossings was closely tied to how the frontier territory were defined.
From roughly the 1540s to the 1590s, the highland witnessed a higher frequency of
the drastic movement of goods, religious beliefs, and people than before. This was
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mainly caused by the Mongol civil war, the forming of a Mongol-Tibetan religious
community, and the Ming’s military response to these changes at the time. With
various communities flocking to and mingled in the highland, the region soon became
a place where new ideas and norms overwrote old principles. By the end of the 16th
century, the highland had transformed from an uncharted territory into a crowded
nexus in the “great game” between China, Mongol, and Tibet. This chapter
consequently looks at how the series of geopolitical interactions over transregional
movement affected the territoriality of the region.
Highland as a Shelter Without Enough Oxygen
The direct catalyst for a large number of Mongols entering the highland in the early
16th century was the Mongol civil war, in tandem with the rise of Dayan Khan (14731517) and his grandson, Altan Khan (1507-1582). Known for reuniting many
Mongols under Chinggisid supremacy, Dayan Khan had subjugated many central and
eastern Mongol communities by 1500. However, his rise to power was also
confronted by some Mongols in the west, including a major opponent called Ibarai,
who was possibly Muslim.500 As the powerful leader of a western horde of Mongols
whose military base was at the foot of Mt. Helan, Ibarai posed an obstacle for Dayan
Khan. A civil war eventually broke out. Although he commanded mighty military
force, Ibarai was eventually defeated when half of his troops surrendered.501 Ibarai
himself fled northwest toward his military base. But when he noticed that his base
was within Dayan Khan’s reach, Ibarai turned to the southeast and arrived in the
highland region after bypassing Jiayu Pass, the far western end of the Ming’s military
defensive zone (Fig. 6.1).
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Fig. 6.1: Different Routes for Ibarai and the chasing army to arrive at Xihai area502
Though Ibarai was on the losing side in the civil war, his troops remained strong in
the eyes of many Ming officials on the Gansu frontier and were treated as a
destructive force and great threat to the area. One of these Ming frontier officials,
named Zhang Yi, even sent gold and silk fabrics to Ibarai to bribe him to turn away to
other administrative regions.503 After some wandering around, by 1520, Ibarai and his
troops gradually settled down around the Qinghai Lake, which was designated as
Xihai, the “sea in the west,” because of the lake’s extensive size. For this reason,
Mongol forces who settled down near the Qinghai Lake from then on were oftentimes
deemed as “hai kou” (bandits of the sea) in Ming texts. One has to note that Ibarai
was not the only Mongol leader who kept himself away from the northern steppe and
settled near the Qinghai Lake. Other leaders, such as Mandulai Aqalaqu, another
opponent to Dayan Khan’s rule,504 and Burqai, Dayan Khan’s half-brother,505 all left
Dayan Khan’s domain and moved to the Xihai region following Ibarai’s routes. By
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the 1540s, the steppe to the Ming’s west had become a place where the losers of
Mongol civil wars or rebels took shelter.
Consequently, the highland became an enclave for a large volume of Mongol
immigrants. Many Mongol leaders who opposed Dayan Khan’s rule formed an
alliance in the face of constant pursuit from the northern steppe. Although Dayan
Khan himself had already passed away at the time, his two grandsons, Mergen Jinong
and Alta Anda,506 who later received the honorific title of “Altan Khan,” clearly
understood the imperative to eliminate those who had fled to the highland. Therefore,
in the 1520s and 1530s, they frequently sent large parties to the highland in order to
completely eliminate the rebels.507 However, the expeditionary forces did not take the
detour as Ibarai had: they departed from Ordos, cut through Ming territory directly,
and swiftly entered the highland region (Fig. 6.1). Although nominally belonging to
the Ming, the region of the eastern part of modern-day Gansu was scarcely populated.
The statewide inefficiency of the Ming’s garrison system starting from the mid- to
late 15th century made the military in the region even more incapable, and that is why
frontier generals like Zhang Yi had to buy peace from the transient Mongols. Similar
to the sparsely distributed weak troops, the frontier walls in the region were also
unable to stop the Mongols: they came by tens of thousands, tearing down any walls
along their way and moving on.508 To these expeditionary Mongol troops, traversing
the Ming claimed territory was just like traveling through no man’s land.
The Ming military’s inability to check the Mongols’ movement in and out of the
highland was not unknown to Ming officials. From the early decades of the 16th
century, certain frontline commanders proposed and geared up for military
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confrontation with the trespassing Mongols. On the one hand, they were busy with
deploying soldiers and preparing military logistics such as purchasing horses and
digging trenches.509 On the other hand, they sent many memorials to the Ming court to
ask for financial support as well as approval for their possible military actions.510 But
these radical agendas were not all favored among other officials. Many frontier
officials were more cautious about launching large-scale military action after a
detailed evaluation of the costs and benefits of war.511 Others who thought the tension
between different Mongol groups was a good opportunity to carry out the somewhat
classic “divide and rule” strategy proposed to pacify the Mongols by gradually
drawing them back into the tributary system through political and economic
benefits.512 Such prolonged discussion of frontier policies was not unique at the time:
similar protracted debates had taken place at the Ming court several years earlier
concerning the walling project in Ordos.513 By 1525, the Ming court had decided to
maintain a conservative position in response to the Mongols’ frequent traversal of the
highland by acting only in defense.514
The way the Ming reacted to the Mongol actions reflected this defensive stance,
which included the building of an extensive new military infrastructure. According to
Arthur Waldron, the 16th century marked the peak of the Ming dynasty’s walling
project.515 But most walls built at the time were located in Xuanfu or Datong, regions
closer to Beijing with more strategic significance, while fewer were built in more
remote regions such as the northwest highland. In this area, it was military
infrastructure such as forts, instead of walls, that were primarily constructed. Drawing
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on data from local gazetteers and military guidebooks, in addition to my own
fieldwork, I used GIS software, namely Google Earth and ArcGis, to pin down a total
of 520 military infrastructures in areas of contemporary southern Gansu and eastern
Qinghai. An analysis of their spatial distribution reveals nuances about Ming China’s
frontier policies at the time.

Fig. 6.2: The Spatial Distribution of 520 Military Infrastructures in the administrative
zones of Hezhou, Taozhou, Minzhou, and Xining Guard516
Fig. 6.2 demonstrates the spatial distribution of Ming military infrastructures within
the administrative zones of Hezhou, Taozhou, Minzhou and Xining Guard. These
military infrastructures were not built at the same time, but most of them were
constructed in the early 16th century, making possible a deep dive into the logic of
mid-Ming military deployment.517 As a defensive belt that includes various
infrastructures such as fortresses (堡), guard posts (墩), hamlets (寨), mountain passes
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(关), river ferries (渡), and relay stations (站), the Ming empire implemented in the
highland a plan which greatly resembled what was being constructed around the same
time in the empire’s north– the Great Wall, or, to use the contemporaneous phrase, the
Nine frontier zones (九邊). One may argue that these frontier fort projects came from
the similar court ideology which relied on physical military infrastructures to guard
ward off nomadic Mongols. But even if they were challenged by the same type of
enemies, there was much that the Ming’s northern and highland frontiers did not hold
in common.
Topography was one important and unique factor that characterized how the Ming
constructed its defensive infrastructure in the highland. Unlike the empire’s northern
frontier where the terrain was flat, the Ming’s western frontier was much more
mountainous. Therefore, both the way that topography factored into the construction
of military infrastructure and the importance of terrain varied between the two
frontiers. While in the north, topography, as one among many strategic concerns,
mainly determined the course of the wall, on the Ming’s western frontier, it was a
vital factor for to the survival of the frontier soldiers. Map 6.2 indicates that the
Ming’s military infrastructure was mostly constructed along the eastern edge of the
steppe and the base of the mountains. The reason for this spatial pattern was not
because the regime explicitly forbade its army from marching toward the steppe or an
anti-steppe sentiment. Drawing on geographic and topographic data, I argue that such
a spatial pattern did not stem from strategic or ideological concerns but was related to
environmental constraints: constraints not posed by steppe grassland or mountain
forests, but by tenuous oxygen.
To reveal the logic behind this map, I first converted a three-dimensional
distribution diagram into data clusters that include the longitude and latitude of each
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military construction. Then, after data mining and matching with digital elevation
model (DEM), I managed to extract the altitude data of each military construction

Table. 6.1: Amount of Ming Military Infrastructure by Altitude
Table 6.1 shows a bar chart that measures and groups the number of Ming military
infrastructure by altitude. More than half of the military’s infrastructure was built
within the altitude range of 2,200 and 2,600 meters. As the altitude rises, the chance
of building military construction decreases. Also, the Ming soldiers seldom chose
places with an altitude higher than 3,000 meters for building stationing outposts, even
if many strategic spots, such as the Qinghai Lake, were higher than 3,000 meters. In
this regard, strategic concerns were not at play either. The reason behind such
behaviors, I argue, is related to altitude sickness.
Altitude is a crucial factor that restrained the Ming’s imperial penetration into its
western frontier. Because the higher the elevation, the easier the Ming soldiers would
suffer from altitude illness. Biological and medical studies have suggested that high
altitude environments can result in multiple health problems for those unacclimated,
such as acute mountain sickness, high-altitude cerebral edema, and high-altitude
pulmonary edema. Although not recorded in Ming dynasty texts, symptoms of
altitude illness such as headaches, vomiting, dizziness, or oxygen deficiency were
found in Tang and Qing dynasties materials when describing human activities in the
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highland.518 Ming soldiers were not immune to these sicknesses. Contemporary
studies have shown that in the Swiss Alps, symptoms of high-altitude sickness
occurred only in 9% of climbers at the height of 2850 m, but increased to 13% and
34% when altitude reached 3,050 m and 3,650 m respectively.519 One has to note that
Ming soldiers in the highland were not merely hiking: they had to wear heavy armor
and took on work that required intensive physical labor, such as infrastructure
construction and combat. Therefore, they were much more vulnerable to altitude
sickness. Taking the risk of being ahistorical, this chapter suggests that high altitude
sickness constitutes one significant ecological factor that affected imperial agendas,
just like how the deep forest in Qing dynasty Yunnan and the mosquitos in the early
modern Caribbean islands demonstrated the agency of the environment.520
High altitude not only weakened Ming soldiers’ physical conditions; it also affected
the empire’s logistics. First, farming in high altitude environments was quite difficult.
Not only would dry air and low temperature damage grain yield, the barren soil of the
region also rendered production quite low. Locally produced grain, as previous
chapters have shown, could not meet the needs of a large army. But when it came to
grain shipment, the high altitude posed great obstacles yet again. One can imagine
how difficult and inefficient hard labor such as hauling grain can be in high altitude
environments. This partially explains why Songpan was the most controversial
military outpost in the Ming court debates, since its 2,850m altitude makes it the
highest in the northwest Sichuan military zone and thus very difficult for logistics
management. In the high-altitude highland region, it was the inadaptability of both
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human beings and grains to a tenuous oxygen supply that slowed the pace of Ming
China’s imperial expansion
The high altitude also affected the nomadic lifestyle of the Mongols in the
highland. According to several Ming military housemen who were captured by the
Mongols but later managed to escape, the Mongols in the highland would move
southward to the steppe of northwest Sichuan for the winter and only returned to the
pasture near the Qinghai Lake during summer.521 Gradually, this became a seasonal
pattern of nomadic movement for the Mongols in the highland.522 Such a pattern, I
argue, was related to the high altitude of the region as well. The Qinghai Lake area
was quite elevated, and thus too cold and dry during the winter for livestock to
endure. In comparison, the northwest Sichuan steppe, which was lower in both
latitude and altitude, was a warmer place to herd livestock. The high altitude of the
highland not only kept the Ming soldiers away, but also affected the nomadic pattern
of the Mongols.
What did the highland region mean to both the Ming and Mongol regimes in the
early 16th century? This section has argued that what various groups valued about the
region was not the land itself, but its strategic importance. For the defeated Mongols,
the highland was mainly a shelter that provided accommodation. The Ming military,
in contrast, relied on the highland to construct its defensive military infrastructure in
the face of the growing Mongol threat. In the meantime, the activities of both parties
were affected by the local environmental conditions. Neither side could make use of
the land in a more substantial manner, and it is not likely that they had developed
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much of a sense of territoriality toward the highland. These changes would took place
in the coming decades.
The highland was a shelter for Mongols for decades. But it was very difficult for
Ibarai and his allies to hide forever as their locations were soon known to Dayan Khan
and his successors. In order to completely eliminate the threats to their unification
enterprise, Mongol leaders in Ordos conducted in total six expeditions from 1525 to
1550s to attack the Mongols in the highland. Although they managed to resist and
survive for decades, the Mongol rebels were eventually defeated by Altan Khan in
1558, which brought an end to the long-term Mongolian schism and opened a new
page for the highland’s history.523
Highland as a Religious Realm
In the early and mid-16th century, transregional movements in the highland were
prompted by the fierce Mongol civil war to which the Ming responded with passive
and defensive frontier policies. With the defeat of the Mongol renegades, the highland
region entered a new era of peaceful Ming-Mongol relations and laid the foundation
for a Mongol-Tibetan alliance. The following two sections focus on how religious and
economic factors incentivized the flow of people and how such transregional
movements reflected different territorial perceptions of the highland.
From the mid-16th century, divisions began to emerge in the Mongol steppe shortly
after the death of Dayan Khan, who managed to unite many individual communities
for the first time in centuries. Different Mongol groups attacked each other for various
reasons and interacted with the Ming individually. Out of this geopolitical
fragmentation, Altan Khan gradually came into power and greatly reshaped the power
dynamics in the highland.
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Altan Khan was born in 1508 as one of many grandsons of Dayan Khan. Despite
starting from an inferior military rank, Altan Khan gradually gained reputation and
power through his remarkable military achievements and became the ruler of the
western wing of Mongols. In addition to eliminating the rebels in the Xihai area and
subordinating Uriyangqad in the north and Oirads in the west, Altan Khan also
actively consolidated his power via diplomatic and ideological means.
Diplomatically, Altan Khan endeavored to improve the relationship with the Ming.
But unlike his grandfather who sought to unite all Mongols, Altan Kahn was more
keen to consolidate power only in his own ulus.524 From 1542 afterwards, Altan Khan
attempted to establish trade relations with the Ming by dispatching envoys and
returning Chinese captives.525 However, the conservative Ming court, exemplified by
Emperor Jiajing’s extreme resentment toward the Mongols, was not interested in
Altan Khan’s peace-seeking gestures. Therefore, Ming-Mongol relations were highly
charged throughout the xenophobic Jiajing reign (1522-1566) until the throne was
passed to the relatively open-minded Longqing emperor (1567-1572). Persuaded by
court ministers such as Gao Gong and Zhang Juzheng who were much more realistic
toward interacting with the Mongols,526 the Longqing emperor made up his mind to
end the Mongol issue with a peace treaty in 1571.527
Throughout his life, Altan Khan tried to solidify his authority by drawing
legitimacy from various religions. Following Mongol indigenous religions in the very
beginning, Altan Khan later turned to the White Lotus religion for political
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legitimation.528 However, as was agreed in one article of the 1571 peace treaty, the
White Lotus hierarchs, seen by the Ming as subversives (and therefore heretics), were
extradited back to the Ming for torture and public execution.529 From then on, Tibetan
Buddhism, the Geluk sect specifically, became the dominant religion of Altan Khan’s
regime.530
In the 16th century, the Mongols, especially those in modern-day Northern Tibet
and Southern Qinghai, already had close and frequent interactions with Tibetan
Buddhist monks.531 For Altan Khan himself, after encountering Tibetan Buddhism in
1558 for the first time,532 he decided to convert to Tibetan Buddhism in 1571.533
Although Chinese materials suggest that Altan Khan made this decision to cleanse his
soul after decades of war and violence,534 Elverskog argues that conversion into
Tibetan Buddhism went along with Altan’s regime-building enterprise that he was
only seeking benefits for his own ulus but not the entire Mongol nation.535 Whichever
the reason was, in 1574, Altan Khan sent an envoy group with an invitation to the
great Geluk sect monk, Sonam Gyatso, who was later known as the third Dalai Lama,
for a meeting.
Sonam Gyatso was quite hesitant at first when he received the invitation, until a
patron of the Geluk sect, Ngawang Drakpa from the Phagmodru family in central
Tibet, encouraged him to accept it.536 After all, the support from a powerful Mongol
Khan could be a significant source of support for the Geluk sect’s disadvantaged
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position in Tibet’s fierce political and religious competition.537 Moreover, Sonam
Gyatso was looking for chances to build a diplomatic relationship with the Ming, and
Altan Khan had such connections. In retrospect, Altan indeed helped to introduce
Sonam Gyatso to the Ming frontier officials and court ministers afterwards.538
Obviously for a religious leader under heavy political pressure, support from external
sources was always welcome. Therefore, Sonam Gyatso accepted Altan Khan’s
invitation.
Upon hearing this news, Altan Khan began to prepare for the Tibetan monk’s
arrival. On the one hand, from 1574 to 1578, he dispatched in total five groups of
Mongol envoys to greet Sonam Gyatso. Each of them was comprised of hundreds of
envoys, and the last one had more than 3,000 people.539 On the other hand, Altan
Khan sent his fourth son, Bingtu, to the Xihai area to take charge of building a
monastery for Altan Khan to meet Sonam Gyatso. At first, Bingtu planned to build
the monastery at Wuwang Cheng, “the city of five kings” (see Map 5.3). But after a
series of negotiations with the Ming, which I will elaborate on in the next section,
Bingtu at last chose Chabchiyal, a site just to the south of the Qinghai Lake, to build
the monastery. The entire project for the religious complex took around two years,
and many laborers, craftsmen, and architecture materials were provided by the
Ming.540 In 1577 when the construction was done, the Ming also granted a Chinese
name, Yanghua, to the monastery, meaning this monastery symbolized the Mongols’
“admiration for China.”541
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After years of preparation, in 1578, Altan Khan finally met with Sonam Gyatso in
Chabchiyal. It was said that more than one hundred thousand Chinese, Mongol, and
Tibetan believers gathered for the great ceremony.542 During the meeting, Sonam
Gyatso claimed himself to be the reincarnation of Phagpa and Altan Khan the
reincarnation of Qubilai Khan. In this way, he made an analogy that the alliance
between himself and Altan Khan was similar to the time-honored priest-patron
relationship between Phagpa with Qubilai Khan. Meanwhile, Sonam Gyatso gave the
monastery a Tibetan name, rnam par rgyal ba'i phan bde legs bshad gling, which
means “the continent of victorious and blessed teachings.”543 In return, Altan Khan
designated Sonam Gyatso as "Dalai", a Mongol word that means “Ocean.”544 The
meeting by Qinghai Lake was a watershed moment in the history of Mongol-Tibetan
relations, and it reflected the Mongols’ changed perception of the highland region.
Before the 1578 meeting, the highland was nothing more than a shelter to the
Mongols. From an environmental perspective, the area was not very attractive to the
Mongols simply because it was too cold. In 1559, when Altan Khan eliminated the
rebels in the highland and, according to some accounts, was planning to settle for
good, he could not get used to the climate and got sick; thus he went back to Ordos.545
Probably for this reason, the Mongols did not consider the area as a land fit for the
Mongols. As mentioned by Altan Khan himself, Qinghai Lake was where the Han,
Mongol, and Tibetan worlds intersected, meaning that the highland region was an
outside world according to traditional Mongol geographical perception.546
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However, the highland region’s meaning to the Mongols radically changed after the
1578 meeting. It was no longer taken as a cold and dry temporary refuge or foreign
land, but as a religious bridge that connected the Mongols to central Tibet, the sacred
Buddhist realm. Therefore, although Altan Khan did not dwell long in Xihai and soon
returned to the Mongol steppe after the meeting, he left quite a large number of
underlings to stay in the highland region to further consolidate the politico-religious
alliance with the Geluk sect Tibetans.547 Scholars have concluded that it was not until
the Qinghai Lake meeting that a large number of west wing Mongols began to
migrate and settle down in the Xihai area.548 Thus, religion was the primary incentive
for the Mongols to change their perspective on the highland region.

Fig. 6.3: Mongol-patronized Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries from 1574 to 1578549
From the 1570s on, many Mongol activities in the highland were centered around
religious affairs. Fig. 6.3 displays the Tibetan Buddhist monasteries that the Mongols
built or had planned to build from 1574 to 1578. It is clear that other than the
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Wuwang Cheng site, all the other monasteries were constructed near the Qinghai
Lake and, unsurprisingly, all of them were Geluk sect monasteries. In the coming
decades, more monasteries were built in the area, such as Niegongchuan Si and A-wa
Si.550 However, most of them did not leave much of an imprint on history, which is
probably because they were portable monasteries that fit the Mongols’ nomadic
lifestyle better.551 One should also note that in addition to the Geluk sect Tibetan
Buddhism, the Mongols had established a patron-priest relationship with other sects.
Yet because of the Gelugpas’ hegemony in historical narrative, this evidence was
omitted.552 One good example, as pointed out by Elliot Sperling, is that Chöjé Gön, a
Tibetan Buddhist monastery in Dzamtang on the modern-day Sichuan-Tibet frontier
south of the area covered by Fig. 6.3, was also under the patronage of the Mongols
who arrived in the Xihai area in the 1570s. This monastery belonged to the Jonang
sect of Tibetan Buddhism, and its monastic abbot, Gyelwa Senggé, was given
numerous gifts, along with a seal and official documents from Yüngsiyebü dayičing, a
lord of western wing Mongols and also an underling of Altan Khan.553 The scarcity of
existing materials does not allow for a full picture of Mongol patronage of Tibetan
Buddhism in the highland region in the late 16th century, but the Mongols’ intense
religious engagement at the time is quite evident.
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Fig. 6.4: Routes of traversing Ming Territory by Tibetans and Mongols in the 1570s
and 1580s
Yellow: 1574 Mongol itinerary to the Qinghai Lake
Green: 1578 Altan Khan’s round-trip itinerary for the Qinghai Lake Meeting
Blue: Third Dalai Lama’s itinerary from Changdu to Tümed from 1582 to 1584

Religious factors not only played an important role in many Mongols settling down
in the highland and reorganizing of their lifestyle. They also facilitated the
transregional movements of many others in and out of the highland. Fig. 6.4 traces the
Mongols’ cross-regional itineraries from 1574 to 1584. It is clear that the western
wing Mongols in the 1570s, unlike their early 16th century predecessors, did not take a
detour that bypassed Jiayu Pass (Jiayu Guan) to enter the highland. Instead, they cut
through Ming territory directly. Moreover, this traversal was not done by force as they
were before, but with the Ming’s permission under the peace treaty. In 1574, when the
Mongols needed to go through the Ming territory to get to the Qinghai Lake, the
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Ming’s frontier official reluctantly agreed to the requests. Yet he still directed the
Mongols to the less populated frontier region in modern-day Jinchang in order to keep
them away from eastern Gansu, which was considered as part of the Ming
heartland.554 However, several years later, when Altan Khan himself needed to travel
the Qinghai Lake and back, the Khan ignored the regulations and took the most direct
route to cut through Ming territory.555 The reason that the Ming did not overly react to
such actions, other than the fact that Altan Khan was the leader of the western wing
Mongols, was also related to the purpose of the Khan’s trip: the Ming thought that
since the Mongols were about to convert into Buddhism, a religion featuring
benevolence and kindness which could keep the Mongols at peace, a minor violation
of the rules would be tolerable. 556
The loose regulation of religion-related transregional movements was even more
evident in Sonam Gyatso’s trip in the early 1580s, which had a long-lasting effect on
the religious landscape of the highland. In 1582, Altan Khan was terribly sick and
sent Mongol envoys to invite Sonam Gyatso, who by then was already known as the
third Dalai Lama, to go to Tümed to carry out blessing rituals for his well-being. Yet
when the third Dalai Lama arrived at the Qinghai Lake, he received news of Altan
Khan’s demise. Since there was no need to rush anymore, the third Dalai Lama spent
the next two years wandering around the highland region preaching. He attended and
held numerous Buddhist ceremonies, visited many religious sites and Mongol
communities, and helped build several new monasteries.557 From his biography, it is
clear that he frequently traversed the Ming-controlled highland region and yet met no
obstacles. Moreover, many monasteries that the third Dalai Lama visited during this

554

Ming shenzong shilu, juan 3, Longqing 6, month VII, wuxu.
Mingshi, xiyu zhuan, 8547. Xiaoke, “Chelike Han Xixing Qinghai Chuyi,” 5.
556
Gu, Ming Shilu Zangzu Shiliao, 1097-1098.
557
A‘wang luosang jiasuo, Yishi Sishi Dalai Lama Zhuan, 243-245.
555

205
period, such as the Kumbum Monastery and the Youning Monastery, all became the
most important Geluk monasteries in the near future. It is not an exaggeration to say
that because of the support from Altan Khan, modern-day northeast Qinghai became a
stronghold for the Tibetan Buddhist Geluk school by the late 16th century. And that is
most likely why Sonam Gyatso later announced Altan Khan’s grandson as his
reincarnation, the fourth Dalai Lama.
As the Mongols were converting a rebel base into a Buddhist realm after the peace
treaty, the Ming continued its earlier project—building military infrastructure. Taking
the peaceful period as a golden opportunity, the Ming spent great effort to solidify its
defensive fortifications in the region. In the previous decades, as the last section
demonstrated, most military infrastructure the Ming constructed in the area were
fortresses and watching outposts, and border walls were only erected in certain
regions. But after the peace treaty, the Ming could devote more energy and funding to
such projects without worrying about surprise Mongol attacks, leading to what
archeologists describe as the “large-scale construction stage” of border walls in the
region.558 In the 1570s, continuous walls were constructed, especially surrounding the
Xining region in order to protect the most strategically important city in the area from
potential Mongol attacks.
In this regard, we can conclude this examination by noting that while the Mongols’
territorial perception of the highland experienced transformative changes from a
military shelter to a religious landscape, the Ming’s territorial perception of the region
as a military stronghold did not change in essence, only in degree. From the Ming’s
perspective, the Mongols’ transregional movements were not harmful since they were
primarily for religious purposes. By 1580, the Ming did not yet treat the Mongols as
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permanent inhabitants of the highland region, and they thus allowed their traversal of
Ming territory under certain conditions as a friendly gesture after the Ming-Mongol
peace treaty. In the meantime, the Ming continued to emphasize the region’s military
value and built more defensive infrastructure. In the 1570s, the Ming still considered
the highland a region that ought to be closely monitored, but the court was also
willing to see its society remain autonomous. The Ming valued the region’s strategic
importance in the empire’s Mongol diplomacy but gave less attention to the highland
itself and its inhabitants.
Ripping off the Highland
One of the most important results of the 1571 Ming-Mongol treaty was the
normalization of mutual trade. While the Ming interpreted this change in a typical
China-centric tone in which the Mongols submitted to the Ming as a tributary subregime,559 the Mongols depicted it as a moment when the Ming bought peace with
various goods from the Mongols.560 Nevertheless, exchanges of various types of
goods did kick off with increasing volume and frequency after the 1570s.
Despite a game change in Ming-Mongol relations, the Ming side made various
rules to normalize trade. First, trade was confined to just a few appointed markets, and
they were all located around the Ming’s Xuanfu, Datong, and Shanxi frontiers.561
Secondly, no free trade was to take place in the market: the Mongols could only
attend the market periodically, usually once a year, and the trade volume was
technically fixed. Thirdly, each Mongol group was only allowed to trade at its
specifically assigned market, and responsibilities were divided among the Mongol
leaders to regulate the behavior of their underlings.562
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To no one’s surprise, the Mongols were not satisfied with these restrictions.
Therefore, in the early 1570s, they used various tactics to break through the trade
limits. For example, annual trade was quite inadequate for the Mongols. Therefore,
they successfully requested monthly trade from the Ming in certain frontier
markets.563 Moreover, the Mongols managed to convince the Ming to open up new
markets in various places, including the highland region.
At first, the Ming did not plan to establish trade markets in the highland at all. One
official noted that since there were already various indigenous groups, such as Fan
people and Muslims, trading with the Ming in the highland region, allowing the
Mongols to trade there would unnecessarily complicate the situation.564 In contrast,
the Mongols were eager to have markets there. They kept pushing the Ming, even to
the point of making threats, for new trade markets near the highland.565 At last, the
Ming softened its attitude, but only agreed to establish one more market in Ningxia.
In 1574, officials from Ming’s Ministry of War declared: “Markets cannot be set up in
regions to the west of Ningxia. There is nothing to trade.”566 However, this conclusion
was overturned by the Mongols in less than one year.
In 1575, the Mongols successfully persuaded the Ming, if not outright forced, to
open up a new market specifically for those who dwelled in the highland. They were
able to do so because they bundled this trading request with a pledge for monastery
construction, toward which the Ming held a relatively favorable attitude. In 1574,
when Bingtu was first dispatched to the region to build a monastery for the meeting,
he filed a report to the Ming about the forthcoming construction in the highland. The
Ming agreed to the request, arguing that believing in Buddhism was not a bad thing
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for the Mongols. Still, the place that Bingtu picked made the Ming nervous. He
wished to build the monastery at Wuwang Cheng, an open steppe merely 150 miles
away from the Ming’s northwest Sichuan military base.567 Compared to the Ming’s
northern frontier that was heavily consolidated during the previous decades, military
defense in northwest Sichuan was still fragile. Therefore, Sichuan frontier officials
were quite worried about Mongol presence and requested Bingtu to leave. But Altan
Khan, the architect behind Bingyu’s moves, responded that the reason for Bingtu to
linger around at Ming’s Sichuan frontier was that there was no trade market at Gansu,
and the Ningxia market was too far away.568 By phrasing his narrative in this way,
Altan Khan implied that once there was a Gansu trade market, Bingtu would be
immediately recalled.
Some Ming officials at court maintained a pragmatic attitude toward such requests.
Fang Fengshi, for example, was sure that the only reason for Bingtu to hang around
the northwest Sichuan steppe was to give the Ming a certain level of anxiety; it was
unlikely he would lead the troops to enter the deep mountains. For Bingtu, the trade
market in Ningxia was indeed quite far away. Thus, once a functional market within
his reach was opened, his defiant actions would naturally quiet down.569 Zhang
Juzheng, another Ming court minister, agreed with this idea by saying that since the
Fan people were allowed to trade in the highland regions, there was no reason why
the Mongols shouldn’t be allowed to do the same.570 He was quite confident that
various kinds of requests from the reckless Mongols could all be subtly dealt with.
With the support and advocacy of these top-level officials, in 1575, a new market was
established in Biandu Kou, which, according to Zhang Juzheng, was a perfect site for
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mutual trade (Fig. 6.5). It was not too close to Xining where Bingtu could easily
monopolize the trade, and it was also not too far from the Ming territory so that Ming
subjects would not have to take a detour to get to the market.571 The Mongols warmly
welcomed the approval of the Biandu Kou market. From 1576 to 1580, the market
opened once a year, and each time for an entire month.572 According to Li Wenjun,
the trade volume was quite considerable and even comparable to that of the northern
markets for the Ordos Mongols.573

Fig. 6.5: The spatial relationship between Wuwang Cheng and two Ming frontier
markets
From the late 1570s to the early 1580s, as more and more Mongols began to settle
down in the highland, the region’s geopolitical function also began to change. On the
one hand, it remained an important area to solidify the Mongol-Tibetan alliance.
Knowing the importance of tea to the Tibetans, the Mongols in the highland
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frequently asked for tea from the Ming and gave it to the Tibetans as gifts to
consolidate their alliance.574 On the other hand, the region’s economic function
gradually came into play. It changed into a place where many Mongols settled to
make their living. Such a changing role of the highland derived from the increasing
economic independence of highland Mongols from their Ordos compatriots. As
previously mentioned, each Mongol group could only trade at one specific market.
For the highland Mongols, it was the Biandu Kou market per Bingtu’s earlier
request.575 The Ming even announced that all the markets in the northwest frontier
would have the exact same opening and closing dates in case any Mongol group
attempted to commute between different markets for more trading opportunities.576
Therefore, to trade with the Han people for various daily necessities, the Mongols in
the region could only rely on the local land to raise livestock such as horses, instead
of herding them from other regions. To feed themselves, they need to know the local
pastures well in order to raise enough good-quality horses to trade with the Ming. The
relatively higher price for horses at the Biandu Kou Market provided further incentive
for the Mongols to work hard on the land.577 In this vein, the Mongols in the highland
began to pay more attention to the region for the sake of their livelihood instead of
religious reasons.
In 1578 when the meeting between Altan Khan and the third Dalai Lama ended,
many Mongols returned to Ordos with Altan Khan. Yet at the same time, many others
chose to stay in the pastures near the Qinghai Lake and began to treat the highland
region as their new home. In this regard, we see that the nature of the highland in the
eyes of the Mongols changed one more time. The place was transformed from a
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shelter for rebels, to a venue imbued with religious sacredness, to a piece of land on
which make a living. Fom then on, the Mongols in the highland poured in much effort
to make the region prosper.
After 1578, the Mongols who remained in the highland used multiple methods to
benefit from the land. First, they brought more horses to the market regardless of the
fixed trading number set by the Ming. The Ming usually accepted the excess horses to
demonstrate their generosity, warning the Mongols that the fixed quota should be
strictly obeyed, only to pardon their violations again the next time.578 Second, the
Mongols began to sell horses of inferior quality to the Ming. In 1583, a Gansu frontier
commander reported to the court that the horses traded by the Mongols were either
old or too skinny, and these feeble horses often died during military drills.579 Such
situations also existed in frontier markets in the north.580 Third, having one trade
market opened up for them, the Mongols in the highland wished to have more. In
1578, Bingtu requested to establish a market in Taozhou, in addition to Biandu Kou,
for his underlings to trade.581 The Ming rejected his demand. One year later, Altan
Khan himself raised the same request to the Ming, but it is unlikely to have been
successful as there was no records of trade there in the Ming documents.582 In 1584,
Bingtu made the request again and wished to have not only Taozhou, but also Hezhou
as legitimate trade markets.583 Although the Ming did not agree to these demands,
they reflected the highland Mongols’ eagerness to have more trading opportunities
with the Ming.
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The demands that highland Mongols made on the Ming attest to the development of
their communities in the early 1580s. The Mongols gradually became accustomed to
the highland natural environment. Therefore, they were able to increase horse
production. In the meantime, they settled down well and thus needed more daily
necessities which could only be acquired from the Ming. As pointed out by one Ming
official, the Mongols “herd their livestock in the region, produce and raise their
children in the region. Drinking the sweet water and enjoying the rich pasture, these
Mongols begin to treat their northern base as a desert…there were all sorts of things
that exist in the Xihai area but not the north steppe.”584 In the early 1580s, the
Mongols actively exploited the highland region for economic purposes.
As the Mongols grew stronger in the highland, they began to act more aggressively
and even challenged the peace treaty. Some of their reckless behaviors were checked
when Altan Khan was still in power. In 1581, some underlings of Bingtu trespassed
on the Ming territory, murdered several Han civilians, and plundered their property
and livestock. The Ming, instead of going after Bingtu, asked Altan Khan to regulate
his subjects better. With Altan Khan hastening Bingtu for an explanation, Bingtu
eventually apologized and accepted the Ming’s penalty.585 But once Altan Khan
passed away in 1582 and his successor died a mere three years later, the power
dynamics in the highland shifted. In 1586, Altan Khan’s grandson, Namudai Jirüke
Qong Tayiji, nicknamed Cherik (扯力克) in the Ming texts, became the nominal lord
of the western wing Mongols. However, as a relatively young leader, Cherik was not
adequately recognized and thus less capable of keeping all his underlings under
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control.586 Therefore, in the 1580s, the Mongol groups in the highland began to act on
their own.
Various Mongol groups in the highland region deepened their exploitation of the
local land, especially by squeezing its indigenous inhabitants, the Fan people.
Because of the restraints of the Ming-Mongol peace treaty, the Mongols were
technically not allowed to plunder the Han people.587 Moreover, many of them were
worried that raiding the Han people increased the possibility of getting contaminated
of small pox,588 a deadly disease for low-density, non-resistant populations like the
Mongols, but one to which higher-density Chinese populations typically were
resistant since childhood. In comparison, raiding the Fan people was less risky. As
mentioned in the previous chapters, it is clear that the Fan people in the highland
accumulated much wealth in their centuries-long interactions with the Ming through
trade, the tributary system, or simply plunder. Therefore, they became prime targets in
the eyes of the Mongols.589 When Altan Khan was alive, he still had the authority to
stop highland Mongols from plundering the Fan in case it violated the peace treaty.590
Yet as soon as he passed away in 1852, such violent actions resurged.
In the 1580s, the power dynamic between the Mongols and the Fan people in the
highland was tremendously reshaped. Conflicts over pastures were frequent, and
plundering became the most convenient way to acquire daily necessities. In 1583, the
Mongols raided certain Fan communities, murdering and injuring more than 1,000
people and removing more than 4,000 livestock.591 In 1584, eight communities of Fan
people ran to the Ming’s frontier military for protection after being attacked by the
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Mongols.592 Although some Fan groups were courageous enough to fight against
Mongols and even killed some Mongol leaders, many others just ran away.593
According to Li Wenjun, the Fan people who fled from the highland in the late 16th
century migrated toward the east, west, and north, and thus left their fine pastures to
the growing number of Mongols.594
More and more Fan people submitted to and then acknowledged the Mongols’
power. Some formed inter-marriage relationships with the Mongols to keep
themselves safe,595 and others gave up their property.596 The Mongols treated these
new subordinates as resources for extraction. They requested the Fan people to pay
“tianba,” which was a tax in kind of 10% of the grain, livestock and cloth or whatever
they produced.597 Even the Han people scattered in the highland submitted tianba to
the Mongols to buy peace.598 The wealth accumulated through these means
undoubtedly improved the conditions of the highland Mongols. In 1586, some
Mongols went to the Ming’s frontier town to ask for goods, including silk fabrics for
hats, musical instruments such as pipa and guzheng, grapes, leather suitcases, rice,
and wheat. Moreover, they claimed that they wanted hundreds of bags of these items
at the least.599 It seems that the living quality of the Mongols had already greatly
improved as they started to demand opulent goods instead of daily necessities.
Moreover, there are records that the Mongols traded extra horses and other livestock
not only to the Ming, but also Muslims from the west.600 By the late 1580s, the
Mongols had successfully taken root in the highland and prospered.
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While the Mongols gradually converted the highland into a settlement with
compliant subjects and rich resources, the Ming still treated the region and its
inhabitants as part of the barbaric world and therefore did not care so much about its
annexation by the Mongols. On the contrary, they were aware of and even somehow
helped along the Mongols’ penetration of the highland. Receiving reports about the
Mongols’ attack on Fan people, Sheng Shixing, the leading cabinet minister at the
time, suggested to the Ming’s frontier official that “if the Mongols are merely
plundering the raw barbarians, just ready the military as a preparation; but if it is the
Han people and their property that are damaged, then you shall send out the army to
pursue them.”601 Gao Gong, another top-level official even claimed that the Mongols’
attack on the Fan people was quite understandable: “Since we do not want the
Mongols to raid us, it is inhumane to forbid the Mongols from plundering the Fan!”602
Such attitudes certainly emboldened the Mongols to continue exploiting the Fan
people in the highland since they knew where the Ming’s bottom line lay.
Moreover, Ming frontier officials allowed the Mongols to traverse the territory
technically under the Ming’s control to conduct various activities. During Altan
Khan’s time, the so-called “borrowing routes” (借路) were still a form of diplomatic
interaction that involved the circulation of official documents between the Mongol
Khan and the Ming’s top bureaucrats. But over time, traversing the Ming’s territory to
enter the highland gradually evolved from a diplomatic protocol into common
practice.603 On the ground, it was reduced to a custom that the Mongols took as a
natural and normal request, and even the Ming’s frontier military found it no big deal.
The Mongols gradually developed multiple routes to cut through the Ming territory to
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enter the highland.604 Each time, regardless of whether it was for hunting, plundering
the Fan, or other business, the Mongols would find some excuse and ask for rewards
from the Ming. The Ming officials, in comparison, by then had become sluggish due
to the long peace and stopped fixing and building their military infrastructure. They
frequently took bribes from the Mongols for their borrowing route demands and even
prepared banquets for them as long as they did not cause trouble during the journey.605
In the 1580s, the Ming’s attitude toward the highland region was not even comparable
to previous decades when an active defensive policy was in effect. In the 1580s, the
Ming simply did not care about the highland territory or its inhabitants.
From Borderland to Border
In 1588, one high-ranking military commander of Xining, Li Kui, got himself
involved in a Mongol-Fan clash and was eventually killed by the Mongols. The Ming
court officials knew it was primarily Li Kui’s fault as he should have not intervened
in the Mongols’ raiding business, especially while drunk, but such a conflict allows us
to imagine the precarious power dynamics on the ground.606 While the Mongols were
getting increasingly stronger and therefore aggressive, the Ming military were told to
keep their distance from the Mongols and maintain a defensive position. It seems that
the clash between the Mongol forces and the Ming was only a matter of time. This
section examines the Ming-Mongol interactions in the highland in this context. In
particular, I argue that the transformation of the region from a borderland to a border
was one outcome of these clashes.
In the late 1580s, other than Bingtu who was old and soon died, Qolachi (火落赤)
was another powerful Mongol leader in the highland. Following Altan Khan’s order
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to stay in the highland as an intermediary between Mongol and Tibet,607 Qolachi
gradually became powerful after receiving his deceased brother’s underlings.608
Moreover, his name frequently shows up in Ming texts because of, among other
reasons, his pompous personality. Qolachi was quite a character. He not only asked
for the title of “king” from the Ming,609 which previously was granted only to Altan
Khan and his successors, but also publicly announced that he could easily take over
the Ming’s entire northwest frontier if he wanted.610 As a swaggering and ambitious
leader, Qolachi was insatiable and considered the plundering of the Fan people
unsatisfying. Therefore, he invited Cherik to the highland to plan something bigger.611
When Cherik was informed of Qolachi’s plan in 1589, he was still in Ordos. To get
to the highland quickly, Cherik and his wife, who is usually referred as “the third
lady” (三娘子), jointly wrote a letter to the Ming court, asking for permission to
borrow routes and traverse the Ming territory. With a humble tone, the couple raised
three reasons for the request. First, the border clashes that led to Li Kui’s death two
years prior had greatly sabotaged the hard-earned peace between the Ming and
Mongols, and the couple desired to go and tackle the conflict as soon as possible.
Second, the western wing Mongols were recently attacked by the Oirads in the west,
and thus Cherik needed to traverse the Ming territory to lead the punitive expedition.
Third, the third Dalai Lama had recently passed away while he was preaching in the
Mongol steppe. Therefore, Cherik needed to escort his ashes back to Tibet for
Buddhist rituals. Believing these requests reasonable, Cherik asked for some subsidies
from the Ming and pledged to keep the trade market functional during his absence.612
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Despite there being no consensus in the Ming court,613 the Mongol Khan was
eventually granted permission.614 Later that year, Cherik and his underlings arrived at
the Yanghua Monastery.
Knowing that Cherik had arrived in the highland, Qolachi was quite excited. It was
said that he even paid daily visits to Cherik’s tent to discuss various matters.615 Soon,
Cherik began to dispatch troops, prepare boats to cross the Yellow River, and claim
that he was going to mount a large-scale raid in the area.616 In 1590, the Mongols
began to attack the Ming’s highland frontier, especially Taozhou and Songpan. The
Ming border troops tried to defend their territory but were met with a disastrous
defeat: they lost dozens of battles, in which several high-ranking military
commanders were killed, including one called Li Lianfang who enjoyed great
reputation both in the court and among the local troops. The frontier crisis greatly
shocked the Ming Emperor Wanli, who immediately requested a detailed report from
grant minister Sheng Shixing to find a solution.617 From then on, just as Emperor
Wanli reminded Sheng Shixing, “We should not please the barbarians any more,”618
the Ming began to revise its defensive policy, claiming that it was time to “cut off the
barbarian’s right arm.”619 After the 1590 frontier crisis, with its “right arm” becoming
stronger, the Ming decided to turn to military actions for a solution.
To solve the highland Mongol issue once and for all, the Ming assigned Zheng Luo
(鄭洛), the supreme commander of the Xuanfu and Datong military districts, to be the
superintendent of the western frontier region.620 Once Zheng Luo arrived at the
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highland, he noticed that the Mongols had become rampant in the highland for two
reasons: they came and went through the Ming territory freely, and their exploitation
of the indigenous Fan people was unrestrained.621 This points to the Ming’s lack of
attention to both the highland and its inhabitants. It was the Ming’s loose attitude in
previous decades toward various transregional movements in the highland, especially
in the context of the Mongol-Tibetan alliance, which resulted in a series of frontier
crises. Therefore, Zheng Luo devised a three-step plan to take the region back from
the Mongol control: checking the Mongols’ transregional movements, taking back
control over the highland inhabitants, and eliminating the Mongols’ influence in the
region.
Zheng Luo first issued strict control over the “borrowing routes” requests through
which the Mongols wished to traverse the Ming’s Gansu territory to enter the
highland. He pointed out that the recent chaos caused by Qolachi and other Mongol
leaders could be traced back to the permission they received to cut through Ming
territory to get to the highland. It was because of the Ming’s loose control over such
requests that the Mongols were able to conceal themselves in the highland and
covetously exploit the region.622 Therefore, from then on, they could only take the
detour from the Jiayu Pass if they needed to go to the highland. Ming territory was not
open to their passage anymore. If they insisted on forcing their way through, serious
consequence awaited them.623 Obviously not all Mongol leaders were intimidated by
Zhang Luo’s warning; when a Mongol figurehead named Bushitu attempted to muscle
his way through, Zheng Luo dispatched a heavy army to attack the Mongols and
drove them away.624
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While those who wished to enter the highland were forbidden to do so, those who
left the highland could still borrow the routes from the Ming.625 In fact, Zheng Luo
wished to see more Mongols leave the region, particularly Cherik. Zheng Luo knew
that the arrival of Cherik had invigorated the highland Mongols and fueled their
aggressive actions. Therefore, he decided to force Cherik to leave the highland first.
In the beginning, Zheng Luo informed Cherik that if he continued to linger in the
highland, the court rewards for him would be suspended, and the frontier market
where his subjects acquired their daily necessities would be closed.626 Cherik did not
care. He even began to lobby other Mongol leaders to break with the Ming.627 Seeing
that threats of cutting off the Mongol’s economic supply did not work, Zheng Luo
turned to political means to regulate them. He wrote Cherik a letter and informed him
of the possibility of granting more Mongol leaders the title of “king.”628 This made
Cherik nervous because it would sabotage his prestige if other Mongol leaders were
upgraded from Cherik’s underlings to his equals. Cherik weighed the political
situation and eventually decided to go back to Ordos. He did not want to risk his
political privilege for some meager plunder. Qolachi, undoubtedly, was strongly
against Cherik’s departure ideas. He knew that the Mongol leader’s leave would
greatly weaken the highland Mongols, and therefore he “frequently went to Cherik’s
tent and used one hundred ways to persuade him to stay, including his big plan to take
over the Ming’s entire highland frontier.”629 But Cherik still left later that year, a
move that Ming officials commented was a result of the “Ming’s king-changing
plans.”630
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Dividing the highland Mongols by convincing Cherik to leave, Zheng Luo wished
to further weaken them by winning the Fan people back. As the previous section
points out, the Ming gave away the Fan people as one way to keep the Mongols from
raiding Ming’s frontier subjects. Considering the disappointment of the Fan people
when treated by the Ming generals in this way, it is unsurprising to see that numerous
Fan people began to work for the Mongols against the Ming. Fan spies who were
helping the Mongols were frequently captured by the Ming soldiers. In another
memorial, Zheng Luo notes that the Fan people even made up more than half of the
Mongol forces in the highland.631 It became clear to Zheng Luo that duly handling the
Fan people would be decisive for his overall strategy to settle the troubles caused by
the highland Mongols.
Many civil officials in the frontier also raised their opinions in support of
embracing the highland Fan people for the sake of weakening the Mongols. Overall, it
was widely believed that there were many benefits for doing so. First, the scholars
argued that the policy went along with the conventional geopolitical strategy: the
enemy of my enemy is my friend. The Ming could take advantage of the clashes
between the Fan and the Mongols and therefore weaken the Mongol threat. Once the
Fan became stronger with the support of the Ming, the Mongols’ rampant actions in
the highland would die down as well. Second, improving the relationship with the Fan
could result in a constant supply of leather, meat, dairy products, and timber to the
Ming’s frontier society, which were military and daily necessities that were
previously confiscated by the Mongols. Third, being friendly and protecting the Fan
from Mongol exploitation would play an important role in the long-running process of
converting them into the Ming’s formal subjects, which would be vital for the Ming to
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secure the frontier.632 To comply with these ideas, Zheng Luo devised the plan of
“pacifying the Fan, welcoming the Fan, and encouraging the Fan.”633 He believed that
the Fan was an underestimated group whose hatred toward the Mongols should be
made full use of to weaken the Mongols’ power in the highland.
Collecting suggestions from his civil advisors, Zheng Luo began to use multiple
methods to foster intimacy with the highland Fan people. For example, he promised
rich material rewards of tea, grain, and cloth for those who fought the Mongols or
stole their horses for the Ming.634 Also, he agreed to provide materials and labor to
build defensive fortresses for the Fan communities and offered military protection.635
It was said that with his proactive policy, more than 80,000 Fan people from nearly
two hundred highland communities submitted to the Ming in the first several years of
the 1590s. Even many alleged raw barbarians deserted from the Mongols’ control and
subordinated themselves to the Ming.636 To the people at the time, this was an
accomplishment that could pacify the region for at least another half-century.637
While the Ming texts highly praise Zheng Luo’s efforts in appealing to the Fan
people and thus successfully encouraging them to break their alliance with the
Mongols, I argue that what is depicted is more propaganda than objective picture and
may be inaccurate in certain ways. What really took place in the highland is most
likely enhanced Ming control over the indigenous Fan people through coercive
actions with military intervention. Close surveillance, control over material goods,
and forced conscription were all very likely measures adopted by the Ming’s frontier
military to cut off the Fan people’s contact with the Mongols. Moreover, the 80,000
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Fan people’s submission is also not likely to be a factual number. Instead, it is highly
possible that eighty communities surrendered to the Ming, and these communities’
leaders all received official titles of chiliarch (千户) from the Ming, and the numbers
were taken from their nominal command number. If they were really converted into
the Ming’s subjects, there should have vastly more records attesting to the fact.
Nevertheless, local gazetteers indicate that after the Ming army’s active campaigns,
some Fan communities migrated to the east toward the Ming territory and began to
submit horses to the Ming yearly;638 others, once submitted to the Ming, experienced
what was literally called “opening up the community” under the command of Zheng
Luo.639 These changes on the ground, if not understood as stemming from the Fan
people’s volition, should be interpreted as a form of social categorization and
jurisdictional registration forcefully imposed by the Ming. The purpose of these
measures was to tighten the Ming’s control over the Fan communities so as to weaken
the Mongols and avoid the appearance of a real border crisis.
A similar gap between the Ming’s politically charged narrative and what really
happened on the ground existed in other parts of the highland as well. In northwest
Sichuan, when the indigenous Fan people attempted rebellion and were suppressed by
the Ming in the 1580s, we also see narratives of a certain pattern that are riddled with
China-centric discourses: the non-Han people surrendered to the Ming’s mighty
military power, petitioned to have the Ming’s mercy, received Chinese surnames,
learned the Han-Chinese language, adopted the Chinese dressing style, and wished to
be the Ming’s subjects.640 Modern scholars often deem these records biased because
they were written by Chinese officials and thus by nature had a Sino-centric
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inclination. However, putting their cultural aspect aside, I argue the much more
important and less exaggerated content in such records reflects the changing political
identity of the Fan people from the Ming’s dependents into the Ming’s subjects. In
northwest Sichuan, the Fan people were incorporated into the late Ming grassroots
administrative system, the baojia system.641 In eastern Qinghai and southern Gansu,
they became the Ming’s “ears, eyes, and wings” to fight with the Mongols.642
In Zheng Luo’s understanding, the Mongols grew rampant in the highland for two
reasons: they came and went through the Ming territory freely and their exploitation
of the indigenous Fan people went unrestrained.643 Adopting multiple methods, Zheng
Luo checked these two issues to a certain degree by the early 1590s. In the meantime,
Zheng Luo also attempted to convert a highland with dense Mongol characteristics
into a region culturally influenced by the Ming, especially in the religious aspect.
When Zheng Luo turned his attention to the highland Mongols, Qolachi attracted
much of his focus. What prompted Zheng Luo to take action was Qolachi’s attempt to
build a huge monastery quite close to the Ming’s territory. Qolachi himself was a
devoted Tibetan Buddhist practitioner. When the third Dalai Lama bypassed the
highland in 1584 to go to Ordos for the ritual after Altan Khan’s death, he stayed in
Qolachi’s lands and enjoyed his warm hospitality.644 In 1587, Qolachi wrote to the
Ming to ask for materials and labor to build a monastery in his domain but was
rejected.645 In addition to religious reasons, Qolachi must have already noticed the
political functions of such religious sites: they could not only boost Qolachi’s
personal prestige, but also attract many potential able-bodied men to gather together.
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In 1590, as Qolachi frequently attacked Ming towns and fortresses, he decided to
build a monastery on his own and chose a place just outside the Ming’s military zone.
With this religious complex as a stronghold, Qolachi intended to construct a politicalreligious center to ground his control over the region and further his challenge of the
Ming.
To prepare for the construction, Qolachi sent one of his sons to the nearby
mountains in the Ming’s Sichuan province to collect timber. Source indicate that in
total the Mongols cut down tens of thousands of huge trees and piled them at the
construction site waiting for the project to kick off.646 Informed of Qolachi’s plan, the
Ming was quite anxious as the monastery would gather many Mongols, just as the
Yanghua Monastery did, and it would expose the entire region to Qolachi.647 Zheng
Luo decided to eliminate the threat before it sprouted. In 1590, when the Mongols
were preparing for the seasonal movement and Qolachi was away, Zheng Luo
dispatched a small number of Ming troops to sneak into the construction site under
the cover of dark and set fire to the timber supply the Mongols had gathered. With the
help of a heavy wind, all the construction materials burned up as the Mongols were
unable to put out the fire.648
Having successfully destroyed the unfinished monastery and thus considerably
weakened Qolachi, Zheng Luo had a clear idea of the Tibetan Buddhist monasteries’
geopolitical importance to the highland Mongols. Therefore, he further planned to
have the Yanghua Monastery, a site of much greater geopolitical and religious
significance, burned down as well. Because the Yanghua Monastery was nominally
under the Ming’s patronage, Zheng Luo sent a memorial to the Ming court before
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making a move. He argued that the Mongol threat in the highland had grown bigger
and bigger. They came to the highland and settled down in the name of Buddhist
pilgrimage, but their true purpose was to subordinate the local Fan people. Yanghua
Monastery was the deepest root of all these problems. If they wished to solve the
Mongol problems in the the highland, the monastery must be torn down.649 With a
determined tone, Zheng Luo claimed that destroying Yanghua Monastery was critical.
The Ming court granted him permission. In 1591, Zheng Luo dispatched a large army
for a surprise attack on the Yanghua Monastery, set the entire religious complex on
fire, and defeated the Mongols who came to save the monastery. Successfully
destroying the stronghold of the highland Mongols, Zheng Luo was ecstatic and even
wrote several poems to commemorate his success.650 The loss of the Yanghua
Monastery was a major blow to the highland Mongols, resulting in their low morale
as well as a series of defeats in the ensuing clashes with the Ming.651
Having Zheng Luo burn down the Tibetan Buddhist monasteries controlled by the
Mongols, the Ming did not leave a religious vacuum in the highland. Instead, it filled
the void by portraying itself as a legitimate patron of Tibetan Buddhism. The most
typical example came from the Zhenzhu Monastery of Guide (贵德珍珠寺). In 1597,
an inscription was carved onto a stone tablet in the monastery. Quite strangely, as
pointed out by Chen Qinying and Ma Lin, the content of the inscription seems to have
nothing to do with the monastery itself: it is completely concerned with the history of
one Buddhist statue of Shakyamuni preserved in contemporaneous Beijing.652 The
inscription begins with Buddhism’s early history when the statue was claimed to have
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been made. Then, it describes how the statue circulated to and within China over time
and arrived at the Jiufeng Monastery in Beijing some 2,580 years after its original
casting. Throughout the text, there is not even one word about Buddhist developments
in either Tibet or Mongol, not to mention the highland region or Zhenzhu Monastery.
In that case, why was it carved on a Zhenzhu Monastery stone tablet?
Chen Qinying and Ma Lin, the scholars that first studied the stone tablet, argue that
this inscription indicates the Ming military’s attempt to foster good relations with the
Fan people during the series of military campaigns in the 1590s against the highland
Mongols.653 This is undoubtedly a correct observation. However, I wish to push the
analysis one step further. I argue that the inscription not only serves the pragmatic
needs of the Ming military, but also more importantly demonstrates the Ming court’s
wish to exert influence over the religious realm of the highland following the
diminution of the Mongols’ patronage over Tibetan Buddhism and the destruction of
the Yanghua Monastery. Highlighting the sacredness of Beijing, the Ming capital,
served this goal because the Shakyamuni statue was the embodiment of religious
legitimacy.
Controlling the inhabitants and penetrating the religious realm on the frontier, the
Ming also tried to exploit the highland for material resources. By the final years of the
16th century, the Ming had already taken back control over the highland and begun to
make full use of its productive capacity. In 1596, a Ming official discovered an iron
mine near the northern mountain of Xining and set up an iron mill there.654
Previously, the Xining region alone would require 7,500 jin of iron yearly, and it all
had to be shipped in from Xi’an several hundreds of miles away.655 But the discovery
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of the iron mine allowed the Ming to extract natural resources locally in the highland.
The official allocated 400 soldiers to build two furnaces and dozens of dorms and
offices at the foot of the mountain. All the timber could be acquired from the nearby
mountain, and all the iron production was used to make weapons for the highland
Ming army.656
In the 1590s, due to the changing geopolitical situation, the Ming decided to revise
its loose attitude toward territorial crossing in the highland. More attention was paid
to the highland’s territoriality and its inhabitants. By the end of the decade, as the
Ming put more and more restraints over the movement of people, goods, and
information, the highland transformed from a borderland into a border.
Summary
This chapter charts the conflict between the Ming and Mongol forces over the
highland from the mid- to the late 16th century. In the first several decades, the
Mongols consistently demonstrated the greater will toward the highland. Using the
highland for refuge, religious pilgrimage, and their livelihood, the Mongols facilitated
a complex and constant flow of people, goods, and religious ideas across the highland
region. The Ming, in contrast, remained passive in the face of these movements. In
one respect, this was a continuation of the Ming’s general attitude toward the
highland in the previous centuries, but it was also a result of the Ming- Mongol peace
treaty. Such a defensive stance only shifted in the last decade of the century when the
Mongols’ movements in the region had spiraled out of control and evolved into a
frontier crisis for the Ming. With a series of military campaigns, the Ming drove the
Mongols away and also put an end to the transregional movements in the highland
that had lasted for centuries.
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One important historical theme this chapter illustrates is a borderland’s
transformation into a border as territory-crossing gradually diminished. Unchecked
movement characterizes a borderland. With the termination of such mobility, a
borderland featuring open access morphed into a border where accessibility was
strictly regulated. Through the negotiation revolving around various territorial
perceptions, this chapter suggests the correlation between a regime of mobility and
the essence of a frontier society. With the Mongols’ withdrawal from the highland
and the Ming’s redefinition of the region as a zone not to be trespassed, an uncharted
land finally became part of Ming empire’s territory.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion

This project examines the turbulent history of China’s northwest Inner Asian
highland from 1368 to 1600. Competing visions, as both a historical phenomenon and
a conceptual tool, highlight the fluid nature of the highland and its bridging role in
transregional geopolitics. Straddling different geopolitical units, the highland was a
convergence zone for the constant flow of people, goods, and knowledge. While
movements in and through the highland encompassed not only geographic shifts but
also socioeconomic, religious-political, and environmental exchange, the meaning of
the highland changed accordingly in the eyes of different social groups. This
dissertation examines how communities, commodities, and information in motion led
to various forms of encounter in the highland and how such encounters were initiated,
regulated, and perceived. Simply put, it asks how these competing visions over the
highland shaped the cultural connotations and social landscape of the highland world.
Through the activities of five types of historical actors—namely Ming emperors,
highland lords, Tibetan Buddhist monks, Ming deserted soldiers, and Mongol riders—
this project takes the highland as a geographical and analytical unit of study in its own
right. Repositioning the highland in the transregional interactions in the East and
Inner Asian world, this dissertation points out that various ideas and designs for the
highland shaped, and were shaped by, the highland’s basic path of historical
development.
Changes in the Highland from 1368 to 1600
Stretching through modern-day southern Gansu, eastern Qinghai, and western
Sichuan, the highland is a mountainous upland that connects the Chinese heartland to
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the Tibetan Plateau. In the mid-14th century, as a result of its steep terrain and harsh
environment, the highland was only sparsely populated. However, the power
dynamics in the broader East and Inner Asian spheres redefined the geopolitical role
of the region. From the late 14th century on, Chinese troops were dispatched to the
highland to guard the Ming empire’s western frontier and secure its diplomatic
interaction with the Tibetan world, while Tibetans entered the area from the west as a
result of the eastward movement of Islam. The pouring of outsiders into the highland
extensively reshaped the economic and social structure of the region. While the
hegemony of the highland’s indigenous lords gradually faded out, Tibetan Buddhist
forces rose to power, infiltrated, and took root in the highland, significantly
reconfiguring the highland’s religious landscape and its relationship with the Ming’s
political center.
While the highland remained a non-Chinese realm in the 15th century, it was
increasingly pulled into the Ming’s imperial orbit since the 16th century. The Mongol
civil war resulted in a large-scale Mongol migration into the highland and thus posed
a threatening frontier crisis for the Ming empire. In response, the Ming began to adopt
a proactive frontier policy toward the highland. By constructing more military
infrastructure and dispatching more soldiers to the highland, the Ming was able to
mitigate the human trafficking of captured Ming soldiers that prevailed in the
highland. Yet as the number of Ming soldiers stationed in the highland increased, the
desertion rate also surged. The relocation and ultimate settlement of many Ming
soldiers in the highland changed the ethnic constitution of the highland population. As
more and more Mongols frequently traversed the Ming-controlled Hexi Corridor and
entered the highland, the region’s strategic value in regional geopolitics also changed.
While for the Mongols, it changed from a military shelter, to a religious realm, and
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finally to a resourceful settlement, the Ming empire began to view the highland as an
indispensable border instead of a semi-autonomous borderland. By the end of the 16th
century, the highland region had already transformed from an uncharted middle
ground where the East and Inner Asian worlds interacted to an outpost on which the
Ming empire relied to regulate Inner Asian influences.
Competing Visions for the Highland
Though traditionally left out of master narratives, the highland obliges a scholarly
revisiting of early modern borderland spaces. This dissertation employs “competing
visions” as an analytical framework and addresses the following questions: How,
when, and why did various social groups became interested in the highland? How
were their actions in the highland initiated, conceptualized, and managed? And what
were their practical ramifications? With diverse communities flocking into the
highland with their languages, religions, commodities, and forms of knowledge in
tow, the region became a place where customs, rules, and ideas were reconceptualized. By unpacking this process, this dissertation highlights the complexity
of social interactions, the fluidity of borderland spaces, and the volatility of regional
geopolitics.
On the multidimensionality of encounters: “Competing visions” serves as a
microscope that reveals the multi-faceted nature of certain historical phenomenon.
Exchanges of material goods in the tributary system, for instance, have been treated as
a mechanism through which Chinese dynasties bridled frontier regimes. Yet from
those who were recognized as tribute payers in Chinese sources, such interactions
meant differently. Tea, in the eyes of Ming people, was a life-sustaining daily
necessity for the highland inhabitants. But in the highland, tea was not only a
commodity, but also served as tokens for the brokering of political alliances, an

233
excuse for territorial expansion, and a catalyst for the (re)creation of social relations.
As the exchange of tea encompassed a wide array of activities such as gift giving, tax
collection, tribute payment, and long-distance movements, the highland setting
highlights material aspects of tea that are less visible in most historical accounts.
Another example is the movement of people throughout the highland. While many
able-bodied men were dispatched to the region as Ming frontier soldiers, they were
reduced to goods that indigenous leaders of highland communities captured for
ransom or sold as slaves. In other scenarios, these Ming soldiers were treated as
valuable military guides and spies by the Mongols or potential religious converts in
the eyes of Tibetan Buddhist monks. The encounters in the highland demonstrate the
broad range of the connotations of specific materials or behaviors in a borderland
society.
On the fluidity of borderland space: Fluidity is one of the very essences of premodern borderland spaces. Straddling distinct geographical units and bridging
multiple cultural and political spheres, the highland was a space where the
connotation of certain categorical labels, such as religion and ethnicity, became
contingent and flexible. As Tibetan Buddhist monks actively preached in the highland
and converted many Ming subjects, the emperors found it difficult to regulate these
monastic practices. There were no criteria to decide what being a Tibetan Buddhist
entailed since inter-religious conversion was common and religious practices often
transcended ethnic and lingual boundaries. Similar dilemmas applied to ethnicity.
Although ethnic segregation was technically implemented in the highland society, it
had little impact on the ground. As different groups of people comingled in the
highland society, rigid labels based on supposed ethnic features such as Han, Fan, and
Qiang could no longer reflect the reality in flux. Distinctions between social
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categories were porous and contextual. The encounters of multiple variables made the
highland society a conglomeration where everything was deconstructed, mingled, and
reconstructed. It was such practical transformations that oftentimes nullified idealized
lines of distinction, separation, inclusion, or exclusion that were usually imposed by
alleged political centers.
On power dynamics of regional geopolitics: As middle ground for transregional
social and economic interactions in peacetime and battlefields when geopolitical
powers scrambled for supremacy, pre-modern borderland spaces were epicenters of
geopolitical vicissitudes. This dissertation takes the highland as a lens to examine the
mechanics of East and Inner Asian diplomacy. Previous scholarship has mainly taken
up the tributary framework, a top-level orientation to study transregional interactions,
but focused less on how exactly such interactions were carried out on a day-to-day
basis. This dissertation, in contrast, investigates how cross-regional interactions were
perceived, regulated, and contested in the highland, a process that enables analysis of
on-the-ground geopolitical negotiations among the Chinese, Mongols, and Tibetans.
Competing for hegemony became a touchstone for these regimes’ political capacities,
and the contestation revealed how different regimes measured the strategic value of
the highland. But even though the outside powers attempted to infiltrate the highland,
in reality it was oftentimes the highland inhabitants who decided how to define the
region. The uncertainty and flexibility of the highland challenged familiar historical
interpretations of concepts such as loyalty, rulership, and sovereignty in pre-modern
Eurasian geopolitics and also pointed out the limitations of these imperial powers.
Highland as an in-between Region
Pre-modern borderland spaces were contested zones in geopolitics and, to some
degree, could be even more charged than their modern counterparts demarcated by
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well-defined territories and sovereignty. The highland was only one such hot spot in
the interaction between China and Inner Asia. It was Ming China’s outpost for laying
claim over the Silk Road and was also the bridging point for the formation of a
Tibetan-Mongol alliance. Encounters at this crossroads were transformative in both
scale and scope. On the one hand, macroregional geopolitical crises in Ming-Mongol
relations had various effects on the highland, such as escalating tension over natural
resources and territory and the erection of defensive walls. On the other hand,
seemingly trivial skirmishes could entirely reshuffle geopolitical power balances on a
great scale as the death of a single military commander might be the last straw that led
to a complete redirection of geopolitics. As the highland itself transformed from an
uncharted territory into a crowded intersection, its role in geopolitics also evolved
from an indifferent margin to a decisive key point.
How can a research project on a continental inland region contribute to the field of
frontier studies? This dissertation emphasizes the importance of revising the current
paradigm of frontier studies and promotes a comparative framework. I have argued
that the framework of “competing visions” can shed new light on important historical
phenomenon such as migration and diaspora or travel and cultural encounter.
Moreover, the approach I have outlined gives scholars an opportunity to revisit
assumptions that have characterized early modern Chinese societies as ethnically
charged or socially static. Meanwhile, it has comparative potential for parallel studies
on China’s interaction with the southwest Zomia highland, southeast Asian maritime
world, or Inner Asia through the Silk Road. These themes, together with the subaltern
whose silence this project has endeavored to unmute, enables this project to appeal to
a broader audience.

236
The conventional center-frontier framework has proven inadequate for studying the
history of crossroads. Interpreting the highland as either a passive frontier subject to
imperial annexation or a resilient local society resisting top-down imposition still does
not fully break away from the binary framework. Therefore, this dissertation has
examined the region on its own terms. Due to its distance from various geopolitical
centers, the highland society was not restrained by any political principle or cultural
tradition. Power balances in the region were diffuse and fragile, and human actions
were not determined according to concepts like settlement and permanence. This
dissertation frames a narrative in which the highland society is not passively
mobilized for various regimes’ ends, but shown to have significantly bent the
instruments of outside regimes to its own will through its own agency. In this regard,
the “frontier” in fact initiated geopolitical changes, fulfilling the traditional function
of the “center,” while the metropole became the passive recipient of such changes.
This dissertation argues that the notion of the “frontier” as a conceptual tool
peripheralizes alleged border zones and their roles in history-making. However, it was
the “frontier” that shaped the nature of the “center,” not vice-versa. By portraying the
historical process by which the “frontier” developed on its own terms while the
seeming center was at best one of many forces in this “frontier,” and by eschewing
the predominant center-frontier framework which silences those who inhabited the
periphery, I contextualize my dissertation within postcolonial subaltern studies.
The highland serves as a fine reference for comparative studies. On one hand, it
resembles other upland regions such as the southwest Asian Zomia, as these specific
terrains all created societies of identity fluidity, cultural hybridity, cross-regional
connectivity, and indigenous ingenuity. On the other hand, the perspective of
transregional movements allows this dissertation to open a dialogue with Oceanic
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studies. Oceans, as spaces away from landlocked centralizations of power, have
always been spheres where the driving force for transformative exchanges, transfers,
and interactions is not so much state imperatives as it is what happens on the ground.
As the analytical concept of “competing visions” reveals nuances embedded in the
process of material exchange, knowledge circulation, and people’s movement that are
otherwise lost, erased, or silenced, it provides a fine lens through which to see how
geographical/spatial “in-betweens” created opportunities for new and different
interactions. In this vein, this dissertation breaks new ground in a broader sense
concerning borderland society and pre-modern macroregional geopolitical interaction.
Highland in the China-Tibet impasse: Past and Present
Contemporary political disputes can hamper historical research, especially that on
borders, nationalism, ethnicity, and religion. This is especially the case in studies of
the Chinese-Tibetan relationship. The field has been at an academic impasse primarily
due to political constraints. While some scholars draw on Chinese-language materials
to claim China’s absolute sovereignty over Tibet throughout history, others,
referencing Tibetan primary sources, assert that the historically independent plateau
was only recently annexed and colonized by the communist Chinese regime in the
1950s. Such politically charged disagreements not only tremendously affect academic
discourse, but also cast a shadow over the daily lives and mentality of highland
inhabitants whose in-between position brings them under suspicion and pressure from
both sides.
This dissertation pushes beyond these divisions by excavating the livelihood, logic,
and perspectives of an understudied society. It argues that an examination of the
highland on its own provides new insight into the dynamic process of how
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contemporary disputes have taken shape and how historical actors have dealt with
such political tension.
First, studying the history of the highland can help us better understand Ming China
and Tibet from the 14th to the 16th century. For the Ming empire, the highland region
was its Achilles’ heel that represented the bitterness embedded in its empire-building
process. The Ming empire indeed created a system in favor of the borderland’s
livelihood. However, to cope with the ever-changing situation on the ground, the
Ming had to keep updating and tailoring its imperial policy. Such constant adaptation
became a significant component of its empire-building process. In this regard, the
highland exemplifies the predicaments that imperial China had to grapple with. Its
endeavor to construct a multi-ethnic universal empire inadvertently helped to
establish the grounds for a separatist consciousness among its frontier subjects. The
extension of the state apparatus eventually backfired and created a huge political
burden for the empire.
Examining the social dynamics of the highland also allows for a revisit of the
nationalist framework that dominates Tibetan history studies. In the historiography of
Tibetology, the highland has always been seen as the eastern periphery that only
receives influence, particularly in the religious manner, from central Tibet. This
Lhasa-centric view greatly underestimates the variety of social structures in the Great
Tibetan world. Unlike other Tibetan regions such as Bhutan or central Tibet where
secular rulers were subordinate to the ecclesiastical forces, in the highland region, the
hegemony resided in the authority of lay figureheads but not in the religious clergy.
Such reversed power dynamics enabled a reconsideration of the effectiveness of
Tibet’s religious sovereignty claim, and more importantly, opens the door for another
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type of historical narrative that is different from the conventional heavily religioncharged history.
Understanding the history of the highland as an indispensable part of the ChineseTibetan borderland helps to situate the Chinese-Tibetan relationship in a historical
context. By tracing the structuring process of the Chinese-Tibetan relationship, this
project suggests that the bilateral relationship hovered somewhere at the intersection
of suzerainty, sovereignty, political alliance, and diplomatic rivalry. A fixed definition
is hard to pin down because this relationship contingently shifted from one mode to
another. In this regard, taking up the perspective of the highland society allows for an
illuminating exploration of how, when, and why the Chinese-Tibetan relationship
changed and thus situates supposedly ahistorical political disputes in their historical
context.
Current disagreements on sovereignty and mutually exclusive historical
interpretations obscure the position of the highland society in relation to both China
and Tibet. Following an ontological turn to excavate the livelihood, logic, and
perspectives of the highland inhabitants, this project illuminates how contemporary
disputes have taken shape and how historical actors dealt with political tension. In this
regard, the borderland perspective has the potential to immunize academic projects
that have been infected by political wrangles. By eschewing the predominant nationstate framework which silences those who inhabited the periphery, this project is a
probing interrogation of what it means to have political subjectivity, to be able to
access the state apparatus, and to have one’s voice be heard in history.
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